- The Unity of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-45.details
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Conceptual Role Accounts of Meaning in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 260-274.details
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Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments Against Robust Moral Realism.Joshua Schechter - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 345-369.details
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Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity.Antti Kauppinen - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.details
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Normative Commitments in Metanormative Theory.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 193-213.details
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‘Ought’: The correct intention account.Heath White - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.details
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Minimalism's continued creep: Subject matter.Joshua Gert - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Normative Reference Magnets.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (1):41-71.details
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On epistemic conceptions of meaning: Use, meaning and normativity.Daniel Whiting - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.details
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Why conceptual competence won’t help the non-naturalist epistemologist.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):616-637.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):499-519..details
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The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.details
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Practical reasoning as figuring out what is best: Against constructivism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):139-152.details
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Practical reason and desire.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):345 – 358.details
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How we know what ought to be.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.details
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Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse.Pekka Vayrynen - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Moore’s Open Question Phenomenon Explained—Naturalistically.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):241-256.details
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Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument.Jacob Sparks - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543.details
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Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4):201-220.details
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Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts.Neil Sinclair - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):95-121.details
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Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter.Matthew Simpson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):750-766.details
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Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness.Miriam Schoenfield - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):257-282.details
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Jazz Redux: a reply to Möller.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):303-316.details
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Is Gibbard a Realist?Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-18.details
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A third way in metaethics.Laura Schroeter & François Schroeter - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):1-30.details
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A slim semantics for thin moral terms?Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):191 – 207.details
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Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2).details
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Two Sources of Morality.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):102.details
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The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.details
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Possessing moral concepts.David Merli - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):535-556.details
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Conjuring Ethics from Words.Jonathan McKeown-Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster - 2012 - Noûs 49 (1):71-93.details
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Author meets critics: Matti Eklund’s choosing normative concepts.Kris McDaniel - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):475-488.details
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The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics.Bar Luzon - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):217-237.details
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Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts.Stephanie Leary - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):455-474.details
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Good Guys, Bad Guys: How to Reliably Tell Virtue from Schmirtue.Christos Kyriacou - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):775-786.details
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Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement.Michael Klenk & Ibo van de Poel - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Expressivism, but at a Whole Other Level.Sebastian Köhler - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.details
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Are moral properties impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.details
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The Return of Moral Fictionalism.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):149–188.details
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Moral concepts and motivation.Mark Greenberg - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):137-164.details
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
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Alternative normative concepts.Matti Eklund - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.details
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Realism, Metasemantics, and Risk.Billy Dunaway - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3).details
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A coherent moral relativism.David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.details
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Expressivism and Cognitive Propositions.James L. D. Brown - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):371-387.details
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Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.details
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