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  1. (2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
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  • (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
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  • Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
    Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.
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  • (2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  • (7 other versions)Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1929 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. Translated by Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood.
    This entirely new translation of Critique of Pure Reason by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood is the most accurate and informative English translation ever produced of this epochal philosophical text. Though its simple, direct style will make it suitable for all new readers of Kant, the translation displays a philosophical and textual sophistication that will enlighten Kant scholars as well. This translation recreates as far as possible a text with the same interpretative nuances and richness as the original.
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  • (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
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  • The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.
    Perry argues that certain sorts of indexicals are 'essential', in the sense that they cannot be eliminated in favor of descriptions. This paper also introduces the influential idea that certain sorts of indexicals play a special role in thought, and have a special connection to action.
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  • (2 other versions)Critique of pure reason.Immanuel Kant - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
    One of the cornerstone books of Western philosophy, Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's seminal treatise, where he seeks to define the nature of reason itself and builds his own unique system of philosophical thought with an approach known as transcendental idealism. He argues that human knowledge is limited by the capacity for perception and attempts a logical designation of two varieties of knowledge: a posteriori, the knowledge acquired through experience; and a priori, knowledge not derived through experience. This accurate (...)
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  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  • Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  • (12 other versions)An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1690 - Cleveland,: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by P. H. Nidditch.
    'To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking' In An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke sets out his theory of knowledge and how we acquire it. Eschewing doctrines of innate principles and ideas, Locke shows how all our ideas, even the most abstract and complex, are grounded in human experience and attained by sensation of external things or reflection upon our own mental activities. A thorough examination of (...)
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  • (3 other versions)An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
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  • (5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2010 - New York: Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
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  • The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    "Self-knowledge" is commonly used in philosophy to refer to knowledge of one's particular mental states, including one's beliefs, desires, and sensations. It is also sometimes used to refer to knowledge about a persisting self -- its ontological nature, identity conditions, or character traits. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge is importantly different from knowledge of the world external to oneself, including others' thoughts. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to (...)
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  • (1 other version)'He': A study in the logic of self-consciousness.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1966 - Ratio 8:130-157.
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  • (1 other version)A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
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  • Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 175-226.
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  • Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1996 - John Benjamins.
    This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
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  • Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue (...)
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  • Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us (...)
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  • I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  • Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.
    It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be (...)
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  • The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Kathleen Virginia Wider - 1997 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    In this work, Kathleen V. Wider discusses Jean-Paul Sartre's analysis of consciousness in Being and Nothingness in light of recent work by analytic philosophers ...
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  • Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  • Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
    An important objection to the "higher-order" theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.Karen Neander - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):411-434.
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  • No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership.Monima Chadha - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):14-27.
    The Abhidharma Buddhist revisionary metaphysics aims to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks a self. The first part of the paper claims that the Abhidharma ‘no-self’ view can be plausibly interpreted as a no-ownership view, according to which there is no locus or subject of experience and thus no owner of mental or bodily awarenesses. On this interpretation of the no-self view, the Abhidharma Buddhist metaphysicians are committed to denying the ownership of experiences, and (...)
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  • Naturalism and the first-person perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  • Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
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  • Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
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  • Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.
    Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (...)
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  • On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.
    ABSTRACTAmbitious Higher-order theories of consciousness – Higher-order theories that purport to give an account of phenomenal consciousness – face a well-known objection from the possibility of ra...
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  • Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.
    I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be (...)
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  • The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Kathleen V. Wider - 1997 - Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):161-168.
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  • From “Fichte’s Original Insight” to a Moderate Defence of Self-Representationalism.Manfred Frank - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:36-78.
    Fifty years ago, Dieter Henrich wrote an influential little text on ‘Fichte’s Origi­nal Insight’. Seldom so much food for thought has been put in a nutshell. The essay, bearing such an unremarkable title, delivers a diagnosis of why two hundred years of penetrating thought about the internal structure of subjectivity have ended up so fruitless. Henrich’s point was: Self-consciousness cannot be explained as the result of a higher-order act, bending back upon a first-order one, given that “what reflection finds, must (...)
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  • (1 other version)State consciousness and transitive consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1994 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.
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  • Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
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  • The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.
    The so-called 'higher-order thought' theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it . The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged that the HOT theory (...)
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  • Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
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  • (1 other version)State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):355-363.
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  • Between pure self-referentialism and the HOT theory of consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
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  • A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):149 - 181.
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  • Introduction.Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:7-33.
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  • Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1999 - In Rocco J. Gennaro & Charles Huenemann (eds.), New essays on the rationalists. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 353--71.
    In the absence of any plausible reductionist account of consciousness in nonmentalistic terms, the HOT theory says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought (or awareness) that one is in that state. I discuss HOT theory with special attention to how Leibnizian theses can help support it and how it can shed light on Leibniz's theory of perception, apperception, and consciousness. It will become clear how treating Leibniz as (...)
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  • An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.Todd Buras - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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