A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events; Negative Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.

In The Fold Deleuze proposes a new and radical way of understanding philosophy and art.

Of fundamental importance to literary critics and philosophers, Difference and Repetition develops two central concepts -- pure difference and complex ...

Suggests an open system of psychological exploration to cut through accepted norms of morality, language, and politics.

An essential exploration of sense and meaning. -/- Is there a “world” anymore, let alone any “sense” to it? Acknowledging the lack of meaning in our time, and the lack of a world at the center of meanings we try to impose, Jean-Luc Nancy presents a rigorous critique of the many discourses-from philosophy and political science to psychoanalysis and art history-that talk and write their way around these gaping absences in our lives. -/- In an original style befitting his search (...) for a new mode of thought, Nancy offers fragmentary readings of writers such as Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Lévinas, Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze insofar as their work reflects his concern with sense and the world. Rather than celebrate or bemoan the loss of meaning or attempt to install a new one, his book seeks to reposition both sense and the world between the presence and absence of meaning, between objectivity and subjectivity. Nancy’s project entails a reconception of the field of philosophy itself, a rearticulation of philosophical practice. Neither recondite nor abstract, it is concerned with the existence and experience of freedom-the actuality of existence as experienced by contemporary communities of citizens, readers, and writers. -/- Combining aesthetic, political, and philosophical considerations to convey a sense of the world between meaning and reality, ideal content and material form, this book offers a new way of understanding-and responding to-“the end of the world.”. (shrink)

This book contains the unfinished manuscript and working notes of the book Merleau-Ponty was writing when he died.

An incisive analysis of Deleuze's philosophy of eventsSean Bowden shows how the Deleuzian event should be understood in terms of the broader metaphysical thesis that substances are ontologically secondary with respect to events. He achieves this through a reconstruction of Deleuze's relation to the history of thought from the Stoics through to Simondon, taking account of Leibniz, Lautman, structuralism and psychoanalysis along the way.This exciting new reading of Deleuze focuses firmly on his approach to events. Bowden also examines and clarifies (...) a number of Deleuze's most difficult philosophical concepts, including sense, problematic Ideas and intensive individuation, and engages with material by Lautman and Simondon that has not yet been translated into English. (shrink)

This paper sets out a series of critical contrasts between Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze's philosophies of the event. It does so in the context of some likely objections to their positions from a broadly analytic position. These objections concern problems of individuation and location in space-time. The paper also explains Deleuze and Badiou's views on the event through a literary application on a short story by John Cheever. In conclusion it is argued that both thinkers have good answers to (...) the objections, but that they diverge on the ontological commitments of their definitions of the event. (shrink)

Seeking to capture the problem of intuition of mobility in philosophy, mathematics and physics, this text presents the relationshisp between the three disciplines in terms of a comparison between intuitive practices and discursive practices.

In 1908, Henri Poincar? claimed that: ...the mathematical facts worthy of being studied are those which, by their analogy with other facts, are capable of leading us to the knowledge of a mathematical law, just as experimental facts lead us to the knowledge of a physical law. They are those which reveal to us unsuspected kinship between other facts, long known, but wrongly believed to be strangers to one another. Towards the end of the twentieth century, with many more mathematical (...) facts since discovered, several mathematicians proposed overarching schemes to organise the facts they considered most significant. In this paper, I shall briefly discuss three of these schemes (those of Arnold, Atiyah, and Baez and Dolan), before drawing some philosophical consequences from their attempts. Rather than the kind of claim made by Frege that with the entry of imaginary numbers we reach the ?natural end of the domain of numbers?, we are dealing here with a more open-ended sense of conceptual growth. I shall illustrate this theme by discussing the elaboration of algebraic structures designed to measure symmetry. What emerges is that at any one time mathematicians are operating with a notion very similar to that discussed in the philosophy of science under the heading of ?natural kinds?. We find ?quasi-causal? talk of properties being ?responsible? for a phenomenon, projectability, the transfer of robust mechanisms between domains, and reference to entities not yet fully determined. Debates in philosophy of science prompt further questioning as to the ?naturalness? of these mathematical kinds, whether one should expect them to be dependent on varying human interests, whether there is a distinction between artefactual and real kinds, and whether there is convergence of kinds. I believe that these questions present a wonderful opportunity for a philosophy of mathematics to treat ?real? mathematics, while making powerful points of contact with philosophy of science, and philosophy in general. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to bring the work of Deleuze and Guattari to bear on the question ofcommunication in the classroom. I focus on the mathematics classroom, where agency and subjectivity are highly regulated by the rituals of the discipline, and where neoliberal psychological frameworks continue to dominate theories of teaching and learning. Moreover, the nature ofcommunication in mathematics classrooms remains highlyelusive and problematic, due in part to the distinct relationship the discipline has with verbal language and (...) thought. I first discuss current attempts to better address the embodied nature ofcommunication in mathematics classrooms, and argue that these remain overly logo-centric and language-centric in their conception of thinking. I then show how the work of Deleuze and Guattari on thought as a radical disruptive event can be used effectively to critique current pedagogical practices that privilege a narrow conception of communication in the classroom. I examine a set of exemplary classroom videos used in mathematics teacher education to argue that the current approach fails to honor the highly creative and disruptive nature ofthinking. (shrink)

In order to address to the relation between philosophy and mathematics it is first necessary to distinguish the grand style and the little style. The little style painstakingly constructs mathematics as the object for philosophical scrutiny. It is called the little style for a precise reason, because it assigns mathematics to the subservient role of that which supports the definition and perpetuation of a philosophical specialisation. This specialisation is called the ‘philosophy of mathematics’, where the ‘of’ is objective. The philosophy (...) of mathematics can in turn be inscribed under the area of specialisation that supports the name ‘epistemology and history of science’, an area to which corresponds a specialised bureaucracy in the academic authorities and committees whose role it is to manage the personnel of researchers and teachers. But in philosophy, specialisation is invariably the means by which the little style insinuates itself. In Lacan terms, this occurs through the collapse of the discourse of the Master, which is rooted in the signifier of the same name, the S1 that gives rise to a signifying chain, onto the discourse of the University, that perpetual commentary which adequately represents the second moment of all speech, that is, the S2 which only exists by making the Master disappear under the commentary which exhausts it. The little style of the philosophy of mathematics, and of its epistemology, strives for such a disappearance of the ontological sovereignty of mathematics, its instituting aristocratism, its unrivalled mastery, by confining its dramatic and almost incomprehensible existence to a generally dusty compartment of academic specialisation. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, Alain Badiou's first Manifesto for Philosophy rose up against the all-pervasive proclamation of the "end" of philosophy. In lieu of this problematic of the end, he put forward the watchword: "one more step". The situation has considerably changed since then. Philosophy was threatened with obliteration at the time, whereas today it finds itself under threat for the diametrically opposed reason: it is endowed with an excessive, artificial existence. "Philosophy" is everywhere. It serves as a trademark for various (...) media pundits. It livens up cafés and health clubs. It has its magazines and its gurus. It is universally called upon, by everything from banks to major state commissions, to pronounce on ethics, law and duty. In essence, "philosophy" has now come to stand for nothing other than its most ancient enemy: conservative ethics. Badiou's second manifesto therefore seeks to demoralize philosophy and to separate it from all those "philosophies" that are as servile as they are ubiquitous. It demonstrates the power of certain eternal truths to illuminate action and, as such, to transport philosophy far beyond the figure of "the human" and its "rights". There, well beyond all moralism, in the clear expanse of the idea, life becomes something radically other than survival. (shrink)

In October 1984, Bruno Huisman stated with regards to Jean Cavaillès, ‘Let us be honest, or at least realistic: today, one can be a professor of philosophy without ever having read a single line of Cavaillès. Often invoked, sometimes quoted, the oeuvre of Cavaillès is little attended for itself’ (Huisman 1984). As for Albert Lautman, it would seem that the situation is even more extreme. In 1994, the publisher Hermann, under the impetus of Bruno Huisman and George Canguilhem, collected almost (...) the totality of the Jean Cavaillès papers in one volume (Oeuvres complètes de philosophie des sciences (Cavaillès 1994)). But, the Essai sur l’unité des mathématiques et divers écrits (Lautman 1977), published by the Union générale d’Éditions in 1977, had all but disappeared by the early 1980s and yet was never republished! This will remain one of the great indignities of French publishing, for as Jean Petitot rightly affirms: ‘Regarded as too speculative, in spite of his exceptional mathematical scholarship and his close connection with Hilbertian axiomatic structuralism, his mathematical philosophy has, until now, been devoid of any particular attention …. We would like to state clearly from the start, Albert Lautman represents, in our view, without exaggeration, one of the most inspired philosophers of this century’ (Petitot 1987, 79-80). (shrink)