In this paper, I examine the transmission of some ideas of the pragmatist tradition to Wittgenstein, in his ‘middle period,’ through the intermediary of F. P. Ramsey, with whom he had numerous fruitful discussions at Cambridge in 1929. I argue more specifically that one must first come to terms with Ramsey’s own views in 1929, and explain how they differ from views expressed in earlier papers from 1925-27, so a large part of this paper is devoted to this task. One (...) is then in a better position to understand the impact of Ramsey’s astute critique of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in conjunction with his pragmatism, and explain how it may have set into motion the ‘later’ Wittgenstein. I then argue that Ramsey introduced his notion of ‘variable hypothetical’ as a rule, not a proposition, on pragmatist grounds and that Wittgenstein picked this up in 1929, along with a more ‘dynamic’ view of meaning than the ‘static’ view of the Tractatus, and that this explains in part Wittgenstein’s turn to his ‘later philosophy.’. (shrink)

The idea that the function of language is its use is commonly ascribed to the Later Wittgenstein. In this paper, I argue that there is textual evidence already coming from the early manuscripts proving that Wittgenstein's philosophical development is culminating in the idea of function as use around 1929–30. I interpret a passage from Ms‐107 in order to show that Wittgenstein's practical turn has sources in different stages of his philosophical development, each of which is dominated by different ideas: the (...) idea of a picture theory; the idea of a phenomenological language and the idea of function as use. (shrink)

Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus provides an accessible and yet novel discussion of all the major themes of the Tractatus. The book starts by setting out the history and structure of the Tractatus. It then investigates the two main dimensions of the early Wittgenstein's thought, corresponding to the division between what language can say by means of its propositions and what language can only show. It goes on to discuss picture theory, logical atomism, extensionality, truth-functions and truth-operations, semantics, metalogic and mathematics, solipsism (...) and value, metaphysics, and finally, Wittgenstein's idea of the duty of maintaining silence. Frascolla also proposes a new interpretation of the ontology of the Tractatus. Based on the identification of objects with qualia, the argument put forward in the book challenges the currently prevalent ideas of the ‘New Wittgenstein'. The paradoxical nature of the Tractatus itself, and the theme of "throwing away the ladder", are thus revisited in a new key. _Understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus_ is essential reading for anyone wishing to further their insight into one of the most influential works of twentieth-century philosophy. (shrink)

The paper examines some remarks Wittgenstein expresses on pragmatism in manuscripts and lectures during the first half of the Thirties. These remarks focus principally on the Jamesian conception of truth, very roughly summarized in the claim that a belief or a proposition is true if it is useful. Wittgenstein acknowledges that this conception is able to capture some characters of ordinary language, but at the same time, he criticizes some aspects of it, and his criticism strongly resembles Frank Ramsey’s attitude (...) towards the same topics. In this sense, it is argued that Ramsey had a role both for Wittgenstein approaching pragmatism, and for the partly negative attitude with which he came to judge it, at least in this period. Yet, the two thinkers’ general perspectives diverge when it comes to the place of theory in philosophical activity. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's views on mathematics in the period before the Tractatus are examined and it is argued that at this time he endorsed the logicist view of mathematics propounded by Frege and Russell. His view of mathematics in the Tractatus itself is then considered and it is shown that he now rejects logicism. It is further argued that despite the brevity and sketchiness of the Tractatus discussion there are good reasons for believing that Wittgenstein intended it to be the basis of (...) a comprehensive account of mathematics intended to replace Principia Mathematica. It is argued that the core of this new account of mathematics is based on Wittgenstein's concept of a 'calculus'. Some central aspects of this account are described. Attention then turns to Wittgenstein's views on mathematics in the period immediately after his return to philosophy in 1929. It is argued that the idea that his account of mathematics is now based on an 'anti-realist' theory of meaning inspired by his contact with Brouwer is mistaken. It is shown that far from making such a completely fresh start the most fundamental ideas of Wittgenstein's view of mathematics at this time stem from the calculus picture which he had arrived at in the Tractatus. The question of what aspects of Wittgenstein's views had changed is examined. It is argued that the crucial change concerns his view of the infinite. Whereas he had previously accepted the concept of the completed infinite as unproblematic he now rejects it emphatically. It is shown that almost all of the other prominent changes in Wittgenstein's view of mathematics derived from this single new idea. How Wittgenstein came to change his view of the infinite is explained. It is argued that his encounter with the ideas of Brouwer did have some role to play in bringing this change about, but that Brouwer's influence was much less fundamental and was exerted in a completely different way than is often claimed. (shrink)