- The Fate of Explanatory Reasoning in the Age of Big Data.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):645-665.details
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Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair.John Anthony Blair - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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From One Conservative to Another: A Critique of Epistemic Conservatism.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (2):167-186.details
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Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):411-424.details
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Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.details
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Logic as a methodological discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.details
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Practical concepts and productive reasoning.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7659-7688.details
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Trusting our own minds.Dennis Kalde - 2019 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
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Another way logic might be normative.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):5861-5881.details
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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A Common Sense Defence of Ostrich Nominalism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):71-93.details
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Frege and saving substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2687-2697.details
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning.John Brunero - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):13-37.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3611-3641.details
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Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.details
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Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.details
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The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.details
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Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Two puzzles about ability can.Malte Willer - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):551-586.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction.Colin R. Caret & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4789-4800.details
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Power, Truth and Politics.Steven Lukes - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (4):562-576.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Communication and content.Prashant Parikh - 2019 - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.details
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The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik zu einem transzendentalen Kern der Logik.David Löwenstein - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):514-531.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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II—What Should ‘Impostor Syndrome’ Be?Sarah K. Paul - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):227-245.details
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Mistakes as revealing and as manifestations of competence.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3289-3308.details
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A plea for KR.Alison Duncan Kerr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3047-3071.details
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Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
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Practical Moore Sentences.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Noûs 55 (1):39-61.details
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Logique, Raisonnement et Rationalité.Matías Osta-Vélez - 2014 - Dissertation, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonnedetails
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The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.details
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(1 other version)Michael Williams and the hypothetical world.E. P. Brandon - 2002 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 6 (1).details
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The Reflective Equilibrium in Rawls’ Theory of Justice: The Perspective of Holistic Pragmatism.Mihai Burlacu - 2015 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 7 (2):336-356.details
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The normative problem for logical pluralism.Nathan Kellen - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):258-281.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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