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  1. From Potency to Act: Hyloenergeism.Jeremy W. Skrzypek - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 11):2691-2716.
    Many contemporary proponents of hylomorphism endorse a version of hylomorphism according to which the form of a material object is a certain kind of complex relation or structure. Structural approaches to form, however, seem not to capture form’s traditional role as the guarantor of diachronic identity, since more “dynamically complex” material objects, such as living organisms, seem to undergo, and survive, various structural changes over the course of their existence. As a result, some contemporary hylomorphists have looked to alternative, non-structural (...)
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  • In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...)
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  • A Personal Love of the Good.Camilla Kronqvist - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):977-994.
    In order to articulate an account of erotic love that does not attempt to transcend its personal features, Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum lean on the speeches by Aristophanes and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium. This leads them to downplay the sense in which love is not only for another person, but also for the good. Drawing on a distinction between relative and absolute senses of speaking about the good, I mediate between two features of love that at first may seem (...)
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  • Aboutness and Ontology: A Modest Approach to Truthmakers.Arthur Schipper - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):505-533.
    Truthmaker theory has been used to argue for substantial conclusions about the categorial structure of the world, in particular that states of affairs are needed to play the role of truthmakers. In this paper, I argue that closely considering the role of aboutness in truthmaking, that is considering what truthbearers are about, yields the result that there is no good truthmaker-based reason to think that truthmakers must be states of affairs understood as existing entities, whether complex or simple. First, I (...)
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  • Metaphysics and Methods in Moral Enquiry and Education: Some Old Philosophical Wine for New Theoretical Bottles.David Carr - 2014 - Journal of Moral Education 43 (4):500-515.
    If we reject sentimentalist accounts of the nature of moral motivation and education, then we may regard some form of reason as intrinsic to any genuine moral response. The large question for moral education is therefore that of the nature of such reason—perhaps more especially of its status as knowledge. In this regard, there is evidence of some recent drift in both ethics and theory of moral educational theory towards more instrumental pro-social skill acquisition conceptions of moral reason as more (...)
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  • Five Studies in Action Theory.Lennart Nordenfelt - unknown
    The essays presented in this collection were written over a long period. The first two : "On the Classification of Verbs and Actions" and "On von Wright's Theory of Action" constitute steps in my preparation for the book Events, Actions, and Ordinary Language, Lund 1977. Much of the contents of the former paper was carried over to the book, whereas the analyses in the latter paper were more or less completely left out. These papers have not been published before. "On (...)
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  • How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost Vs. Difficulty and Restriction.Marcel van Ackeren - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):315-334.
    ABSTRACTThe standard view of demandingness understands demandingness exclusively as a matter of costs to the agent. The paper discusses whether the standard view must be given up because we should think of demandingness as a matter of difficulty or restriction of options. I will argue that difficulty can indeed increase demandingness, but only insofar as it leads to further costs. As to restrictions of options, I will show that confinement can become costly and thus increase demandingness in three ways, by (...)
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  • Emotions, Me, Myself and I.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):433-451.
    We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they (...)
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  • The Desired Moral Attitude of the Physician: (II) Compassion. [REVIEW]Petra Gelhaus - 2012 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (4):397-410.
    Professional medical ethics demands of health care professionals in addition to specific duties and rules of conduct that they embody a responsible and trustworthy personality. In the public discussion, different concepts are suggested to describe the desired implied attitude of physicians. In a sequel of three articles, a set of three of these concepts is presented in an interpretation that is meant to characterise the morally emotional part of this attitude: “empathy”, “compassion” and “care”. In the first article of the (...)
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  • "The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
    Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...)
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  • Feeling, Impulse and Changeability: The Role of Emotion in Hume's Theory of the Passions.Katharina A. Paxman - unknown
    Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, including “the passions and other emotions.” These two terms for affective mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often treated by scholars as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former are the (...)
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  • Remembering Without Storing: Beyond Archival Models in the Science and Philosophy of Human Memory.Ian O'Loughlin - 2014 - Dissertation,
    Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and (...)
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  • The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure.Aaron Smuts - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.
    Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ so radically that one cannot find a common, distinctive feeling among them. This is known as the heterogeneity problem. To get around this problem, the motivational theory of pleasure suggests that what makes an experience one of pleasure is our reaction to it, not something internal to the experience. I argue that the motivational theory is wrong, and not only wrong, but backwards. The heterogeneity problem is the (...)
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  • The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire.Chris Heathwood - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.
    One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to be defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend it against (...)
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  • Subject-Centred Reasons and Bestowal Love.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (1):62-77.
    Speaking roughly, there are two competing accounts of the basis of love. First, the appraisal view: love is based in reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. Second, the bestowal view: love is not based in reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but love is based in the lover, who then bestows value onto the beloved. While both models deserve due attention, the bestowal model is of present concern. Despite numerous virtues, the bestowal model faces (...)
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  • Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.
    It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs.
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  • Spanish Imperfecto and Pretérito: Truth Conditions and Aktionsart Effects in a Situation Semantics. [REVIEW]Alicia Cipria & Craige Roberts - 2000 - Natural Language Semantics 8 (4):297-347.
    Spanish verbs display two past-tense forms, the pret´rito and the imperfecto. We offer an account of the semantics of these forms within a situation semantics, addressing a number of theoretically interesting questions about how to realize a semantics for tense and events in that type of framework. We argue that each of these forms is unambiguous, and that the apparent variety of readings attested for them derives from interaction with other factors in the course of interpretation. The meaning of the (...)
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  • Philosophical and Religious Origins of the Private Inner Self.Phillip Cary - 2011 - Zygon 46 (1):121-134.
    Abstract. The modern concept of the inner self containing a private inner world has ancient philosophical and religious roots. These begin with Plato's intelligible world of ideas. In Plotinus, the intelligible world becomes the inner world of the divine Mind and its ideas, which the soul sees by turning “into the inside.” Augustine made the inner world into something merely human, not a world of divine ideas, so that the soul seeking for God must turn in, then up: entering into (...)
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  • The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - In W. F. Overton, U. Müller & J. L. Newman (eds.), Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  • Enactive Appraisal.Giovanna Colombetti - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):527-546.
    Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.
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  • Emotion, Intentionality and Appropriateness of Emotion: In Defense of a Response Dependence Theory.Sunny Yang - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (1):82-104.
    In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the (...)
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  • Reason Explanation a First-Order Rationalizing Account.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to 'why' questions that assuage agents' puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  • Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive.Rick Anthony Furtak - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking (...)
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  • Colloquium 1.Christopher A. Dustin - 1993 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):34-56.
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  • Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
    It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.
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  • Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual Activity.Thomas Crowther - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):1-27.
    There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role. The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of (...)
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  • Aristotle on Action.Ursula Coope - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):109–138.
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  • Emotion as Patheception.Raja Bahlul - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):104-122.
    Emotion as patheception. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.874494.
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  • Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
    This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for (...)
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  • Aristotle Against Delos: Pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X.Joachim Aufderheide - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (3):284-306.
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  • In Defence of “Emotion”. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):133-154.
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  • Courage as a Management Virtue.Howard Harris - 1999 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 18 (3/4):27-46.
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  • Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
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  • Causes and Categories.Nathanael Stein - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):465-489.
    Philosophers discussing causation take on, as one of their responsibilities, the task of specifying an ontology of causation. Both standard and non-standard accounts of that ontology make two assumptions: that the ontological category of causal relata admits a unique specification, and that cause and effect are of the same ontological type. These assumptions are rarely made explicit, but there is in fact little reason to think them true. It is argued here that, if the question has any interest, there are (...)
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  • Is Attending a Mental Process?Yair Levy - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):283-298.
    The nature of attention has been the topic of a lively research programme in psychology for over a century. But there is widespread agreement that none of the theories on offer manage to fully capture the nature of attention. Recently, philosophers have become interested in the debate again after a prolonged period of neglect. This paper contributes to the project of explaining the nature of attention. It starts off by critically examining Christopher Mole’s prominent “adverbial” account of attention, which traces (...)
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  • Descartes on Phantom Limbs.Tommy L. Lott - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (3):243-271.
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  • Locating and Representing Pain.Simone Gozzano - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (4):313-332.
    Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show that (...)
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  • Aristotelian Diagrams for Semantic and Syntactic Consequence.Lorenz Demey - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Several authors have recently studied Aristotelian diagrams for various metatheoretical notions from logic, such as tautology, satisfiability, and the Aristotelian relations themselves. However, all these metalogical Aristotelian diagrams focus on the semantic perspective on logical consequence, thus ignoring the complementary, and equally important, syntactic perspective. In this paper, I propose an explanation for this discrepancy, by arguing that the metalogical square of opposition for semantic consequence exhibits a natural analogy to the well-known square of opposition for the categorical statements from (...)
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  • Shared Emotions: A Steinian Proposal.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):997-1015.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...)
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  • Emotion, Evaluation, Desire, Behavior and Goals: A Eudaimonistic View.Maria Adamos - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):505-524.
    In this essay I examine the conceptual relation between emotions and their corresponding evaluations, desires, behavior and goals. Such conceptual relation is of the utmost importance in order to account for the unity or oneness of emotion, for if the different aspects of emotion are linked conceptually, then to have one such aspect would imply having all the others. After I discuss how emotions are related to their corresponding evaluations, desires and behavior, I show how each aspect of emotion is (...)
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  • Is Affectivity Passive or Active?Robert Zaborowski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):541-554.
    In this paper I adopt Aquinas’ explanation of passivity and activity by means of acts remaining in the agent and acts passing over into external matter. I use it to propose a divide between immanent-type and transcendent-type acts. I then touch upon a grammatical distinction between three kinds of verbs. To argue for the activity and passivity of affectivity I refer to the group that includes acts of transcendent-type and whose verbs in both voices possess affective meaning. In the end (...)
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  • One-Particularism in the Theory of Action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2677-2694.
    In this paper, I intend to introduce what I think is a novel proposal in the metaphysics of action: one-particularism. In order to do so, I must first explain two ideas: a concept in the semantics of English that many philosophers of action take to be of great importance in action theory, causative alternation; and the idea of an intrinsic event. By attempting to understand the role that intrinsic events are meant to play in action theory, I then introduce my (...)
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  • Worlds, Events, and Inertia.Károly Varasdi - 2017 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 26 (3):303-332.
    The semantics of progressive sentences presents a challenge to linguists and philosophers alike. According to a widely accepted view, the truth-conditions of progressive sentences rely essentially on a notion of inertia. Dowty suggested inertia worlds to implement this “inertia idea” in a formal semantic theory of the progressive. The main thesis of the paper is that the notion of inertia went through a subtle, but crucial change when worlds were replaced by events in Landman and Portner :760–787, 1998), and that (...)
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  • La Metafísica de la Mente de A. Kenny: 25 Años Después.Miguel García-Valdecasas - 2014 - Scientia et Fides 2 (2):93-128.
    A. Kenny’s Metaphysics of Mind: 25 years later: To mark the 25th anniversary of A. Kenny’s The Metaphysics of Mind, this article discusses some of the central arguments of this book, in particular, it discusses Descartes’ dualism, the notion of soul or Aristotle’s psychê, human and animal language, voluntary action, the self, the mind-brain relation, thinking and intentionality, and determinism and free will. The author holds that, although Kenny’s book offers valid and substantial arguments inspired in Wittgenstein’s thought and the (...)
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  • There Are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  • Truthy Psychologism About Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...)
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  • The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise (...)
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  • Current Emotion Research in Philosophy.Paul E. Griffiths - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (2):215-222.
    There remains a division between the work of philosophers who draw on the sciences of the mind to understand emotion and those who see the philosophy of emotion as more self-sufficient. This article examines this methodological division before reviewing some of the debates that have figured in the philosophical literature of the last decade: whether emotion is a single kind of thing, whether there are discrete categories of emotion, and whether emotion is a form of perception. These questions have been (...)
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  • Toward a Working Definition of Emotion.Kevin Mulligan & Klaus R. Scherer - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (4):345-357.
    A definition of emotion common to the affective sciences is an urgent desideratum. Lack of such a definition is a constant source of numerous misunderstandings and a series of mostly fruitless debates. There is little hope that there ever will be agreement on a common definition of emotion, given the sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the egos of the scholars working in these disciplines. Our aim here is more modest. We propose a list of elements for a working (...)
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  • Animal Minds: A Non-Representationalist Approach.Hans-Johann Glock - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):213-232.
    Do animals have minds? We have known at least since Aristotle that humans constitute one species of animal. And some benighted contemporaries apart, we also know that most humans have minds. To have any bite, therefore, the question must be restricted to non-human animals, to which I shall henceforth refer simply as "animals." I shall further assume that animals are bereft of linguistic faculties. So, do some animals have minds comparable to those of humans? As regards that question, there are (...)
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