- Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Noûs 49 (1):123-146.details
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The rules of thought.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Benjamin W. Jarvis.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 205.details
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The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism.Campbell Brown - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 205-18.details
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Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The asymmetric magnets problem.Brian Weatherson - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):479–492.details
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(2 other versions)Parthood and location.Raul Saucedo - 2009 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5. Oxford University Press UK.details
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What is Hume's Dictum, and why believe it?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.details
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Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What Is Non-Naturalism?Stephanie Leary - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reasons-Firstism: How to Solve the Discontinuity Problem by Reducing Two Queerness Worries to One.Victor Moberger - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):131-154.details
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Two Problems in Spinoza's Theory of Mind.James Van Cleve - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 2:337-378.details
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Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7.details
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The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism.Ralf M. Bader - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.details
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Moral supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.details
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The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
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Is There a Humean Account of Quantities?Phillip Bricker - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):26-51.details
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Grounding Orthodoxy and the Layered Conception.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2018 - In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-49.details
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Essentialism and Nonnaturalist Normative Supervenience.Antonella Corradini - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):631-643.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality.Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.David Malet Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Armstrong on Quantities and Resemblance.Maya Eddon - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):385-404.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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How To Be a Moral Platonist.Knut Olav Skarsune - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (10).details
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Causal essentialism and mereological monism.Aaron Segal - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):227-255.details
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Reductive theories of modality.Theodore Sider - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 180-208.details
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Imagining possibilities.Dominic Gregory - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):327–348.details
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Determinable nominalism.David A. Denby - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.details
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Conceivability and defeasible modal justification.Heimir Geirsson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):279-304.details
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(2 other versions)A new and improved supervenience argument for ethical descriptivism.C. Brown - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 205-218.details
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A Defense of Hume's Dictum.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Hume’s Dictum and Metaethics.Victor Moberger - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):328-349.details
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Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.details
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(2 other versions)Parthood and Location.Raul Saucedo - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Relations and Collective Essence.Yannic Kappes - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):800-808.details
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Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?Jamie Dreier - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1391-1408.details
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Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge.David Faraci - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3).details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience.Toppinen Teemu - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):645-653.details
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Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience?Aaron Elliott - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.details
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