- An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.details
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Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property.José Martínez Fernández - 2007 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (4):449-472.details
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The Liar.J. Barwise & J. Etchemendy - 1990 - Studia Logica 49 (3):426-427.details
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Truth and paradox: solving the riddles.Tim Maudlin - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reaching Transparent Truth.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):841-866.details
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The semantic paradoxes: A diagnostic investigation.Charles Chihara - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):590-618.details
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The semantic paradoxes: Some second thoughts.Charles Chihara - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):223 - 229.details
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Alternative revision theories of truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.details
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A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences.C. Dutilh Novaes - 2008 - History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (3):227-261.details
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The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.details
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Truth.Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess - 2011 - Princeton University Press.details
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Semantical paradox.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.details
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Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):915-932.details
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Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.details
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A New Conditional for Naive Truth Theory.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):87-104.details
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Vagueness and revision sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.details
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The Complexity of Revision, revised.Aldo Antonelli - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.details
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The Complexity of Revision, Revised.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.details
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Truth, Paradox, and Ineffable Propositions.James R. Shaw - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):64-104.details
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The Semantic Conception of Truth.Alfred Tarski - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.details
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A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell. pp. 282–387.details
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Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.details
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Truth without contra(di)ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.details
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Two types of deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.details
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Paradox, truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth.Peter W. Woodruff - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):213 - 232.details
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Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There’s no Vicious Reference.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.details
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Ultimate truth vis- à- vis stable truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.details
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On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.details
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Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions: Parameters, Complexity and Games.Philip Welch, Kai–Uwe Kühnberger, Benedikt Löwe & Michael Möllerfeld - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (1):79-98.details
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Four valued semantics and the liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.details
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The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.details
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Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.details
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On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.details
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Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.details
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What are we to accept, and what are we to reject, while saving truth from paradox? [REVIEW]Greg Restall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):433 - 443.details
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The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.details
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In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Hopes fade for saving truth. [REVIEW]Graham Priest - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):109-140.details
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Boolean negation and all that.Graham Priest - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (2):201 - 215.details
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The Gupta-Belnap systems ${\rm S}^\#$ and ${\rm S}^*$ are not axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.details
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The liar paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.details
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Property theory and the revision theory of definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):212-246.details
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Field’s logic of truth.Vann McGee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):421-432.details
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Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.details
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Some closure properties of finite definitions.Maricarmen Martinez - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):43-68.details
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Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth.Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.details
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What theories of truth should be like (but cannot be).Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.details
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The Guptα-Belnαp Systems S and S* are not Axiomatisable.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (4):583-596.details
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How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.details
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Comparing inductive and circular definitions: Parameters, complexity and games.Kai-Uwe Küdhnberger, Benedikt Löwe, Michael Möllerfeld & Philip Welch - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (1):79 - 98.details
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