- Separating action and knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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AI-Testimony, Conversational AIs and Our Anthropocentric Theory of Testimony.Ori Freiman - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies (5):1-19.details
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What we know when we act.Timothy Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2665-2683.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Exhaustiveness, normativity, and communicative responsibilities.Miklós Márton & Tibor Bárány - 2022 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Martin Hinton (ed.), Philosophical Approaches to Language and Communication Vol. 2. Peter Lang. pp. 291-312.details
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Actions of Trust and Their Cognitive Motivation.Christian Carbonell - 2021 - Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia 3:19-35.details
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Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes: a Normative Model.Dennis Papadopoulos - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1125-1145.details
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Modeling Long-Term Intentions and Narratives in Autonomous Agents.Christian Kronsted & Zachariah A. Neemeh - forthcoming - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness.details
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(1 other version)Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality.Markus Kneer - 2021 - In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154.details
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(1 other version)Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
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The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
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Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act.Christiana Werner - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2571-2588.details
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Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Freedom, self-prediction, and the possibility of time travel.Alison Fernandes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):89-108.details
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Representation without Thought: Confusion, Reference, and Communication.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2015 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Centerdetails
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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Belief and Difficult Action.Berislav Marušić - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-30.details
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Meaning underdetermines what is said, therefore utterances express many propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):165-189.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.details
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Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.details
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MAKING UP YOUR MIND: Self‐Interpretation and Self‐Constitution.Richard Moran - 2006 - Ratio 1 (2):135-151.details
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(1 other version)Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.details
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Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.Abraham Roth - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):88-115.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox.Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):493-541.details
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Intention-sensitive semantics.A. Stokke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):383-404.details
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A Theory of Free Human Action.Michael John Zimmerman - 1979 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Hope as a Primitive Mental State.Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):207-222.details
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Towards a convincing account of intention.Niel Henk Conradie - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Stellenboschdetails
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Conversational implicature, communicative intentions, and content.Ray Buchanan - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):720-740.details
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On Grice's circle.Alessandro Capone - 2006 - Journal of Pragmatics 38:645-669.details
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Reason, Action, and Weakness of the Will. A Semantic Approach.Tomás Barrero - 2010 - Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161–187.details
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Singular Thought and the Contingent A Priori.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:79-98.details
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Anscombe on Practical Knowledge.Kieran Setiya - 2016 - In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Action, Deviance, and Guidance.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Abstracta (2):41-59.details
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Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.details
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Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.details
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Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.details
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The Meta-Ethical Issue of the Nature of Lying: Implications for Moral Education.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2002 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 (1):37-63.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Altruism.Stephen Stich, John M. Doris & Erica Roedder - 2010 - In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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She intends to try.Alfred R. Mele - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):101-106.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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