- The zetetic turn and the procedural turn.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Separating action and knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Easy Practical Knowledge.Timothy Kearl & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies (5):1-19.details
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Hope: A Solution to the Puzzle of Difficult Action.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Naturalizam i relativnost u pogledu praktičnih razloga (Engl. Naturalism and Relativism about Practical Reasons).Marko Jurjako - 2022 - In Boran Berčić, Aleksandra Golubović & Majda Trobok (eds.), HUMAN RATIONALITY Festschrift for Nenad Smokrović. Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. pp. 113-139.details
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Coherence as Joint Satisfiability.Samuel Fullhart & Camilo Martinez - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Understanding, Luck, and Communicative Value.Andrew Peet - 2023 - In Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Linguistic Luck: Safeguards and Threats to Linguistic Communication. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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What it takes to make a word.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-30.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Intention Reconsideration in Artificial Agents: a Structured Account.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - Special Issue of Phil Studies.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.details
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Practical concepts and productive reasoning.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7659-7688.details
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Ludwig’s Punch and Bertie’s Comeback. Reconciling Russell and Wittgenstein on the Content of Desires.Peter Baumann - 2020 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 40 (2):132-149.details
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The shape of agency: Control, action, skill, knowledge.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):95-115.details
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The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.details
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Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.details
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Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
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Not Intentional, Not Unintentional.Brandon Johns - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1881-1899.details
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The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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Planning on a Prior Intention.Facundo Alonso - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3):229-265.details
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Actions, Paths, and Rational Reconstruction: Replies to Mele, Beebe, and Jiang.Yujian Zheng - 2019 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (4):619-630.details
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
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Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect.Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5457-5490.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness.Brian Coffey - 2014 - Dissertation, University of California, Davisdetails
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Sex By Deception.Berit Brogaard - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 683-711.details
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Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.details
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Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):529-547.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Thought Experiments in Experimental Philosophy.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 385-405.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169 (C):139-146.details
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Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.details
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One Self per Customer? From Disunified Agency to Disunified Self.David Lumsden & Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):314-335.details
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Must we measure what we mean?Nat Hansen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (8):785-815.details
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Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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Reducing Reasons.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.details
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Ethics and the Nature of Action.Heine A. Holmen - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Oslodetails
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In the beginning was the doing: the premises of the practical syllogism.Eric Wiland - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):303-321.details
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