I argue that valid informed consent is ethically required for organ donation from individuals declared dead using neurological criteria. Current policies in the U.S. do not require this and, not surprisingly, current practices inhibit the possibility of informed consent. Relevant information is withheld, opportunities to ensure understanding and appreciation are extremely limited, and the ability to make and communicate a free and voluntary decision is hindered by incomplete disclosure and other practices. Current practices should be revised to facilitate valid informed (...) consent for organ donation. (shrink)

This paper challenges the foundational claim that the human family is no more than a social construction. It advances the position that the family is a central category of experience, being, and knowledge. Throughout, the analysis argues for the centrality of the family for human flourishing and, consequently, for the importance of sustaining family-oriented practices within social policy, such as more family-oriented approaches to consent to medical treatment. Where individually oriented approaches to medical decision-making accent an ethos of isolated personal (...) autonomy family-oriented approaches acknowledge the central social and moral reality of the family. I argue that the family ought to be appreciated as more than a mere network of personal relations and individual undertakings; the family possesses a being that is social and moral such that it realizes a particular structure of human good and sustains the necessary conditions for core areas of human flourishing. Moreover, since the family exists as a nexus of face-to-face relationships, the consent of persons, including adults, to be members of a particular family, subject to its own respective account of family sovereignty, is significantly more amply demonstrated than the consent of citizens to be under the authority of a particular state. As a result, in the face of a general Western bioethical affirmation of the autonomy of individuals, as if adults and children were morally and socially isolated agents, this paper argues that social space must nevertheless be made for families to choose on behalf of their own members. (shrink)

This volume explores Confucian views regarding the human body, health, virtue, suffering, suicide, euthanasia, `human drugs,' human experimentation, and justice in health care distribution. These views are rooted in Confucian metaphysical, cosmological, and moral convictions, which stand in contrast to modern Western liberal perspectives in a number of important ways. In the contemporary world, a wide variety of different moral traditions flourish; there is real moral diversity. Given this circumstance, difficult and even painful ethical conflicts often occur between the East (...) and the West with regard to the issues of life, birth, reproduction, and death. The essays in this volume analyze the ways in which Confucian bioethics can clarify important moral concepts, provide arguments, and offer ethical guidance. The volume should be of interest to both general readers coming afresh to the study of bioethics, ethics, and Confucianism, as well as for philosophers, ethicists, and other scholars already familiar with the subject. (shrink)

Despite its familiarity and widespread acceptance, the concept of “brain death” remains incoherent in theory and confused in practice. Moreover, the only purpose served by the concept is to facilitate the procurement of transplantable organs. By abandoning the concept of brain death and adopting different criteria for organ procurement, we may be able to increase both the supply of transplantable organs and clarity in our understanding of death.

A comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops and (...) defends distinctive accounts of the nature of personal identity, the evaluation of death, and the wrongness of killing. The central metaphysical claim of the book is that we are neither nonmaterial souls nor human organisms but are instead embodied minds. In ethical theory, one of the central claims is that the morality of killing is not unitary; rather, the principles that determine the morality of killing in marginal cases are different from those that govern the killing of persons who are self‐conscious and rational. Another important theme is that killing in marginal cases should be evaluated in terms of the impact it would have on the victim at the time rather than on the value of the victim's life as a whole. What primarily matters is how killing would affect that which would be rational for the victim to care about at the time of death. By appealing to various foundational claims about identity, death, and the morality of killing, this book yields novel conclusions about such issues as abortion, prenatal injury, infanticide, the killing of animals, the significance of brain death, the termination of life support in cases of persistent vegetative state, the use of anencephalic infants as sources of organs for transplantation, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and advance directives in cases of dementia. In particular, the book defends the moral permissibility of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in certain cases and argues that brain death is not the appropriate criterion of death either for a person or a human organism. (shrink)

Advances in life-saving technologies in the past few decades have challenged our traditional understandings of death. Traditionally, death was understood to occur when a person stops breathing, their heart stops beating and they are cold to the touch. Today, physicians determine death by relying on a diagnosis of ‘total brain failure’ or by waiting a short while after circulation stops. Evidence has emerged, however, that the conceptual bases for these approaches to determining death are fundamentally flawed and depart substantially from (...) the established biological conception of death. We argue that the current approach to determining death consists of two different types of unacknowledged legal fictions. These legal fictions were developed for practices that are largely ethically legitimate but need to be reconciled with the law. The considerable debate over the determination of death in the medical and scientific literature has not informed the public that vital organs are being procured from still-living donors and it seems unlikely that this information can remain hidden for long. Given the instability of the status quo and the difficulty of making the substantial legal changes required by complete transparency, we argue for a second-best policy solution: acknowledging the legal fictions involved in determining death to move in the direction of greater transparency. This may someday result in more substantial legal change to directly confront the challenges raised by life-sustaining and life-preserving technologies without the need for fictions. (shrink)

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The dead have no interests and are beyond both harm or benefit, but warrant for respecting the wishes of the dead may be found in the traditional notion of the social contract.

: Research by Siminoff and colleagues reveals that many lay people in Ohio classify legally living persons in irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state (PVS) as dead and that additional respondents, although classifying such patients as living, would be willing to procure organs from them. This paper analyzes possible implications of these findings for public policy. A majority would procure organs from those in irreversible coma or in PVS. Two strategies for legitimizing such procurement are suggested. One strategy would be (...) to make exceptions to the dead donor rule permitting procurement from those in PVS or at least those who are in irreversible coma while continuing to classify them as living. Another strategy would be to further amend the definition of death to classify one or both groups as deceased, thus permitting procurement without violation of the dead donor rule. Permitting exceptions to the dead donor rule would require substantial changes in law—such as authorizing procuring surgeons to end the lives of patients by means of organ procurement—and would weaken societal prohibitions on killing. The paper suggests that it would be easier and less controversial to further amend the definition of death to classify those in irreversible coma and PVS as dead. Incorporation of a conscience clause to permit those whose religious or philosophical convictions support whole-brain or cardiac-based death pronouncement would avoid violating their beliefs while causing no more than minimal social problems. The paper questions whether those who would support an exception to the dead donor rule in these cases and those would support a further amendment to the definition of death could reach agreement to adopt a public policy permitting organ procurement of those in irreversible coma or PVS when proper consent is obtained. (shrink)

In the West, mainstream bioethicists tend to appreciate intimate relationships as a hindrance to individual autonomy. Scholars have even argued against approaching a mother to donate a kidney to save the life of her child; the request, they claim, is too manipulative and, thereby, violates her autonomy. For Chinese bioethicists, such a moral analysis is absurd. The intimate relationship between mother and child establishes strong mutual obligations. It creates mutual moral responsibilities that often require sacrifices for each other. This paper (...) argues that while aiding others is a moral duty, helping one’s family is a much stronger duty and poses no threat to one’s autonomy. For Confucianism, empathetic intimate feelings, the heart and mind of ren, rest at the root of morality. It requires that we, as moral beings, assume duties to relieve the suffering of others. The more intimate the relationship the stronger the obligation to assist. The family is a closely knitted moral community. Family members often share living resources, mutual experiences, and a sense of identity. Family members act as a social unit, and, ordinarily, mutual obligations among members have priority over duties to those outside of the family. For Confucian bioethics, family-based consent to medical treatment is regarded as natural and reasonable. Family-based decision making is a taken-for-granted norm of social life. While close family members have priority, Confucianism extends such obligations outward toward members of the extended family and the society at large. There is a general principle of gradation of love, which reflects different degrees of personal intimacy and, therefore, of moral obligation. In this fashion, Confucianism seeks to treat the whole of society as one extended family. Hence, in bioethics, mutual responsibility and family-based consent are regarded as basic principles. Through a series of case discussions, this paper illustrates that atomistic individual-based autonomy offers but a poor response to bioethical issues. (shrink)

The problem of this philosophical study was to analyze the concept of trust for its nature, scope, and value, and to apply this analysis to an investigation of trust claims in therapeutic relationships between patients and practitioners. The analysis included semantic, literary, sociological, epistemological, and moral considerations. Classical philosophical texts were examined in order to determine the importance of trust as an instrumental value and as a requirement for morally desirable societies. Contemporary sociological theories regarding the function of trust were (...) examined, as was the relationship of trust to the norm of truthfulness. Contemporary philosophical arguments which claim that trust is a value central to morality were examined. Trust was examined for its normative features, including the rationality of trust and its intrinsic value in interpersonal relationships. The following philosophical definition of trust was provided: Trust is the confident belief based on possibly tenuous evidence that others can be believed to act with good will. Four distinct forms of trust were identified. These were: the act of entrusting or consigning to another the care or custody of one's goods or interests; the rendering of a judgment regarding the trustworthy virtues of another; the epistemic attitude of confidence based on the belief in the functional ability and reliability of others; the attitude of assuming that or acting-as-if the word of others can be accepted as true and as if others were worthy of trust. ;This philosophical conception of trust was then applied to the health care setting where an examination of two general classes of expectations regarding trust was undertaken. These expectations were of technical competence and role performance of health care practitioners and fiduciary obligation. Contemporary codes of ethics in medicine, psychiatry, and nursing were examined with regard to trust and claims made by practitioners regarding it. The claim that patients are obligated to trust their physicians was challenged. Trust in therapeutic relationships was seen to be a moral value which is elevated to the status of a moral principle and defended within a theory of care. (shrink)

Politics in America are polarized and trivialized, perhaps as never before. In Congress, the media, and academic debate, opponents from right and left, the Red and the Blue, struggle against one another as if politics were contact sports played to the shouts of cheerleaders. The result, Ronald Dworkin writes, is a deeply depressing political culture, as ill equipped for the perennial challenge of achieving social justice as for the emerging threats of terrorism. Can the hope for change be realized? Dworkin, (...) one the world's leading legal and political philosophers, identifies and defends core principles of personal and political morality that all citizens can share. He shows that recognizing such shared principles can make substantial political argument possible and help replace contempt with mutual respect. Only then can the full promise of democracy be realized in America and elsewhere. Dworkin lays out two core principles that citizens should share: first, that each human life is intrinsically and equally valuable and, second, that each person has an inalienable personal responsibility for identifying and realizing value in his or her own life. He then shows what fidelity to these principles would mean for human rights, the place of religion in public life, economic justice, and the character and value of democracy. Dworkin argues that liberal conclusions flow most naturally from these principles. Properly understood, they collide with the ambitions of religious conservatives, contemporary American tax and social policy, and much of the War on Terror. But his more basic aim is to convince Americans of all political stripes--as well as citizens of other nations with similar cultures--that they can and must defend their own convictions through their own interpretations of these shared values. (shrink)

The controversy over brain death and the dead donor rule continues unabated, with some of the same key points and positions starting to see repetition in the literature. One might wonder whether some of the participants are talking past each other, not all debating the same issue, even though they are using the same words (e.g., “death”). One reason for this is the complexity of the debate: It’s not merely about the nature of human life and death. Interwoven into this (...) debate are deep philosophical issues on realism, the normative/descriptive distinction, the relation of thought and language to the world, the mind–body problem, personhood, moral status, and the ethics of killing. There are also social and legal .. (shrink)

This article examines the impact of traditional Chinese culture on organ donation from the perspective of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. In each of these cultural systems, it appears that there are some particular sayings or remarks that are often taken in modern Chinese society to be contrary to organ donation, especially cadaveric organ donation. However, this article argues that the central concerns of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism are “great love,” “ren,” and “dao,” which can be reasonably interpreted to support organ (...) donation. The author understands that each cultural system, in order to play its cultural function, must have its central concerns as well as relevant ritual practices (li) that incarnate its religious and ethical commitments. That is, each plays a general cultural role, which influences organ donation in particular not merely through abstract or general ethical principles and teachings, but through a combination of ethical teachings and the forming of particular ritual practices. This article contends that the primary reason Chinese individuals fail to donate sufficient cadaveric organs for transplantation is not because particular remarks or sayings from each of these systems appear to conflict with donation. Neither is it that the central concerns of these systems cannot support cadaveric donation. Rather, it is that modern Chinese individuals have failed to develop and secure relevant ritual practices that support the central concerns of organ transplantation. The article concludes that in order to promote more donations, there is a need to form relevant ritual practices supporting organ donation in conformity with the central concerns of these cultural systems. (shrink)

Medicine needs our trust. We need to be able to rely on individual clinicians and researchers, and we need to be able to have confidence in hospitals and clinics. Yet the organization of our healthcare institutions is not designed to promote that trust. In fact, the structure of our medical institutions seems to undermine our faith.

Many accounts of the historical development of neurological criteria for determination of death insufficiently distinguish between two strands of interpretation advanced by advocates of a "whole-brain" criterion. One strand focuses on the brain as the organ of integration. Another provides a far more complex and nuanced account, both of death and of a policy on the determination of death. Current criticisms of the whole-brain criterion are effective in refuting the first interpretation, but not the second, which is advanced in the (...) 2008 President's Council report on the determination of death. In this essay, I seek to further develop this second strand of interpretation. I argue that policy on determination of death aligns moral, biological, and ontological death concepts. Morally, death marks the stage when respect is no longer owed. Biologically, death concerns integrated functioning of an organism as a whole. But the biological concepts are underdetermined. The moral concerns lead to selection of strong individuality concepts rather than weak ones. They also push criteria to the "far side" of the dying process. There is a countervailing consideration associated with optimizing the number of available organs, and this pushes to the "near side" of death. Policy is governed by a conviction that it is possible to align these moral and biological death concepts, but this conviction simply lays out an agenda. There is also a prescription—integral to the dead donor rule—that lexically prioritizes the deontic concerns and that seeks to balance the countervailing tendencies by using science-based refinements to make the line between life and death more precise. After showing how these concerns have been effectively aligned in the current policy, I present a modified variant of a "division" scenario and show how an "inverse decapitation problem" leads to a conclusive refutation of the nonbrain account of death. (shrink)

Bioethics is a subject far removed from the Chinese, even from many Chinese medical students and medical professionals. In-depth interviews with eighteen physicians, patients, and family members provided a deeper understanding of bioethical practices in contemporary China, especially with regard to the doctor-patient relationship (DPR) and informed consent. The Chinese model of doctor-family-patient relationship (DFPR), instead of DPR, is taken to reflect Chinese Confucian cultural commitments. An examination of the history of Chinese culture and the profession of medicine in China (...) is used to disclose the deep roots of these commitments. The author predicts that the DFPR model will further develop in China but that it will maintain its Chinese character. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that the doctor-patient relationship can be viewed as a vessel of trust. Nonetheless, trust within the doctor-patient relationship has been impaired by managed care. When we conceive of trust as social capital, focusing on the role that it plays in individual and social well-being, trust can be viewed as a public good and a scarce medical resource. Given this, there is a moral obligation to protect the doctor-patient relationship from the cost-containment mechanisms that compromise its (...) ability to produce trust. (shrink)

No one really believes that literally all functions of the entire brain must be lost for an individual to be dead. A better definition of death involves a higher brain orientation.

In China, state investment into public hospitals has radically decreased since the early 1980s and has brought on the dismantling of the healthcare system in most parts of the country, especially in rural areas. As a result of this overhaul, the majority of public hospitals have needed to compete in the so-called socialist market economy. The market economy stimulated public hospitals to modernize, take on highly qualified medical professionals, and dispense new therapies and drugs. At same time, liberalization has clearly (...) affected the attitude and behavior of both medical professionals and the general public. The public has many concerns about the healthcare system for various reasons: there are long hospital waiting lists, patients experience difficulties in obtaining an appointment to see a qualified doctor, and, over the past decades, there has been an increase in out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure. These and other changes in post-reform China have radically reshaped the doctor–patient interaction, which is increasingly eroded by tension and violence. (shrink)

People often have strong views about being the subjects of research after their deaths. Should these views be given any weight and, if so, how much? How could we find out what the views are and what should we do if we cannot? This paper defends the idea of posthumous interests and discusses the significance of those interests for research ethics. It argues that we can be guided by a symmetry between the interests of living and dead people and uses (...) posthumous privacy as an example. It also claims that the weight of those interests might not decline even over long periods of time. The arguments have important implications for the ethics of (amongst others) biomedical, archaeological, anthropological, historical, and sociological research. (shrink)

In its October 2001 issue, this journal published a series of articles questioning the Whole-Brain-based definition of death. Much of the concern focused on whether somatic integration - a commonly understood basis for the whole-brain death view - can survive the brain's death. The present article accepts that there are insurmountable problems with whole-brain death views, but challenges the assumption that loss of somatic integration is the proper basis for pronouncing death. It examines three major themes. First, it accepts the (...) claim of the "disaggregators" that some behaviors traditionally associated with death can be unbundled, but argues that other behaviors (including organ procurement) must continue to be associated. Second, it rejects the claims of the "somaticists," that the integration of the body is critical, arguing instead for equating death with the irreversible loss of "embodied consciousness," that is, the loss of integration of bodily and mental function. Third, it defends higher-brain views against the charge that they are necessarily "mentalist," that is, that they equate death with losing some mental function such as consciousness or personhood. It argues, instead, for the integration of bodily and mental function as the critical feature of human life and that its irreversible loss constitutes death. (shrink)

This book brings together, in systematic and generalized form, the main outlines of a conceptual scheme for the analysis of the structure and processes of social systems. It carries out Pareto's intention by using the "structural-functional" level of analysis.

This book challenges fundamental doctrines of established medical ethics. It is argued that the routine practice of stopping life support technology causes the death of patients and that donors of vital organs (hearts, liver, lungs, and both kidneys) are not really dead at the time that their organs are removed for life-saving transplantation. Although these practices are ethically legitimate, they are not compatible with traditional medical ethics: they conflict with the norms that doctors must not intentionally cause the death of (...) their patients and that vital organs can be obtained only from dead donors. The aim of this book is to undertake an ethical examination that aims to honestly face the reality of medical practices at the end of life. This involves exposing the misconception that stopping life support merely allows patients to die from their medical conditions, that there is an ethical bright line separating withdrawal of life support from active euthanasia, and that determination of death of hospitalized patients prior to vital organ donation is consistent with the established biological conception of death. A novel ethical justification is required for procuring vital organs from still-living donors. It is contended that in the context of plans to withdraw life support, donors of vital organs are not harmed or wronged by organ procurement prior to death, provided that valid consent is obtained for stopping treatment and organ donation. In view of serious practical difficulties in facing the truth regarding organ donation, an alternative pragmatic account is developed for justifying current practices that relies on the concept of transparent legal fictions. In sum, it is the thesis of this book that to preserve the legitimacy of end-of-life practices, we need to reconstruct medical ethics. (shrink)

Background Requirements for organ donation after cardiac or imminent death have been introduced to address the transplantable organs shortage in the United States. Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) increasingly use the Internet for organ donation consent. Methods An analysis of OPO Web sites available to the public for enrollment and consent for organ donation. The Web sites and consent forms were examined for the minimal information recommended by the United States Department of Health and Human Services for informed consent. Content scores (...) were calculated as percentages of data elements in four information categories: donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, donation promotion, and informed consent. Results There were 60 Web sites for organ donation enrollment serving the 52 states. The median percent (10 percentile-90 percentile) content scores of the Web sites for donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, and donation promotion were 33% (20–47), 79% (57–86), and 75% (50–100), respectively. The informed consent score was 0% (0–33). The content scores for donor knowledge and informed consent were significantly lower than donor consent reinforcement and donation promotion for all Web sites (P < .05). The content scores for the four categories were similar among the 11 regions of the United Network for Organ Sharing. Conclusion The Web sites and consent forms for public enrollment in organ donation do not fulfill the necessary requirements for informed consent. The Web sites predominantly provide positive reinforcement and promotional information rather than the transparent disclosure of organ donation process. Independent regulatory oversight is essential to ensure that Internet enrollment for organ donation complies with legal and ethical standards for informed consent. (shrink)

Trust relations in medicine are argued to be a requisite response to the special vulnerability of persons as patients. Even so, the problem of motivating trust remains a vital concern. On this score, it is argued that a strong motivation can be found in recognizing that professional self-interest actually entails cultivation of patient trust as a means to maintain professional self-governance. And while the initial move to restore trust must be provoked from such narrow concerns, the process of sustaining trust (...) will require educational initiatives aimed at restoring attitudes and skills suggestive of Percival's concept of empathic care. By including such initiatives, future waves of medical professionals are apt to sustain trust with deepened commitments to character, care, and trust as constitutive properties of their professional mission. (shrink)

Cadaver organs should be automatically availableThe shortage of donor organs and tissue for transplantation constitutes an acute emergency which demands radical rethinking of our policies and radical measures. While estimates vary and are difficult to arrive at there is no doubt that the donor organ shortage costs literally hundreds of thousands of lives every year. “In the world as a whole there are an estimated 700 000 patients on dialysis . . .. In India alone 100 000 new patients present (...) with kidney failure each year” . Almost “three million Americans suffer from congestive heart failure . . . deaths related to this condition are estimated at 250 000 each year . . . 27 000 patients die annually from liver disease . . .. In Western Europe as a whole 40 000 patients await a kidney but only . . . 10 000 kidneys”1 become available. Nobody knows how many people fail to make it onto the waiting lists and fail to register in the statistics. “As of 24th November 2002 in the United Kingdom 667 people have donated organs, 2055 people have received transplants, and 5615 people are still awaiting transplants.”2Conscious of the terrible and unnecessary tragedy that figures like these represent I have been advocating for more than 20 years now some radical measures to stem this appalling waste of human life. The measure which is the subject of Hamer and Rivlin’s paper 3 concerns the automatic availability of all cadaver organs—a measure, which I first advocated publicly in 1983.4THE AUTOMATIC AVAILABILITY OF DONOR ORGANSWe need to begin by being clear about just what it is I propose and why. At the moment in the United Kingdom we …. (shrink)

The “standard position” on organ donation is that the donor must be dead in order for vital organs to be removed, a position with which we agree. Recently, Robert Truog and Walter Robinson have argued that brain death is not death, and even though “brain dead” patients are not dead, it is morally acceptable to remove vital organs from those patients. We accept and defend their claim that brain death is not death, and we argue against both the US “whole (...) brain” criterion and the UK “brain stem” criterion. Then we answer their arguments in favour of removing vital organs from “brain dead” and other classes of comatose patients. We dispute their claim that the removal of vital organs is morally equivalent to “letting nature take its course”, arguing that, unlike “allowing to die”, it is the removal of vital organs that kills the patient, not his or her disease or injury. Then, we argue that removing vital organs from living patients is immoral and contrary to the nature of medical practice. Finally, we offer practical suggestions for changing public policy on organ transplantation. (shrink)

No one has the right to say what should be done to their body after deathIn my opinion any concept of property in the human body either during life or after death is biologically inaccurate and morally wrong. The body should be regarded as on loan to the individual from the biomass, to which the cadaver will inevitably return. Development of immunosuppressive drugs has resulted in the cadaver becoming a unique and invaluable resource to those who will benefit from organ (...) donation. Faced with the biological reality, the moral error of any concept of property in the body, and the quantitative failure of voluntary organ donation, I believe that the right of control over the cadaver should be vested in the state as representative of those who may benefit from organ donation.How one regards the dead human body, the cadaver, is in part governed by one’s familiarity with it. At the present time, very few people ever see a cadaver which has not in some way been altered after death, and even fewer touch, handle, deal in any way with the dead human body. In developed countries, death itself most frequently occurs away from the home, in an institution, under the supervision of professional caregivers. For most people, ideas concerning the cadaver, its nature, the proper way to deal with it, are formed under these conditions.As a pathologist specialising in forensic pathology, for 50 years I have been at the other end of the spectrum of experience. In my daily work I have been privileged to examine the cadaver in all its stages after death from the immediate postmortem moments through all the stages of decomposition to bare bones. Working in a relatively small community, I have sometimes been charged with examining the body of someone I …. (shrink)

Modern Western medical individualism has had a significant impact on health care in China. This essay demonstrates the ways in which such Western-style individualism has been explicitly endorsed in China’s 2010 directive: The Basic Norms of the Documentation of the Medical Record. The Norms require that the patient himself, rather than a member of his family, sign each informed consent form. This change in clinical practice indicates a shift toward medical individualism in Chinese healthcare legislation. Such individualism, however, is incompatible (...) with the character of Chinese familism that is deeply rooted in the Chinese ethical tradition. It also contradicts family-based patterns of health care in China. Moreover, the requirement for individual informed consent is incompatible with numerous medical regulations promulgated in the past two decades. This essay argues that while Chinese medical legislation should learn from relevant Western ideas, it should not simply copy such practices by importing medical individualism into Chinese health care. Chinese healthcare policy is properly based on Chinese medical familist resources. (shrink)

Since the Harvard Committees bold and highly successful attempt to redefine death in 1968 (Harvard Ad Hoc committee, 1968), multiple controversies have arisen. Stimulated by several factors, including the inherent conceptual weakness of the Harvard Committees proposal, accumulated clinical experience, and the incessant push to expand the pool of potential organ donors, the lively debate about the definition of death has, for the most part, been confined to a relatively small group of academics who have created a large body of (...) literature of which this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy is an example. Law and public policy, however, have remained essentially unaffected. This paper will briefly review the multiple controversies about defining death in an attempt to explain why they have and will remain unresolved in the academic community and have even less chance of being understood and resolved by politicians, legislators, and the general public. Considering this, we will end by suggesting the probable course of public policy and clinical practice in the decades ahead. (shrink)

A number of prominent nonconsequentialists support the thesis that we can wrong the dead by violating their moral claims. In contrast, this study suggests that the arguments offered by Thomson, Scanlon, Dworkin, Feinberg and others do not warrant posthumous rights because having claim-grounding interests requires an entity to have the capacity to experience significance. If dead people don't have this capacity, there is no reason to attribute claims to them. Raising doubts about prominent hypothetical examples of ‘no-effect injury’, the study (...) concludes that nonconsequentialists should consider adopting an error theory regarding posthumous claims, and suggests two alternative explanations of the relevant moral domains. (shrink)

This article discusses the practice and development of organ donation by capital prisoners in China. It analyzes the issue of informed consent regarding organ donation from capital prisoners in light of Confucian ethics and expounds the point that under the influence of Confucianism, China is a country that attaches great importance to the role of the family in practicing informed consent in various areas, the area of organ donation from capital prisoners included. It argues that a proper form of organ (...) donation from capital prisoners can be justified within the Confucian moral context in which the proper interests of capital prisoners and their families, the benefit of organ receptors, and a rightful order of society should all be appropriately considered. From the Confucian perspective, the act of donating organs from a capital prisoner must be decided by both the prisoner and his/her family (i.e., each side should hold a veto power), whereas such donation, in the proper circumstance protected by a rightful procedure, should be appreciated as a morally praiseworthy act of the prisoner who is willing to make the final effort to repent and correct his/her evil conduct and to leave something good to the world. (shrink)

Traditionally, people were recognized as being dead using cardio-respiratory criteria: individuals who had permanently stopped breathing and whose heart had permanently stopped beating were dead. Technological developments in the middle of the twentieth century and the advent of the intensive care unit made it possible to sustain cardio-respiratory and other functions in patients with severe brain injury who previously would have lost such functions permanently shortly after sustaining a brain injury. What could and should physicians caring for such patients do? (...) Significant advances in human organ transplantation also played direct and indirect roles in discussions regarding the care of such patients. Because successful transplantation requires that organs be removed from cadavers shortly after death to avoid organ damage due to loss of oxygen, there has been keen interest in knowing precisely when people are dead so that organs could be removed. Criteria for declaring death using neurological criteria developed, and today a whole brain definition of death is widely used and recognized by all 50 states in the United States as an acceptable way to determine death. We explore the ongoing debate over definitions of death, particularly over brain death or death determined using neurological criteria, and the relationship between definitions of death and organ transplantation. (shrink)