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Intellectual norms and foundations of mind.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.details
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Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.details
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The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Holism: A Consumer Update.Georges Rey (ed.) - 1993 - Amsterdam: Rodopi.details
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The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.details
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The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.details
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(5 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.details
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A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories.Mark Greenberg - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.details
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Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
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(2 other versions)The Unavailability of What We Mean.Georges Rey - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 46:61-101.details
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From a Logical Point of View.Willard Orman Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.details
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A theory of content II: The theory.Jerrold A. Fodor - 1990 - In Jerry A. Fodor (ed.), A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.details
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(7 other versions)Conceptual Role Semantics.Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 295.details
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The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):549-552.details
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Thoughts Without Masters Incomplete Understanding and the Content of Mind.Mark Greenberg - 2001details
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