- (2 other versions)Philosophy and the Scientific Image Of Man.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Science, Perception and Reality. New York,: Humanities Press.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states (second version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, eds).Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York,: Humanities Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Cognitive homelessness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):554-573.details
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(1 other version)Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.details
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(1 other version)Defining 'intrinsic'.Rae Langton & David Lewis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.details
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Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
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There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.details
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(2 other versions)What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.details
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Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett. [REVIEW]Ned Block - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):181-193.details
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Armchair metaphysics.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23--42.details
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The limits of intelligibility: A post-verificationist proposal.Christopher Peacocke - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (4):463-496.details
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Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.details
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Q.Ned Block - 1994 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 514–525.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.details
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Sense data: The sensible approach.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.details
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(1 other version)Defining ‘Intrinsic’.David Lewis & Rae Langton - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 17-30.details
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Can we explain intentionality?Brian Loar - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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