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  1. The Senses.Keith A. Wilson & Fiona Macpherson - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    Philosophers and scientists have studied sensory perception and, in particular, vision for many years. Increasingly, however, they have become interested in the nonvisual senses in greater detail and the problem of individuating the senses in a more general way. The Aristotelian view is that there are only five external senses—smell, taste, hearing, touch, and vision. This has, by many counts, been extended to include internal senses, such as balance, proprioception, and kinesthesis; pain; and potentially other human and nonhuman senses. This (...)
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  • Active Perception and the Representation of Space.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 44-72.
    Kant argued that the perceptual representations of space and time were templates for the perceived spatiotemporal ordering of objects, and common to all modalities. His idea is that these perceptual representations were specific to no modality, but prior to all—they are pre-modal, so to speak. In this paper, it is argued that active perception—purposeful interactive exploration of the environment by the senses—demands premodal representations of time and space.
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  • Touch.Frédérique de Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
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  • The Individuation of the Senses.Mohan Matthen - 2015 - In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 567-586.
    How many senses do humans possess? Five external senses, as most cultures have it—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste? Should proprioception, kinaesthesia, thirst, and pain be included, under the rubric bodily sense? What about the perception of time and the sense of number? Such questions reduce to two. 1. How do we distinguish a sense from other sorts of information-receiving faculties? 2. By what principle do we distinguish the senses? Aristotle discussed these questions in the De Anima. H. P. Grice (...)
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  • Touch Without Touching.Matthew Fulkerson - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    In this paper, I argue that in touch, as in vision and audition, we can and often do perceive objects and properties even when we are not in direct or even apparent bodily contact with them. Unlike those senses, however, touch experiences require a special kind of mutually interactive connection between our sensory surfaces and the objects of our experience. I call this constraint the Connection Principle. This view has implications for the proper understanding of touch, and perceptual reference generally. (...)
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  • Sight and touch.Michael Martin - 1992 - In Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • What do our experiences of heat and cold represent?Richard Gray - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):131-151.
    Our experiences of heat and cold are usually thought to represent states of things: their hotness and coldness. I propose a novel account according to which their contents are not states of things but processes, more specifically, the opposite processes of thermal energy being transmitted to and from the body, respectively. I call this account the Heat Exchange Model of heat perception. Having set out the evidence in support of the proposal, I conclude by showing how it provides a new (...)
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  • What is Touch?Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432.
    This paper addresses the nature of touch or ?tactual perception?. I argue that touch encompasses a wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, and that the permissive conception we are left with is so permissive that it is unclear how touch might be distinguished from the other senses. I conclude that no criteria will succeed in individuating touch. Although I do not rule out the possibility that this also applies to (...)
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  • The sense of touch.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):37 – 58.
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  • Dual Structure of Touch: The Body vs. Peripersonal Space.Mohan Matthen - 2020 - In Frédérique de Vignemont (ed.), The World at Our Fingertips: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Peripersonal Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197–214.
    The sense of touch provides us knowledge of two kinds of events. Tactile sensation (T) makes us aware of events on or just below the skin; haptic perception (H) gives us knowledge of things outside the body with which we are in contact. This paper argues that T and H are distinct experiences, and not (as some have argued) different aspects of the same touch-experience. In other words, T ≠ H. Moreover, H does not supervene on T. Secondly: In T, (...)
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  • Tactual perception.M. Scott - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):149-160.
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  • Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States.Kathleen Akins - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337-372.
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