Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Review: The Emotions. [REVIEW]Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):132-135.
    Peter Goldie’s The Emotions is a fascinating account distinguished by its originality and breadth. Throughout, the account is well grounded in sound common sense, as Goldie lets his careful and sensitive interpretation of the phenomena drive his theory rather than the other way around.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • The Moral Problem.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):94.
    Michael Smith’s moral problem is not about whether to betray one’s friends or one’s country. It is a metaethical problem about how to combine three tempting theses that look mutually inconsistent: moral cognitivism, appraiser internalism about moral judgments and motivation, and a “Humean” account of motivation. In Smith’s formulation, these become: 1. Moral judgements of the form, ‘It is right that I φ’ express a subject’s belief about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • What is It to Lose Hope?Matthew Ratcliffe - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):597-614.
    This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions.Peter Goldie - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):93-101.
    What is the best model of emotion if we are to reach a good understanding of the role of emotion in religious life? I begin by setting out a simple model of emotion, based on a paradigm emotional experience of fear of an immediate threat in one’s environment. I argue that the simple model neglects many of the complexities of our emotional lives, including in particular the complexities that one finds with the intellectual emotions. I then discuss how our dispositions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   960 citations  
  • Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750.Lorraine Daston & Katharine Park - 1998 - Zone Books.
    Wonders and the Order of Nature is about the ways in which European naturalists from the High Middle Ages through the Enlightenment used wonder and wonders, the passion and its objects, to envision themselves and the natural world. Monsters, gems that shone in the dark, petrifying springs, celestial apparitions---these were the marvels that adorned romances, puzzled philosophers, lured collectors, and frightened the devout. Drawing on the histories of art, science, philosophy, and literature, Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park explore and explain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Motivation, Depression and Character.Iain Law - 2009 - In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 351--364.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   132 citations  
  • The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration.Peter Goldie - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   357 citations  
  • Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   469 citations  
  • Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way.Peter Goldie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.
    I argue that emotional feelings are not just bodily feelings, but also feelings directed towards things in the world beyond the bounds of the body, and that these feelings (feelings towards) are bound up with the way we take in the world in emotional experience.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Might There Be External Reasons?John McDowell - 1995 - In J. E. J. Altham & Ross Harrison (eds.), World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Nicomachean Ethics.C. C. W. Taylor - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):247.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • What is an Emotion?William James - 1884 - Mind 9:188.
    A perfectly matched layer (PML) absorbing material composed of a uniaxial anisotropic material is presented for the truncation of finite-difference time-domain (FDTD) lattices. It is shown that the uniaxial PML material formulation is mathematically equivalent to the perfectly matched layer method published by Berenger (see J. Computat. Phys., Oct. 1994). However, unlike Berenger's technique, the uniaxial PML absorbing medium presented in this paper is based on a Maxwellian formulation. Numerical examples demonstrate that the FDTD implementation of the uniaxial PML medium (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   624 citations  
  • "Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology".Guy Axtell - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1--27.
    This article traces a growing interest among epistemologists in the intellectuals of epistemic virtues. These are cognitive dispositions exercised in the formation of beliefs. Attempts to give intellectual virtues a central normative and/or explanatory role in epistemology occur together with renewed interest in the ethics/epistemology analogy, and in the role of intellectual virtue in Aristotle's epistemology. The central distinction drawn here is between two opposed forms of virtue epistemology, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. The article develops the shared and distinctive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Epistemic Emotions.Adam Morton - 2010 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 385--399.
    I discuss a large number of emotions that are relevant to performance at epistemic tasks. My central concern is the possibility that it is not the emotions that are most relevant to success of these tasks but associated virtues. I present cases in which it does seem to be the emotions rather than the virtues that are doing the work. I end of the paper by mentioning the connections between desirable and undesirable epistemic emotions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • The varieties of religious experience. A Study in human Nature.William James - 1902 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 54:516-527.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   191 citations  
  • On the Emotions.Richard Wollheim - 1999 - The Personalist Forum 15 (2):442-444.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • On the Emotions.Richard Wollheim - 1999 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59 (3):336-337.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Content of Emotional Thoughts.Tim Bloser - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):219-243.
    In this paper I examine Peter Goldie's theory of emotional thoughts and feelings, offered in his recent book The Emotions and subsequent articles. Goldie argues that emotional thoughts cannot be assimilated to belief or judgment, together with some added-on phenomenological component, and on this point I agree with him. However, he also argues that emotionally-laden thoughts, thoughts had, as he puts it, ‘with feeling,' in part differ from unemotional thoughts in their content. The thought ‘the gorilla is dangerous' when thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Autobiography.John Stuart Mill - 1959 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 15 (4):436-437.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Intellectual and Other Non-Standard Emotions.Michael Stocker - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2010 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. pp. 585--613.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations