This extended investigation of the semantics of event (and state) sentences in their various forms is a major contribution to the semantics of natural language, simultaneously encompassing important issues in linguistics, philosophy, and logic. It develops the view that the logical forms of simple English sentences typically contain quantification over events or states and shows how this view can account for a wide variety of semantic phenomena. Focusing on the structure of meaning in English sentences at a &"subatomic&" level&-that is, (...) a level below the one most theories accept as basic or &"atomic&"&-Parsons asserts that the semantics of simple English sentences require logical forms somewhat more complex than is normally assumed in natural language semantics. His articulation of underlying event theory explains a wide variety of apparently diverse semantic characteristics of natural language, and his development of the theory shows the importance of seeing the distinction between events and states. Parsons demonstrates that verbs, also, indicate kinds of actions rather than specific, individual actions. Verb phrases, too, he argues, depend on modifiers to make their function and meaning in a sentence specific. An appendix gives many of the details needed to formalize the theory discussed in the body of the text and provides a series of templates that permit the generation of atomic formulas of English. (shrink)

I am pleased to have been able to vindicate Plato from the oft-rehearsed charge of not having distinguished relations from qualities. Not only does Phaedo 102B7-C4 show quite clearly that he did make the proper distinction, but the theory of relations he adumbrated there is logically sound and ontologically viable. Furthermore, it is refreshing to think of relations not as Forms or universals, but as chains of ontologically tied universals.Naturally, now that we have a clear understanding of Plato's Phaedo theory (...) of relations and relational facts there is plenty of work to do. We must examine the other dialogues for alterations or even preservation of that theory. Moreover, there are those arguments of Aristotle that purport to reduce Plato's Theory of Forms to absurdity on account of relations. But of this I shall say more at some other time. (shrink)

ACTION, EMOTION AND WILL "This a clear and persuasive book which contains as many sharp points as a thorn bush and an array of arguments that as neat and ...

The four main essays in this volume investigate new sectors of the theory of decision, preference, act-characteristics, and action analysis. Herbert A. Simon applies tools developed in the theory of decision-making to the logic of action, and thereby develops a novel concept of heuristic power. Adapting ideas from utility and decision theory, Nicholas Rescher proposes a logic of preference by which conflicting theories proposed by G. H. von Wright, R. M. Chisholm, and others can be systematized. Donald Davidson discusses difficulties (...) in specifying the structure of action sentences to elucidate how their meaning depends on that structure. G. H. von Wright devises a method for describing each “state of the world” that results from an action, in a revision of his own earlier work. Additionally, a study of the logic of norms by Alan Ross Anderson is presented as an appendix, along with an appendix by Rescher outlining the aspects of action. (shrink)

Many of the problems traditionally related to the interpretation of Leibniz' theory of relations may be seen in a better light considering essentially two factors: 1) the different plans (ontological, metaphysical, psychological and logical-linguistic) implied by Leibniz reflections on the subject; 2) the reference to scholastic and late-scholastic texts read or consulted by Leibniz. Relations for Leibniz are, from a metaphysical point of view, denominations only seemingly external, they are in reality denominationes intrinsecae, and are founded on the general connection (...) of all things. From a psychological point of view they are abstract entities that our mind builds by resemblance. From an ontological point of view they are individual accidents inherent to the substances. From a logical-linguistic point of view they are abstract structures that connect the one to the other at least two subjects. The propositions in which they appear, as for example the proposition “Paris loves Helen” are transformed by Leibniz in equivalent propositions joined by operators, which in medieval logic were known as termini reduplicantes (terms which define mostly intensional contexts). This may be seen with sufficient clarity examining the last part, until now inedited, of the famous passage about Paris and Helen published by Couturat in his Opuscules. (shrink)