John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, (...) though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem. (shrink)

The analysis of function-ascribing statements, such as “the function of x is y”, is proving to be a difficult matter. It is difficult because we are only beginning to see the complexity which is involved in ascribing functions. The process of discovery has been slow and tedious, with each newly constructed analysis of the meaning of functional ascriptions yielding insights into the structure of functional analysis and functional explanation. However, as each analysis is, in turn, dismantled, we seem to see (...) our insights slip away. In the wake of each exchange, a new member is added to the list of desiderata for an analysis of function-ascribing statements. Thus, the matter of finding a proper analysis of function attributions becomes more and more complex. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Essay 1.

INTRODUCTION I What is teleology? If you ever look closely at an ants' nest, you will see an intricate network of pathways and chambers teeming with ...

This systematic investigation of computation and mental phenomena by a noted psychologist and computer scientist argues that cognition is a form of computation, that the semantic contents of mental states are encoded in the same general way as computer representations are encoded. It is a rich and sustained investigation of the assumptions underlying the directions cognitive science research is taking. 1 The Explanatory Vocabulary of Cognition 2 The Explanatory Role of Representations 3 The Relevance of Computation 4 The Psychological Reality (...) of Programs: Strong Equivalence 5 Constraining Functional Architecture 6 The Bridge from Physical to Symbolic: Transduction 7 Functional Architecture and Analogue Processes 8 Mental Imagery and Functional Architecture 9 Epilogue: What is Cognitive Science the Science of? (shrink)

My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...) not intended, examine the two senses of "desire," distinguish intending from being willing, and relate intending to a variety of other propositional at? titudes. (shrink)

This essay attempts to resurrect a cybernetic model of goal-directed systems. Since the inception of cybernetic, there has been wide agreement that it holds--in its notions of information and feedback control--the clues to solving the mystery of teleological behavior. Unfortunately, early attempts to piece together the puzzle portrayed goal-direction as a matter of a system's receiving information from a predetermined goal, and then directing itself towards that goal. This version of a cybernetic model faced crippling objections concerning the intentionality of (...) goal-directed behavior, viz. it could not handle non-existent goals, nor could it explain how systems are selectively directed towards only the goal-constituting properties of goal-objects. Subsequent analyses of goal-directed behavior turned toward more mentalistic theories which have primary application to human, intentional goal-directed behavior. ;Our model requires that goal-directed systems contain the following: an internal representation of the goal-state of the system; a feedback loop by which information about the present state of the system can be compared with the goal-state as internally represented and via which an error-correction signal can be sent to minimize any difference; a causal dependency of system output upon the error-correction process . ;The first condition occupies central position, for it provides the model with the account of intentionality that previous cybernetic models lack. Using only the concepts of information and of control, we show how internal structures take on representational content and causally direct the behavior of a system towards a goal-state made determinate by the representational content of the controlling structures. The condition is given a realist interpretation. We also rest no part of the analysis upon a mentalistic interpretation of representation. ;The second condition of the model anchors the concepts of feedback control and information in the formal theory of cybernetics. ;The third condition closes the network of control that is central to teleological behavior. Through it we are able to draw the line of demarcation that divides systems which are genuinely goal-directed from those which exhibit similar but not truly directed behavior. (shrink)