- Separating Action and Knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale.Olivia Coombes - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
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Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof.Lucy Campbell - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):230-252.details
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Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.details
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Conversational implicature, communicative intentions, and content.Ray Buchanan - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):720-740.details
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Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.details
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox.Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):493-541.details
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Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
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Evidence and Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Antill - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):319-330.details
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Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.details
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The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
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Planning on a Prior Intention.Facundo Alonso - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3):229-265.details
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A Gate‐Based Account of Intentions.Stéphane Lemaire - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):45-67.details
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In Defense of Bad Infinity: A Fichtean Response to Hegel's Differenzschrift.Wayne M. Martin - 2007 - Hegel Bulletin 28 (1-2):168-187.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Proper nouns.Samuel Cumming - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswickdetails
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Intentions and self-referential content.Tomis Kapitan - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):151-166.details
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In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.details
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Exhaustiveness, normativity, and communicative responsibilities.Miklós Márton & Tibor Bárány - 2022 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Martin Hinton (ed.), Philosophical Approaches to Language and Communication Vol. 2. Peter Lang. pp. 291-312.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Naive action theory.Michael Thompson - 2008 - In Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Altruism.Stephen Stich, John M. Doris & Erica Roedder - 2010 - In John M. Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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AI-Testimony, Conversational AIs and Our Anthropocentric Theory of Testimony.Ori Freiman - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
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Anscombe on Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Singular Thought and the Contingent.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 243 (1):79-98.details
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Intentions are mental states.Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.details
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Intention and Predicition in Means-End Reasoning.Stephen J. White - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):251-266.details
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Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act.Christiana Werner - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2571-2588.details
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A problem for causal theories of action.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):84–108.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Intention-sensitive semantics.A. Stokke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):383-404.details
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Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.details
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Practical Knowledge Revisited.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):128-137.details
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Knowing How.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):285-307.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Hope as a Primitive Mental State.Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):207-222.details
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Transparency and introspective unification.Kateryna Samoilova - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Intentions rationnelles et acceptations en délibération.Olivier Roy - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):525-545.details
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Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):88-115.details
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Is it rational to carry out strategic intentions?Michael H. Robins - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):191-221.details
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Intention and control.Michael H. Robins - 1986 - Theoria 52 (1-2):41-56.details
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Things mere mortals can do, but philosophers can’t.Stephanie Rennick - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):22-26.details
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Cultural Affordances: Scaffolding Local Worlds Through Shared Intentionality and Regimes of Attention.Maxwell J. D. Ramstead, Samuel P. L. Veissière & Laurence J. Kirmayer - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.details
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