Bruner sets forth nothing less than a new agenda for the study of the mind. He examines the irrepressibly human acts of imagination that allow us to make experience meaningful; he calls this side of mental activity the “narrative mode,” and his book makes important advances in the effort to unravel its nature.

Special 2018 Edition From the new Introduction by Janet L. Miller, Teachers College, Columbia University: "Maxine Greene never claimed to be a visionary thinker. But forty years later, her trepidations detailed throughout 1978's Landscapes of Learning now appear unnervingly prescient. Witness and treasure Landscapes as evidence of her matchless abilities to inspire myriad educators and students worldwide." “I would suggest that there must always be a place in teacher education for ‘foundations’ people, whose fundamental concern is with opening new perspectives (...) on the many faces of the human world.” —Maxine Greene The essays in this volume demonstrate clearly that Maxine Greene is herself an example of the kind of “foundations” specialist she hopes to see: someone who can stimulate, inform, and bring new insights to teachers, students, curriculum planners, administrators, policy-makers—indeed all those concerned with education in its broadest sense. These essays, a number of them based on lectures presented to various professional organizations, reveals her dedication to learning and teaching, as it reveals her belief in the potential of each individual person. A philosopher whose orientation is largely existential and phenomenological, she seeks to demystify aspects of today’s technological society, to question taken-for-granted notions of social justice and equality, and to elucidate conflicts between youth and age, the poor and the middle class, people of color and Whites, male and female. As a humanist, she calls for self-reflectiveness, wide-awakeness, and personal transformation within the context of each person’s own lived world—each one’s particular landscape of work, experience, and aspiration. Recognizing the multiple realities that compose experience, the many landscapes against which sense-making proceeds, the essays are grouped in four sections: intellectual and moral components of emancipatory education; social issues and their implications for approaches to pedagogy; artistic-aesthetic considerations in the making of curriculum; and the cultural significance of women’s predicaments today. All are richly illuminated by examples; all are written with grace and passion; all will help readers achieve greater self-understanding and critical consciousness. (shrink)

The ills of education are caused, Kieran Egan argues, by the fact that we have inherited three major educational ideas, each of which is incompatible with the other two. Is the purpose of education to make good citizens and inculcate socially relevant skills and values? Or is it to master certain bodies of knowledge? Or is it the fulfillment of each student's unique potential? These conflicting goals bring about clashes at every level of the educational process, from curriculum decisions to (...) teaching methods. Egan's analysis is cool, clear, and wholly original, and his diagnosis is as convincing as it is unexpected. Not content with a radical diagnosis, Egan presents us with a new and sophisticated alternative. Egan reconceives education as our learning to use particular "intellectual tools" - such as language or literacy - which shape how we make sense of the world. These mediating tools generate successive kinds of understanding: somatic, mythic, romantic, philosophical, and ironic. As practical as it is theoretically innovative, Egan's account concludes with practical proposals for how teaching and curriculum could be changed to reflect the ways we actually learn. (shrink)

John Dewey's Gifford Lectures, given at Edinburgh in 1929.

The examination of the notion of science from a sociological perspective has begun to transform the attitudes to science traditionally upheld by historians and philosophers.

The purpose of this article is to integrate two outstanding problems within the philosophy of science. The first concerns what role aesthetics plays in scientific thinking. The second is the problem of how logically testable ideas are generated (the so-called "psychology of research" versus "logic of (dis)proof" problem). I argue that aesthetic sensibility is the basis for what scientists often call intuition, and that intuition in turn embodies (in a literal physiological sense) ways of thinking that have their own meta-logic. (...) Thus, aesthetics is a form of cognition. Scientists think not in equations or words or other logical abstractions, but emotionally and sensually, using visual and aural images, kinesthetic and other proprioceptive feelings, sensations, patterns, and analogies. These aesthetic forms of thinking have their own logics that I call "synosia", from the root words synaesthesia (a combining of senses) and gnosis, "to know". Synosia denotes understanding that integrates feeling that one knows with feeling what one knows. Eminent scientists universally describe an explicitly secondary process in which such personal knowledge must be "translated" into a formal language, such as words or equations, in order to be communicated to other people. Many of the unsolved problems that philosophers of science (as well as psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers) have had in making sense of scientific thinking have arisen from confusing the form and content of the final translations with the hidden means by which scientific insights are actually achieved. (shrink)