- Explanatory exclusion and mental explanation.Dwayne Moore - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):390-404.details
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(1 other version)The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124.details
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Serious metaphysics and the vindication of reductions.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91-110.details
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Materialism: Matters Of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction.Terry Horgan - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-183.details
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Hidden Qualia.Derek Shiller - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):165-180.details
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Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):25–46.details
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An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism.Jason Megill - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.details
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Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible.William Robert Webster - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):297-310.details
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A Refutation of Qualia-Physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2005 - In Michael O'Rourke & Corey Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press. pp. 469.details
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The Two‐Dimensionalist Reductio.Robert J. Howell - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):348-358.details
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A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2013 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism: A Defense. New York: Routledge. pp. 112-135.details
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Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity instead of Indexicality.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):135-182.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Pain is Mechanism.Simon van Rysewyk - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Tasmaniadetails
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Having it Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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The conceivability argument and the intuition of dualism.Karol Polcyn - 2010 - Diametros 24:90-106.details
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Conceptualizing physical consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.details
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The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge.Robert J. Howell - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):459-468.details
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Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.details
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Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism.Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 14 (1):55-63.details
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Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Janet Levin - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):391-421.details
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The vagueness constraint and the quality space for pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.details
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Mind-brain correlations, identity, and neuroscience.Brandon N. Towl - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):187 - 202.details
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The Epistemic/Ontic Divide.Barbara Montero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404-418.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Does Nagel's footnote eleven solve the mind-body problem?Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.details
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Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Conscious experience, reduction and identity: many explanatory gaps, one solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.details
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Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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Identity theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.details
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Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
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The Ontology of Subjective Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):315-345.details
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Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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(2 other versions)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.details
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Conceivability, higher order patterns, and physicalism.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz & Amir Horowitz - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):349-366.details
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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.details
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Turning the zombie on its head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.details
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Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.details
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Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
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Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.details
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Nagel vs. Nagel on the nature of phenomenal concepts.Janet Levin - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):293–307.details
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Defending the phenomenal concept strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.details
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The cogito and the metaphysics of mind.Nick Treanor - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):247-71.details
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