"Its publication should be a major event for cognitive linguistics and should pose a major challenge for cognitive science. In addition, it should have repercussions in a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology and psychology to epistemology and the philosophy of science.... Lakoff asks: What do categories of language and thought reveal about the human mind? Offering both general theory and minute details, Lakoff shows that categories reveal a great deal."—David E. Leary, American Scientist.

Continuing his exploration of the organization of complexity and the science of design, this new edition of Herbert Simon's classic work on artificial ...

Much of cognitive science is based on the Computational Theory of Mind hypothesis. The claim is that the mind is in part a computer and as such requires a representational medium--a language of thought--in which to represent information and to carry out computations. ;But the Computational Theory of Mind is much more than a bland commitment to internal representations. It requires that the system of representation have some very stringent properties. In this dissertation it is demonstrated that, depending on which (...) version of the computational theory one prefers one is necessarily committed to a mechanism with most or all of the following seven properties: causally efficacious syntax, syntactic disjointness, syntactic differentiation, right causal connections, unambiguity, semantic differentiation, and the maintenance criterion. These properties are referred to as the CTM-properties because they are entailed by the Computational Theory of Mind. A subset of these properties apply to symbol systems in general and are referred to as the CTM$\sp\prime$-properties. ;The main thesis advanced is that, while it may be true that in certain cases the system of internal representation can be characterized as a language exhibiting the CTM-properties, there are also genuine cognitive situations where it needs to exhibit very un-CTM-like properties, in particular, properties associated with symbol systems of sketching. This leads to a dilemma which can only be solved by either circumscribing the domain of cognitive processes to be explained by a CTM-type symbol system or by reworking our notions of computation and representation. ;Two problem solving studies involving expert designers are carried out and described. The first study identifies some of the cognitive processes involved in open-ended, ill-structured problem solving situations like design and notes a correlation between certain of these cognitive processes and certain external symbol systems used by designers. Some of these symbol systems possess the CTM$\sp\prime$-properties while others do not. The second study manipulates the external symbol systems subjects are allowed to use along these dimensions. It is predicted that this manipulation will hamper some cognitive functions and not others. The results indicate statistically significant differences along the lines predicted. (shrink)

In this book, Newell makes the case for unified theories by setting forth a candidate.

"These notes are about the process of design: the process of inventing things which display new physical order, organization, form, in response to function." This book, opening with these words, presents an entirely new theory of the process of design. In the first part of the book, Christopher Alexander discusses the process by which a form is adapted to the context of human needs and demands that has called it into being. He shows that such an adaptive process will be (...) successful only if it proceeds piecemeal instead of all at once. It is for this reason that forms from traditional un-self-conscious cultures, molded not by designers but by the slow pattern of changes within tradition, are so beautifully organized and adapted. When the designer, in our own self-conscious culture, is called on to create a form that is adapted to its context he is unsuccessful, because the preconceived categories out of which he builds his picture of the problem do not correspond to the inherent components of the problem, and therefore lead only to the arbitrariness, willfulness, and lack of understanding which plague the design of modern buildings and modern cities. In the second part, Mr. Alexander presents a method by which the designer may bring his full creative imagination into play, and yet avoid the traps of irrelevant preconception. He shows that, whenever a problem is stated, it is possible to ignore existing concepts and to create new concepts, out of the structure of the problem itself, which do correspond correctly to what he calls the subsystems of the adaptive process. By treating each of these subsystems as a separate subproblem, the designer can translate the new concepts into form. The form, because of the process, will be well-adapted to its context, non-arbitrary, and correct. The mathematics underlying this method, based mainly on set theory, is fully developed in a long appendix. Another appendix demonstrates the application of the method to the design of an Indian village. (shrink)