In this article I explore two accounts of the Fallacy of Many Questions made famous by the question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" The accounts are from the works of Lennart Aqvist and Noel Belnap, and the two authors differ in their accounts of the fallacy. Then I give my own account based on understanding a facet of erotetic logic, i. e., the logic of questions.

Concerned with practical problems and matters basic to critical thinking, this volume provides many examples and "doable" exercises that stress the application of logic to situations expressed in ordinary language. It offers rules for improving the quality of thinking-explaining basic concepts such as induction and deduction in clear and simple terms-and briefly touches upon topics like evidence, statistics and language.

This edition identifies and strengthens critical thinking skills in nursing, emphasizing the value of applying systematic reasoning to clarify conflicts experienced by nurses, resolve controversial moral issues, and make sound judgments. It also helps strengthen intellectual and scientific acuity through the use of reason and logic, and examines the use of argument in nursing. Advanced nursing students.

Charitable Reconstruction and Logical Neutrality.

Students in critical thinking courses are often instructed to "read carefully" as a prerequisite to thinking critically. This instruction, which seems like a simple preliminary caution, in fact reveals controversial assumptions about how readers read, and whether critical thinking instruction presupposes the reading skill it purports to teach.

Philosophers often contrast personal authority to authority vested in offices. Some such distinction is traditional and sometimes useful. But it does not provide us with an exhaustive classification of the types of authority, for there is a third type of authority that I shall argue is more fundamental than these two. Let us start with the types marked out by the usual distinction.Consider first the sort of authority illustrated by the following sentences:Smith is an authority on physics.Smith has authority as (...) a physicist.Smith's views on physics have authority.O.K., I believe you—after all, you're the authority on physics!A person is an authority in virtue of possessing extensive knowledge of a field or subject-matter. There seem to be no limits on what the field or subject-matter can be—for instance, one can be an authority on trivia. (shrink)

Dans son effort pour ébranler la dichotomie entre la raison calculatrice et le domaine de l'irrationnel, Ch. Perelman s'inspire de la rhétorique ancienne et, entre autres, de Platon. Il utilise celui-ci pour illustrer le mépris des philosophes à l'égard de la rhétorique, pour indiquer la voie d'une rhétorique différente, et pour caractériser la forme du dialogue. On montre que cette condamnation de la rhétorique est beaucoup plus systématique, chez Platon, que ne le laisse entendre Perelman; que la "rhétorique digne des (...) dieux" de Platon n'a rien à voir avec la nouvelle rhétorique; et que le dialogue platonicien n'est pas un dialogue au sens de cette dernière. Bref, Platon est un anti-modèle, et c'est en prenant conscience de leur hétérogénéité radicale que l'on pourra le mieux apprécier l'originalité de ces deux conceptions de la philosophie. (shrink)

Begging the question — roughly, positing in the premises what is to be proved in the conclusion — is a perplexing fallacy.1 Are not question-begging arguments valid? Yes, we may find ourselves saying, but they are fallacious despite their validity, owing to their inability to establish the truth of a conclusion which is not already known. But are not question-begging arguments sometimes effective in bringing an audience to an awareness of the truth of the conclusion? How can a dialectical maneuver (...) which is capable of effecting epistemic progress be a fallacy, an illegitimate maneuver? In such cases of success, we can reply, the audience was simply in need of some logical coaching — a question-begging argument is of its very nature ill-suited for producing new knowledge in someone who is being fully rational. But then are not all valid arguments question-begging, since the conclusions are at least implicitly contained in the premises in such a way that a fully rational individual can never augment his knowledge through such arguments? No, we may answer, only those valid arguments in which the proposition constituting the conclusion appears, whether distinguised or not, as a distinct premise are question-begging; if several premises go together to imply a conclusion, the argument does not beg the question, But why is it legitimate to posit premises which more-or-less implicitly contain the conclusion, while it is illegitimate to posit premises which more-or-less explicitly contain the conclusion? Because, we are tempted to say, a question-begging argument is one in which what is to be proved in the conclusion is posited in the premises, and this positing must be more-or-less explicit in order for a fallacy to be committed! (shrink)

Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic (...) problems, epistemic and ontic, related to argumentations are put in perspective. So much of what has been regarded as logic is seen to be involved in the study of argumentations that logic may be usefully defined as the systematic study of argumentations, which is virtually identical to the quest of objective understanding of objectivity. (shrink)

Mr. Wellman’s highly original contribution to the relatively new field of justification in ethics consists of characterizing the different ways in which ethical statements can be challenged and showing how each sort of challenge can be met by an appropriate response, enabling reasonable men to appropriately discuss or reflect on ethical issues. In developing his unique, systematic, methodology of ethics, Mr. Wellman has, first, rigorously reviewed and refuted the main arguments for the view of the nature of all reasoning as (...) deductive and, second, convincingly presented arguments for the existence of nondeductive evidences in ethics. Mr. Wellman’s broad definition of reasoning and his rejection of the identification of justification with reasoning reveals new dimensions of justification which will have wide implications in other areas of human speculation. (shrink)

I LOGIC IN PHILOSOPHY— PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC i. On the relation of logic to philosophy I n this book, the consequences of certain logical insights for ...

Philosophy as now pursued in British universities (and many others) is a highly argumentative discipline. The philosophers most studied are not sages who ...

"Enjoyment as well as enlightenment is provided by trying to detect the fallacies, or at least by reading the solutions given by the author of this lovely little work." Science.

Understanding Scientific Reasoning, Fifth Edition, develops critical reasoning skills and guides students in the improvement of their scientific and technological literacy. The authors teach students how to understand and critically evaluate the scientific information they encounter in both textbooks and the popular media. With its focus on scientific pedagogy, Understanding Scientific Reasoning helps students learn how to examine scientific reports with a reasonable degree of sophistication. The book also explains how to reason through case studies using the same informal logic (...) skills employed by scientists and to analyse a complex series of propositions and hypotheses using sound scientific reasoning--Publisher's blurb. (shrink)

Critical Thinking as Applied Epistemology: Relocating Critical Thinking in the Philosophical Landscape.

Look before you leap. - Proverb. He who hesitates is lost. - Another proverb.

In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is clearly the simplest, because it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard assertoric principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with complicated cases of practical (...) inference. I am not daunted by these objections. My aim here is to offer some observations that will make the merits of my account easier to appreciate. (shrink)