ABSTRACT: I argue that there is no evidence that Epicurus dealt with the kind of free-will problem he is traditionally associated with; i.e. that he discussed free choice or moral responsibility grounded on free choice, or that the "swerve" was involved in decision processes. Rather, for Epicurus, actions are fully determined by the agent's mental disposition at the outset of the action. Moral responsibility presupposes not free choice but that the person is unforced and causally responsible for the action. This (...) requires the agent's ability to influence causally, on the basis of their beliefs, the development of their behavioral dispositions. The "swerve" was intended to explain the non-necessity of agency without undermining Epicurus' atomistic explanation of the order in the universe, viz. by making the mental dispositions of adults non-necessary. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...) of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13). (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the ‘discovery’ of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a combination and mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century AD. It undergoes (...) several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle-Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the ‘free-will problem’ in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him. (shrink)

This volume, the fourth in the Edinburgh Leventis Studies series, comprises a selection of papers from the conference held in Edinburgh March 2005 in conjunction with Professor Terry Penner's tenure of the A. G. Leventis Visiting Research Chair in Greek. It brings together contributions from leading Plato scholars from Britain, Europe and North America on a closely defined topic central to Plato's thought and to Ancient Philosophy--Plato's Form of the Good. The importance of the collection lies in the combination and (...) presentation in one place of a range of different approaches to the good in Plato's Republic, and different solutions to the problems posed and proposed by these approaches. The two central issues, which form an underlying thread throughout the collection, are: first whether Plato's Republic is centred on what is good for individual humans, or on some quasi-moral good; and secondly, what the Form of the Good is. Pursuing the Good goes beyond recent studies in the field, and will appeal to classicists and philosophers alike. To the advanced student, it represents a wide-ranging introduction to central issues of Plato's philosophy; for the academic it will provide stimulus through antithetical and controversial solutions to questions old and new. (shrink)

Plato's Psychology originally published in 1970 and reprinted in 1972, is still the definitive modern discussion of the nature and development of Plato's ...

The idea of perfection.--On God and Good.--The sovereignty of good over other concepts.

Reeve's classic work provides an interpretation of Republic that makes a case for the coherence of Plato's argument.

Hendrik Lorenz presents a comprehensive study of Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of non-rational desire. They see this as something that humans share with animals, and which aims primarily at the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Lorenz explores the cognitive resources that both philosophers make available for the explanation of such desires, and what they take rationality to add to the motivational structure of human beings. In doing so, he finds conceptions of the mind that are coherent and deeply integrated (...) with both philosophers' views about such topics as the relation between body and soul, or the nature of the virtues. (shrink)

This Oxford Reader seeks to introduce some of the main philosophical questions raised by the Greek and Roman philosophers of classical antiquity. Selections from the writings of ancient philosophers are interspersed with Terence Irwin's incisive commentary, and sometimes with contributions from modern philosophers expounding relevant philosophical positions or discussing particular aspects of classical philosophy. The arrangement of the book is thematic, rather than chronological, allowing the reader to focus on philosophical problems and ideas, but a general introduction places philosophers and (...) schools within their historical context. Irwin brings together contributions which shaped debates about knowledge, freedom, ethics, politics, and religious belief - debates which continue to be contested today, 2500 years from their conception. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE Augustine the Philosopher There are, according to Augustine in the early work entitled soliloquia, two principal (indeed, strictly speaking, ...

Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but (...) ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason. (shrink)

The idea of freedom plays a key role in Plato's moral and political thought. In the Republic justice is shown to be beneficial because the just man alone is truly free. There are parallels here with modern discussions of freedom. The Laws argues that to be free a city must avoid the extremes of liberty and of authoritarianism. The legislator should rely on persuasion, not force, so that people willingly obey his laws. The underlying idea is that we are free (...) if we willingly follow the demands of reason rather than being coerced by external forces or by unruly desires. (shrink)

In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do (...) is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action. (shrink)

R. F. Stalley; VIII*—Plato's Doctrine Of Freedom, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 145–158, https://doi.org/10.11.

In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a course between incompatibilism, or the notion that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature, and compatibilism, or the notion that people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. Wolf argues that some of the forces which are beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it, enabling us to see the world for what it is. (...) The freedom we want is not independence from the world, but independence from the forces that prevent us from choosing how to live in the light of a sufficient appreciation of the world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This is a short companion piece to my ‘Found in Translation – Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.5 1113b7-8 and its Reception’ in which I examine in close textual analysis the philosophical question whether these two lines from the Nicomachean Ethics provide any evidence that Aristotle discussed free choice – as is not infrequently assumed. The result is that they do not, and that the claim that they do tends to be based on a mistranslation of the Greek. (There is some (...) inevitable overlap with Part 1 of the 'Found in Translation' paper.). (shrink)

That three of them were popularly regarded as correlated with the three ages of human life; that the structure of early Greek societies, as of other primitive societies, was based on the distinction of three main age-grades, of which the three virtues are characteristic; that Plato's own Ideal State has the same age basis underlying the other features peculiar to it, and is indeed transparently modelled on the Spartan constitution; that it is therefore probable that Plato started with the three (...) divisions of his State and their several virtues, and then, proceeding on the assumption that the ‘natural’ State must reflect on a large scale the constitution of the individual ‘nature,’ arranged the structure of the soul to correspond with his polity. (shrink)

Where does the notion of free will come from? How and when did it develop, and what did that development involve? In Michael Frede's radically new account of the history of this idea, the notion of a free will emerged from powerful assumptions about the relation between divine providence, correctness of individual choice, and self-enslavement due to incorrect choice. Anchoring his discussion in Stoicism, Frede begins with Aristotle--who, he argues, had no notion of a free will--and ends with Augustine. Frede (...) shows that Augustine, far from originating the idea, derived most of his thinking about it from the Stoicism developed by Epictetus. (shrink)

The debate between free will and its opposing doctrine, determinism, is one of the key issues in philosophy. Ilham Dilman brings together all the dimensions of the problem of free will with examples from literature, ethics and psychoanalysis, and draws out valuable insights from both sides of the freedom-determinism divide. The book provides a comprehensive introduction to this highly important question and examines the contributions made by sixteen of the most outstanding thinkers from the time of early Greece to modern (...) times: Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Freud, Sartre, Weil, Wittgenstein, Moore. (shrink)

R. F. Stalley; VIII*—Plato's Doctrine Of Freedom, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 145–158, https://doi.org/10.11.

That three of them were popularly regarded as correlated with the three ages of human life; that the structure of early Greek societies, as of other primitive societies, was based on the distinction of three main age-grades, of which the three virtues are characteristic; that Plato's own Ideal State has the same age basis underlying the other features peculiar to it, and is indeed transparently modelled on the Spartan constitution; that it is therefore probable that Plato started with the three (...) divisions of his State and their several virtues, and then, proceeding on the assumption that the ‘natural’ State must reflect on a large scale the constitution of the individual ‘nature,’ arranged the structure of the soul to correspond with his polity. (shrink)

What is the nature of norms and values for the constitution of human society and culture? In this groundbreaking work, T. K. Seung shows that this was the ultimate question for Plato throughout his life, and that he gave not one but two answers, thus twice inventing political philosophy as the science of all sciences. Providing a thematically unified interpretation of his dialogues on the grand scale, Seung retraces Plato's journey of invention. Plato Rediscovered extends the project Seung began in (...) Intuition and Construction and Kant's Platonic Revolution . A work that will radically alter our understanding of the philosopher. (shrink)

English summary: Rainer Hirsch-Luipold interprets the function of imagery in Plutarch's works in individual studies from a strictly literary and philosophical standpoint. For Plutarch, philosopher and priest, images cover different phenomena in art, literature and religion and emphasize the representative character of the entire visible world. German description: Denken in Bildern? Hatte die uberwaltigende Fulle von Bildern, von Vergleichen und Gleichnissen aus allen Bereichen des antiken Wissens, noch bis ins 18. Jahrhundert zur Beliebtheit von Plutarchs Schriften beigetragen, so galt sie (...) seit der Aufklarung eher als Zeichen mangelnder Seriositat und gedanklicher Stringenz. Rainer Hirsch-Luipold zeigt demgegenuber, wie Plutarch Bilder und Bildfelder als Teil einer besonderen philosophischen Darstellungsform begreift. Die umfassende Struktur des Bildhaften wird aus seiner Verwendung des griechischen Begriffs eikon deutlich. Unter diesem Begriff verbindet der Mittelplatoniker und delphische Priester Phanomene der darstellenden Kunst (Statue, Gemalde, Siegelabdruck etc.) und der Sprache (Gleichnis, Allegorie, Metapher, Ratselwort etc.) mit einer philosophischen Sicht der Welt als Abbild und Widerschein einer hoheren gottlichen Realitat. Neben Untersuchungen zur Rezeption von darstellender Kunst und zur Terminologie bildhafter Sprache bietet die Arbeit ausfuhrliche literarische und philosophische Interpretationen der Bildersprache ausgewahlter Schriften. Rainer Hirsch-Luipold interpretiert die Bilder als Teil der philosophischen Gedankenfuhrung, eroffnet so den Blick auf die philosophische und religionsgeschichtliche Bedeutung Plutarchs und fuhrt zugleich ein Instrument zur Analyse des Aufbaus und der Struktur seiner Schriften vor. Aufgrund ihrer religiosen Farbung wird die Bildersprache Plutarchs zudem als pagane Parallele zur gleichzeitig entstehenden Gleichnissprache des Neuen Testaments interessant. (shrink)