- Reflective epistemological disjunctivism.J. J. Cunningham - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):111-132.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Perceptual reasons.Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.details
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Objective Morality, Subjective Morality, and the Explanatory Question.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-25.details
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How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):400-415.details
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The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Normative Reasons Contextualism.Tim Henning - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.details
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Reasons, Answers, and Goals.John Turri - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):491-499.details
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On the Relationship between Reasons and Evidence.Christopher Cloos - manuscriptdetails
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The Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Moral rationalism and rational amoralism.Mark van Roojen - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):495–525.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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How anger helps us possess reasons for action.Steven Gubka - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Hedonic Consciousness and Moral Status.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.details
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Facts about incoherence as non-evidential epistemic reasons.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-22.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Possessing Love’s Reasons: Or Why a Rationalist Lover Can Have a Normal Romantic Life.Ting Cho Lau - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (13):382-405.details
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The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Blameworthiness, Control, and Consciousness Or A Consciousness Requirement and an Argument For It.Michael Hatcher - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):389-419.details
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The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):520-541.details
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The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.details
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A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.details
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Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):77-91.details
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The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Grounding the Domains of Reasons.Stephanie Leary - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):137-152.details
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Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.details
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On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscriptdetails
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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Moral perception, inference, and intuition.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1495-1512.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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(1 other version)Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.details
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