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Action, Emotion and Will

Philosophy 39 (149):277-278 (1963)

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  1. I hate you. On hatred and its paradigmatic forms.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):617-633.
    In a recent paper, Thomas Szanto develops an account of hatred, according to which the target of this attitude, paradigmatically, is a representative of a group or a class. On this account, hatred overgeneralises its target, has a blurred affective focus, is co-constituted by an outgroup/ingroup distinction, and is accompanied by a commitment for the subject to stick to the hostile attitude. While this description captures an important form of hatred, this paper claims that it does not do justice to (...)
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  • Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  • A Personal Love of the Good.Camilla Kronqvist - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):977-994.
    In order to articulate an account of erotic love that does not attempt to transcend its personal features, Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum lean on the speeches by Aristophanes and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium. This leads them to downplay the sense in which love is not only for another person, but also for the good. Drawing on a distinction between relative and absolute senses of speaking about the good, I mediate between two features of love that at first may seem (...)
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  • Emotions, Me, Myself and I.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):433-451.
    We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they (...)
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  • "The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
    Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...)
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  • ”A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession’.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):373-417.
    Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. I distinguish three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against a rival view sometimes (...)
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  • Doxastic Cognitivism: An Anti‐Intellectualist Theory of Emotion.Christina H. Dietz - 2020 - Wiley: Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):27-52.
    Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 27-52, December 2020.
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  • Reason Explanation a First-Order Rationalizing Account.Neil C. Manson - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to 'why' questions that assuage agents' puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  • Functionalism, Causation and Causal Relevance.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
    causal relevance, a three-place relation between event types, and circumstances, and argue for a logical independence condition on properties standing in the causal relevance relation relative to circumstances. In section 3, I apply these results to show that functionally defined states are not causally relevant to the output or state transitions in terms of which they are defined. In section 4, I extend this result to what that output in turn causes and to intervening mechanisms. In section 5, I examine (...)
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  • Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive.Rick Anthony Furtak - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking (...)
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  • Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
    This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for (...)
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  • Sympathetic Respect, Respectful Sympathy.John Drummond - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    To be more than a meta-ethical stance, moral phenomenology must provide an account of moral norms. This paper unites two sorts of phenomenological considerations. The first considers the teleological character of intentional experiences as ordered toward "truthfulness" in all the spheres of reason and toward a notion of self-responsibility for our beliefs, attitudes, and actions as the flourishing of rational agents. The second considers the phenomenological tradition's identification of empathy as the experience in which we encounter others as conscious agents (...)
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  • Expressivism and Cognitive Propositions.James L. D. Brown - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):371-387.
    Expressivists about normative thought and discourse traditionally deny that there are nondeflationary normative propositions. However, it has recently been suggested that expressivists might avoid a number of problems by providing a theory of normative propositions compatible with expressivism. This paper explores the prospects for developing an expressivist theory of propositions within the framework of cognitive act theories of propositions. First, I argue that the only extant expressivist theory of cognitive propositions—Michael Ridge's ‘ecumenical expressivist’ theory—fails to explain identity conditions for normative (...)
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  • Why There Are No Token States.Eric Marcus - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241.
    The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake.
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  • Anger and its Desires.Laura Silva - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, (...)
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  • Is Anger a Hostile Emotion?Laura Silva - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...)
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  • Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality.Tricia Magalotti & Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    Emotions seem to be epistemically assessable: fear of an onrushing truck is epistemically justified, mutatis mutandis, whereas fear of a peanut rolling on the floor is not. But there is a difficulty in understanding why emotions are epistemically assessable. It is clear why beliefs, for instance, are epistemically assessable: epistemic assessability is, arguably, assessability with respect to likely truth, and belief is by its nature concerned with truth; truth is, we might say, belief’s “formal object.” Emotions, however, have formal objects (...)
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  • Bodily feelings and felt inclinations.Rowland Stout - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body. But it rejects the idea, familiar in the work of William James, that what one feels when one has a feeling is something biological about one’s body. Instead it argues that to have a bodily feeling is to feel an apparent bodily indication of something – a bodily appearance. Being aware of what one’s body is apparently (...)
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  • Virtual Action.Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs - forthcoming - Ethics and Information Technology.
    In the debate about actions in virtual environments two interdependent types of question have been pondered: What is a person doing who acts in a virtual environment? Second, can virtual actions be evaluated morally? These questions have been discussed using examples from morally dubious computer games, which seem to revel in atrocities. The examples were introduced using the terminology of “virtual murder” “virtual rape” and “virtual pedophilia”. The terminological choice had a lasting impact on the debate, on the way action (...)
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  • On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires.Daniel Skibra - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):279-309.
    The view that dominates the literature on intentional attitudes holds that beliefs and desires both have propositional content. A commitment to what I call “content uniformity” underlies this view. According to content uniformity, beliefs and desires are but different psychological modes having a uniform kind of content. Prima facie, the modes don’t place any constraint on the kinds of content the attitude can have. I challenge this consensus by pointing out an asymmetry between belief contents and desire contents which shows (...)
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  • The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience.Brian Scott Ballard - 2020 - Emotion Review 13 (2):113-124.
    Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance evaluative judgment. This is, in fact, a conclusion philosophers of emotion have been eager to endorse. However, after considering several influential proposals—such as the view that emotions (...)
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  • The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion.Bill Wringe - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):275-297.
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  • Phenomenal Contrast Arguments: What They Achieve.Marta Jorba & Agustín Vicente - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):350-367.
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  • Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability.Jane Heal - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67.
    : Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation‐derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content.
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  • Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude-Content Distinction.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):359-386.
    Typical emotions share important features with paradigmatic intentional states, and therefore might admit of distinctions made in theory of intentionality. One such distinction is between attitude and content, where we can specify the content of an intentional state separately from its attitude, and therefore the same content can be taken up by different intentional attitudes. According to some philosophers, emotions do not admit of this distinction, although there has been no sustained argument for this claim. In this article, I argue (...)
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  • Envy's Non-Innocent Victims.Iskra Fileva - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):1-22.
    Envy has often been seen as a vice and the envied as its victims. I suggest that this plausible view has an important limitation: the envied sometimes actively try to provoke envy. They may, thus, be non-innocent victims. Having argued for this thesis, I draw some practical implications.
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  • There Are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  • Investigating Emotions Philosophically.Michael McEachrane - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 29 (4):342-357.
    This paper is a defense of investigations into the meanings of words by reflecting on their use as a philosophical method for investigating the emotions. The paper defends such conceptual analysis against the critique that it is short of empirical grounding and at best reflects current “common-sense beliefs.” Such critique harks back to Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, his idea that all language is theory dependent and the subsequent critique of “linguistic philosophy” as sanctifying our ordinary use of words, (...)
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  • Events, Processes, and the Time of a Killing.Yair Levy - 2020 - Ratio 33 (3):138-144.
    The paper proposes a novel solution to the problem of the time of a killing (ToK), which persistently besets theories of act-individuation. The solution proposed claims to expose a crucial wrong-headed assumption in the debate, according to which ToK is essentially a problem of locating some event that corresponds to the killing. The alternative proposal put forward here turns on recognizing a separate category of dynamic occurents, viz. processes. The paper does not aim to mount a comprehensive defense of process (...)
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  • Extended Emotion.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & S. Orestis Palermos - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):198-217.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.
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  • Frightening Times.Davide Bordini & Giuliano Torrengo - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophers seem to have contrasting opinions. According to some, fear is inherently present-oriented; others instead maintain that it is inherently future-oriented or that it has no inherent temporal orientation at all. Despite the differences, however, all these views seem to understand fear’s temporal orientation as one-dimensional—that is, as uniquely determined by the represented temporal location of the intentional object of fear. By contrast, we present a (...)
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  • The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory.Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):637-678.
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates (...)
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  • Processes and the Philosophy of Action.Andrea White - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):112-129.
    While the concept event has been an important tool in our thinking about causation and action, the concept process has not been appealed to so readily. However, recently, several philosophers have...
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  • Magic, Emotion and Practical Metabolism: Affective Praxis in Sartre and Collingwood.Tom Greaves - forthcoming - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology:1-22.
    This article develops a new way of understanding the integration of emotions in practical life and the practical appraisal of emotions, drawing on insights from both J-P. Sartre and R. G. Collingwo...
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  • Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and (...)
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  • Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.
    Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.
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  • In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  • Obligation and Joint Commitment.Margaret Gilbert - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2):143.
    I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in (...)
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  • Reason and Happiness.Roger Scruton - 1974 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 8:139-161.
    Are moral judgements objective? This is a question of great complexity, and in what follows I shall try to cast some light on what it means, and on how it might be answered.
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  • Needs, Desires and Moral Turpitude.Richard Wollheim - 1974 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 8:162-179.
    Need and Desire have obvious affinities. In this lecture I shall consider how they are to be distinguished, and how they may be confused: distinguished, that is, within philosophy, and confused in life itself. I shall then consider, very briefly, how this possibility of confusion bears upon morality and moral assessment.
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  • The Poetics of Meaningful Work: An Analogy to Speech Acts.Todd Mei - 2018 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 45 (1):1-21.
    Meaningful work refers to the idea that human work is an integral part of the way we think of our lives as going well. The concept is prevalent in sociology and business studies. In philosophy, its discussion tends to revolve around matters of justice and whether the State should take steps to eradicate meaningless work. However, despite the breadth of the recent, general literature, there is little to no discussion about how it is in fact the case that work is (...)
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  • What is an Academic Judgement?Geoffrey Hinchliffe - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (5):1206-1219.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
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  • In Hate We Trust: The Collectivization and Habitualization of Hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):453-480.
    In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...)
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  • States That Are Essentially by-Products.Jon Elster - 1981 - Social Science Information 20 (3):431-473.
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  • Behavioural Economics II: Motivated, Involuntary Behaviour.George Ainslie - 1984 - Social Science Information 23 (1):47-78.
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  • The Attitudinal View and the Integration of the Particular Object of Emotions.Juan Pablo Hernández - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):478-491.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
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  • Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
    Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...)
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  • How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  • Meta-Laws of Nature and the Best System Account.M. Lange - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):216-222.
    The merits of David Lewis’s Best System Account of natural law are frequently debated. But to my knowledge, the prospects for extending the BSA to cover meta-laws have never been examined. I shall identify two obstacles facing the most natural way of extending the BSA to cover meta-laws. The BSA’s fans should consider how these obstacles are to be overcome. Meta-laws are laws about laws. For example, Einstein’s special theory of relativity incorporates a meta-law: The content of the [special] relativity (...)
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