- (4 other versions)Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.details
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Modal Epistemology.Erik Weber Tim De Mey (ed.) - 2004 - Springer.details
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Modal epistemology.Peter Van Inwagen - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1):67--84.details
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(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Identity and necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and individuation. New York,: New York University Press. pp. 135-164.details
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Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.details
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On David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):439-444.details
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Why zombies are inconceivable.Eric Marcus - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.details
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Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.details
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The unimagined preposterousness of zombies.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.details
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Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
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Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.details
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Conceiving what is not there.Andrew Botterell - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.details
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H2O, 'water', and transparent reduction.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):109-130.details
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Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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(1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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Modal Epistemology: Fortune or Virtue?Albert Casullo - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):17-25.details
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A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Conceivability and defeasible modal justification.Heimir Geirsson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):279-304.details
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David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):465-472.details
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Logical possibility.George Seddon - 1972 - Mind 81 (324):481-494.details
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Modal Epistemology.E. Weber & T. DeMey (eds.) - 2004 - Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgie vor Wetenschappen en Kunsten.details
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Why there Couldn’t be Zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1-16.details
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Why there couldn't be zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - The Philosophers' Magazine 8 (8):27-28.details
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The inaugural address: Why there couldn't be zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1–16.details
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The Supporting Arguments.Albert Casullo - 2003 - In A Priori Justification. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.details
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