An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, (...) and so forth. To determine whether or not the chimpanzee infers states of this kind, we showed an adult chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with a variety of problems. Some problems were simple, involving inaccessible food as in the original Kohler problems; others were more complex, involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because of a malfunctioning heater, or unable to play a phonograph because it was unplugged. With each videotape the chimpanzee was given several photographs, one a solution to the problem, such as a stick for the inaccessible bananas, a key for the locked up actor, a lit wick for the malfunctioning heater. The chimpanzee's consistent choice of the correct photographs can be understood by assuming that the animal recognized the videotape as representing a problem, understood the actor's purpose, and chose alternatives compatible with that purpose. (shrink)

This book is a result of a study group that met to discuss the child's theory of mind. A topic whose effects span cognitive, language, and social development, it may bring a unifying influence to developmental psychology. New studies in this area acknowledge children's conceptions of intention and belief, as well as intention and belief themselves, and consider the explanations they provide for children's developing abilities. The contributors to this important volume examine several aspects of the child's theory of mind, (...) and present significant research findings on the theory itself and how it changes and develops for each child. Discussions of the utility of a theory of mind to the child, and to developmental psychologists trying to understand children, are provided. Finally, new explanations are offered for how children acquire a theory of mind in the first place. (shrink)

An abridged version of the 1937 an-thropological study of the Azande of the southern Sudan, the theoretical insights of which have proven increasingly influential among both anthropologists and others.

We all have minds of our own. The fact that we all experience our own thoughts, ideas, and imaginings, and that other people can know about them only if we choose to tell them, is taken for granted by most of us. But young children, whose understanding of everyday mental states is quite different, do not necessarily jump to the same conclusion. This volume reports the latest research and theory on this classic and important topic -- vitally important, since all (...) social behavior depends on an awareness of others. How and when an accurate knowledge of other minds arises is the central question of this volume. This authoritative work explores the theory of mind in a wide-ranging collection, featuring discussions of imagination, false beliefs, mind and emotion, and autism. The Child's Theory of Mind is also published as two issues of the British Journal of Developmental Psychology. Researchers and teachers in psychology and child psychology will find this a stimulating and informative book, which suggests several important potential applications. (shrink)

Do children have a theory of mind? If they do, at what age is it acquired? What is the content of the theory, and how does it differ from that of adults? The Child's Theory of Mind integrates the diverse strands of this rapidly expanding field of study. It charts children's knowledge about a fundamental topic - the mind - and characterizes that developing knowledge as a coherent commonsense theory, strongly advancing the understanding of everyday theories as well as the (...) commonsense theory of mind. Wellman presents evidence that children as young as age three do possess a commonsense theory of mind - that they grasp the distinction between mental constructs and physical entities and that they have an understanding of the relationship between individuals' mental states and their overt actions. He delves in detail into questions about the nature of adults' commonsense theories of mind and about the nature of commonsense theories. Wellman then examines the content of the three-year-old's theory of mind, the nature of children's notions of mind before age three, the changes in the theory during subsequent development from ages three to six, and the young child's conception of mind in comparison with those of older children and adults. Henry M. Wellman is a Professor in the Department of Psychology and the Center for Human Growth and Development at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. (shrink)

An examination of the controversial "theory of mind" hypothesis, which states that children with autism are unable to comprehend other people's mental states. The theory relates to the most fundamental questions of normal development as well as to autism i.