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The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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(1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.details
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Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.details
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(1 other version)The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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(1 other version)Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.details
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Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.details
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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.details
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The mind as the software of the brain.Ned Block - 1990 - In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Visual cognition. 2. MIT Press. pp. 377-425.details
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The epistemic significance of experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:947-67.details
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Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.details
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The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Varieties of externalism.J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.details
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The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.details
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Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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Sensible Over-Determination.Umrao Sethi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):588-616.details
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Pressing the flesh: A tension in the study of the embodied, embedded mind.Andy Clark - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):37–59.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.details
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Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.details
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The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading.Joel Smith - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):274-293.details
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Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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Type 2 blindsight and the nature of visual experience.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.details
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(1 other version)Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 261-276.details
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Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.details
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Philosophical foundation of the right to mental integrity in the age of neurotechnologies.Andrea Lavazza & Rodolfo Giorgi - 2023 - Neuroethics 16 (1):1-13.details
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Color and the duplication assumption.Erik Myin - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):61-77.details
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What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time.Akiko M. Frischhut - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):143-155.details
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Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
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Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Against representationalism.David Papineau - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347.details
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A Theory of Epistemic Supererogation.Han Li - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):349-367.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):475-513.details
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