"This is an important new Cummins work.

Resemblances between colour pictures and their subject-matter can be identified. I use insights from perceptual psychology to develop a description of these shared colour properties. While resemblances do exist, they do not support resemblance theories of depiction. Instead, the character of these resemblances is determined by the construction of our visual system, and is not necessary for depiction. These results support a theory of depiction which holds that our abilities of visual recognition are crucial to our ability to understand pictures.

Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such examples need to be handled with care given a) the differences between works of art and scientific theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and, (...) moreover, allow us to understand how “impossible” artistic objects and inconsistent scientific theories can be said to represent. (shrink)

The representation of color by pictures raises worthwhile questions for philosophers and psychologists. Moreover, philosophers and psychologists interested in answering these questions will benefit by paying attention to each other's work. Failure to recognize the potential for interdisciplinary cooperation can be attributed to tacit acceptance of the resemblance theory of pictorial color. I argue that this theory is inadequate, so philosophers of art have work to do devising an alternative. At the same time, if the resemblance theory is false, then (...) color depiction has interesting implications for color science. Empirical researchers must rethink the widespread assumption that color recognition requires color constancy. I suggest that a neuropsychological account of color recognition will be instrumental to completing the philosophical task, but by the same token scientists might do well not to proceed without casting an eye to the work of philosophers of art. (shrink)

How we see and how we visualize: why the scientific account differs from our experience.

The A.W. Mellon lectures in the fine arts 1956, National Gallery of Art, Washington.