- The Self-Programming System: A Skepticism-conformed Computational Framework of the Mind (3rd edition).Fangfang Li & Xiaojie Zhang - manuscriptdetails
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Against and for Ethical Naturalism Or: How Not To "Naturalize" Ethics.Berit Brogaard & Michael Slote - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):327-352.details
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Consciousness, Haecceitism, and Grounding.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Multi-Descriptional Physicalism, Level(s) of Being, and the Mind-Body Problem.Savvas Ioannou - 2022 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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The Inconceivability Argument.Brian Cutter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work.Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):77-113.details
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Lightweight and Heavyweight Anti-physicalism.Damian Aleksiev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (112):1-23.details
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(1 other version)The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism.Zach Blaesi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1821–1852.details
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Promises as Proposals in Joint Practical Deliberation.Brendan Kenessey - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):204-232.details
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On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.details
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Chalmers and Semantics.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1193-1221.details
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Capacitism as a New Solution to Mary's puzzle.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 14 (32):252-263.details
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Frege Cases and Bad Psychological Laws.Mahrad Almotahari & Aidan Gray - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1253-1280.details
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Troubles with the Canberra Plan.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - Synthese 1 (1-2).details
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Explanation by status as empty-base explanation.Yannic Kappes - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2575-2595.details
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Are Identities Unexplainable? Towards a Non‐causal Contrastive Explanation of Identities.Lorenzo Azzano & Massimiliano Carrara - 2021 - Theoria 87 (2):457-482.details
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Explanatory Distance.Elanor Taylor - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):221-239.details
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The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness.Dylan Black - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 84 (C):102992.details
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Philosophical Puzzles Evade Empirical Evidence: Some Thoughts and Clarifications Regarding the Relation Between Brain Sciences and Philosophy of Mind.Işık Sarıhan - 2017 - In Jon Leefmann & Elisabeth Hildt (eds.), The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain. London, Vereinigtes Königreich: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 14-23.details
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Why Reduction is Underrated.Chris Daly - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):121-136.details
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Modal arguments against materialism.Michael Pelczar - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):426-444.details
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On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie.Martina Fürst - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):105-127.details
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The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.details
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Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.details
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Artificial consciousness: from impossibility to multiplicity.Chuanfei Chin - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 3-18.details
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Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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(1 other version)Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.details
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(1 other version)Recent Work on Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.details
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Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap.Janet Levin - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):57-71.details
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Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angelesdetails
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The Frontloading Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2583-2608.details
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Phenomenal, Normative, and Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis.Neil Mehta - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):567-591.details
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Introduction: The Character of Physicalism.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):435-455.details
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Mind–brain identity and evidential insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):377-395.details
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Inconceivable physicalism.Jonathon VandenHombergh - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):116-125.details
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Abductive two-dimensionalism: a new route to the a priori identification of necessary truths.Biggs Stephen & Wilson Jessica - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):59-93.details
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No help on the hard problem.Derek Nelson Ball - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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(1 other version)Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):19-46.details
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A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):897-912.details
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Constructing the World.Louis deRosset - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):430-437.details
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(1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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