This is a review of David Löwenstein’s book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".

"How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge, since the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong? Andrea Kern argues that we can disarm this skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a rational capacity. In this book, she develops a metaphysics of the mind as existing through knowledge of itself."--Provided by publisher.

This article explores Heidegger's later philosophy with regard to the problem of a philosophical interpretation of religious language. In what follows, I will draw upon the work of Wittgenstein and refer to the cosmological argument to read Heidegger in terms of a post-theistic understanding of religious language that avoids the shortcomings of both theistic realism and non-cognitivism. At the same time, I am proposing a new interpretation of Heidegger's later philosophy against this background. I will show that, in spite of (...) its hermeticism, Heidegger's later philosophy has a specific relevance to philosophy of religion that still needs to be explored. (shrink)

The study aims at expanding the idea of knowledge beyond the notion of descriptive knowledge. It examines a pluralism of scientific, philosophical, literary, and aesthetic forms of knowledge. This pluralism is not relativistic but complementary. Different ways of knowing enrich each other thus facilitating a more comprehensive and differentiated conception of the world.".

Die Beiträge dieses Bandes werfen die Frage nach dem Erkenntniswert der Literatur auf. Der erste Teil des Bandes enthält Beiträge, welche die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen literarischen und anderen Weisen menschlicher Selbstverständigung diskutieren. Im zweiten Teil des Buches finden sich Aufsätze, welche die verschiedenen Argumente, die in der Diskussion um die Frage nach dem kognitiven Wert der Literatur eine Rolle spielen, einer eingehenden Prüfung unterziehen. Sie fragen danach, ob und inwieweit die Literatur Wissen vermittelt. Die Beiträge des dritten Teils (...) vertiefen die Untersuchungen zum kognitiven Wert der Literatur, indem sie verschiedene Formen des Wissens behandeln. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit erhalten die Vergegenwärtigungsleitung der Literatur, das propositionale Wissen, das Zeugniswissen und das begriffliche Wissen. Der vierte Teil des Buches schließlich enthält Aufsätze, die sich mit der Literatur als Quelle moralischen Wissens beschäftigen und den Beitrag der Literatur zu psychologischen Fragen diskutieren, welche das Verständnis der Rolle der Gefühle und die narrative Dimension der Selbstidentität betreffen. (shrink)

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of (...) rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...) of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)