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  1. Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    When making decisions, people naturally face uncertainty about the potential consequences of their actions due in part to limits in their capacity to represent, evaluate or deliberate. Nonetheless, they aim to make the best decisions possible. In Decision Theory with a Human Face, Richard Bradley develops new theories of agency and rational decision-making, offering guidance on how 'real' agents who are aware of their bounds should represent the uncertainty they face, how they should revise their opinions as a result of (...)
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  • (1 other version)A treatise on probability.J. Keynes - 1924 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 31 (1):11-12.
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  • (1 other version)A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.
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  • A Treatise on Probability.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1922 - Philosophical Review 31 (2):180.
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  • False Precision, Surprise and Improved Uncertainty Assessment.Wendy S. Parker & James S. Risbey - 2015 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 373 (2055):20140453.
    An uncertainty report describes the extent of an agent’s uncertainty about some matter. We identify two basic requirements for uncertainty reports, which we call faithfulness and completeness. We then discuss two pitfalls of uncertainty assessment that often result in reports that fail to meet these requirements. The first involves adopting a one-size-fits-all approach to the representation of uncertainty, while the second involves failing to take account of the risk of surprises. In connection with the latter, we respond to the objection (...)
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  • Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision.Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson & Brian Hill - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):500–522.
    The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel framework for assessing and communicating uncertainty in the findings published in their periodic assessment reports. But how should these uncertainty assessments inform decisions? We take a formal decision-making perspective to investigate how scientific input formulated in the IPCC’s novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a normative decision model.
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  • Expert Judgment for Climate Change Adaptation.Erica Thompson, Roman Frigg & Casey Helgeson - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):1110-1121.
    Climate change adaptation is largely a local matter, and adaptation planning can benefit from local climate change projections. Such projections are typically generated by accepting climate model outputs in a relatively uncritical way. We argue, based on the IPCC’s treatment of model outputs from the CMIP5 ensemble, that this approach is unwarranted and that subjective expert judgment should play a central role in the provision of local climate change projections intended to support decision-making.
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