- The Hard Problem of Access for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Grad Paweł - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.details
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Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):271-287.details
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Truth and knowledge in the community of inquiry.Luca Zanetti & Sebastiano Moruzzi - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy of Education.details
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Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style.Annalisa Coliva & Michele Palmira - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):402-415.details
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The fundamental model of deep disagreements.Victoria Lavorerio - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):416-431.details
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Introduction: Disagreement—Epistemological and Argumentation-Theoretic Perspectives.Patrick Bondy & David Godden - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):963-969.details
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Worldview disagreement and subjective epistemic obligations.Daryl Ooi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12887.details
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The Weirdness of the World.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2024 - Princeton University Press.details
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The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and other principles).Yuval Avnur - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Wittgenstein on Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 563–575.details
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Seeing colours unconsciously.Paweł Jakub Zięba - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-36.details
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Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.details
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Closure, deduction and hinge commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3533-3551.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Beyond Authority: Hinge Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2261-2283.details
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The Indispensability of Knowledge.Michael Williams - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1691-1697.details
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Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution.Ju Wang - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2357-2374.details
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Radical Scepticism, How-Possible Questions and Modest Transcendental Arguments.Ju Wang - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):210-226.details
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Pritchard on ignorance and normativity.Chuhan Wang & Ju Wang - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-18.details
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Multi-Path vs. Single-Path Replies to Skepticism.Wen-Fang Wang - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):383-412.details
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Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs.Mark Walker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2163-2183.details
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Contrastive Hinge Epistemology.Giorgio Volpe - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1222-1249.details
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Replies to Commentators.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1713-1724.details
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Précis of Description of Situations.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1683-1690.details
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Caught in the Language-Game.Nuno Venturinha - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1043-1055.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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Arguing about Free Will: Lewis and the Consequence Argument.Danilo Šuster - 2021 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 21 (63):375-403.details
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The Truth of Scepticism: on the varieties of epistemological doubt.Guido Tana - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-30.details
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Closure, Underdetermination, and the Peculiarity of Sceptical Scenarios.Guido Tana - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):73-97.details
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Epistemological disjunctivism: Neo-Wittgensteinian and moderate neo-Moorean.Joshua Stuchlik - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):438-457.details
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Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith & Michael Patrick Lynch - 2020 - Topoi 40 (5):971-982.details
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Epistemic norms, closure, and no-Belief hinge epistemology.Mona Ioana Simion, Johanna Schnurr & Emma C. Gordon - 2021 - Synthese 198 (15):3553-3564.details
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Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Topoi 40 (5):1107-1116.details
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The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge: a new solution to the basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2871-2884.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Internalist Challenge.Kegan Shaw - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):385-396.details
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A Plea for the Theist in the Street.Kegan J. Shaw - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (1):102-128.details
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A Better Disjunctivist Response to the 'New Evil Genius' Challenge.Kegan J. Shaw - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):101-125.details
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A Kantian virtue epistemology: rational capacities and transcendental arguments.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3113-3136.details
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Judgment and Practice in Reid and Wittgenstein.Patrick Rysiew - 2017 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2).details
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What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.details
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Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability.Chris Ranalli - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):183-205.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Synthese:1-33.details
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Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12887.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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