- What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Offences and defences: selected essays in the philosophy of criminal law.John Gardner - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism.Keith DeRose - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.details
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423-428.details
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Hawthorne on knowledge and practical reasoning.T. M. Crisp - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):138-140.details
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On Reasons and Epistemic Rationality.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):326-330.details
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Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.details
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The knowledge Norm for assertion.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):1-20.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.details
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Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.details
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Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion and practical reasoning : common or divergent epistemic standards?Jessica Brown - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.details
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Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.details
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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.details
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Reasons: Explanations or Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):31-56.details
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Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.details
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Excuses, moral and legal: a comment on Marcia Baron’s ‘excuses, excuses’.R. A. Duff - 2007 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.details
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The realm of reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Anti-intellectualism and the knowledge-action principle. [REVIEW]Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180–187.details
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Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle.Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.details
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Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.details
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Having reasons and the factoring account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.details
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Knowledge Norms and Assessing Them Well.Dustin Locke - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):80-89.details
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