- How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.details
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The Ignorance Norm and Paradoxical Assertions.Elise Woodard - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):321-332.details
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(1 other version)Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - 2024 - Episteme 21 (2):644-667.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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(1 other version)Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - 2022 - Episteme:1-24.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):341-396.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):25-46.details
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On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.details
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Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.details
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Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Mind 133 (531):651-676.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism.Matthew Chrisman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225-254.details
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Epistemic intuitions.Jennifer Nagel - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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Epistemic Focal Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41-61.details
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Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
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Much at stake in knowledge.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):729-749.details
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Socially extended knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):939-958.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Navigating Skepticism: Cognitive Insights and Bayesian Rationality in Pinillos’ Why We Doubt.Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):1-20.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes).Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1461-1481.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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Knowledge and implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.details
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Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism.Jumbly Grindrod, James Andow & Nat Hansen - 2017 - Mind and Language (2):1-25.details
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Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear.Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith - 2022 - Abingdon, England: Routledge.details
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Pragmatism, truth, and cognitive agency.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1811-1824.details
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A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.details
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Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Motivated contextualism.David Henderson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.details
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The knowledge Norm for assertion.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.details
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Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.details
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Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):465-476.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.details
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