Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Lucky Achievement: Virtue Epistemology on the Value of Knowledge.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):303-311.
    Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
    To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory ; it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
    This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1061 citations  
  • Many Faces of Virtue.Thomas Hurka - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):496-503.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Moral worth.Paul Benson - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):365 - 382.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Kant, nonaccidentalness and the availability of moral worth.Steven Sverdlik - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):293-313.
    Contemporary Kantians who defend Kant''s view of the superiority of the sense of duty as a form of motivation appeal to various ideas. Some say, if only implicitly, that the sense of duty is always ``available'''' to an agent, when she has a moral obligation. Some, like Barbara Herman, say that the sense of duty provides a ``nonaccidental'''' connection between an agent''s motivation and the act''s rightness. In this paper I show that the ``availability'''' and ``nonaccidentalness'''' arguments are in tension (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories.Michael Stocker - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453-466.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   285 citations  
  • The practice of moral judgment.Barbara Herman - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (8):414-436.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   333 citations  
  • What Kant might have said: Moral worth and the overdetermination of dutiful action.Richard G. Henson - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):39-54.
    My purpose is to account for some oddities in what Kant did and did not say about "moral worth," and for another in what commentators tell us about his intent. The stone with which I hope to dispatch these several birds is-as one would expect a philosopher's stone to be-a distinction. I distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Sir David Ross on duty and purpose in Kant.Lewis White Beck - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (1):98-107.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality.Peter Railton - 1988 - In Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its critics. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Moral Worth and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Some right acts have what philosophers call moral worth. A right act has moral worth if and only if its agent deserves credit for having acted rightly in this instance. And I argue that an agent deserves credit for having acted rightly if and only if her act issues from an appropriate set of concerns, where the appropriateness of these concerns is a function what her ultimate moral concerns should be. Two important upshots of the resulting account of moral worth (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Moral Worth: Having It Both Ways.Jessica Isserow - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (10):529-556.
    It is commonly recognized that one can act rightly without being praiseworthy for doing so. Those who act rightly from ignoble motives, for instance, do not strike us as fitting targets of moral praise; their actions seem to lack moral worth. Though there is broad agreement that only certain kinds of motives confer moral worth on our actions, there is disagreement as to which ones are up to the task. Many theorists confine themselves to two possibilities: praiseworthy agents are thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.David Faraci - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    Many philosophers hold out hope that some final condition on knowledge will allow us to overcome the limitations of the classic "justified true belief" analysis. The most popular intuitive glosses on this condition frame it as an absence of epistemic coincidence. In this paper, I lay the groundwork for an explanationist account of epistemic coincidence—one according to which, roughly, beliefs are non-coincidentally true if and only if they bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. The paper contains (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.Zoe Johnson King - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418.
    ABSTRACTAchievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently, only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.
    Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g., safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. We show that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident.Jessica Isserow - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):251-264.
    ABSTRACTKantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue of accommodating two plausible intuitions—that the praiseworthiness of an action is never ac...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Acting from Duty.Dieter Schönecker & Christoph Horn - 2006 - In Dieter Schönecker & Christoph Horn (eds.), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Walter de Gruyter.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Good Without Limitation.Dieter Schönecker & Christoph Horn - 2006 - In Dieter Schönecker & Christoph Horn (eds.), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Walter de Gruyter.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Right and the Good. By R. Robinson. [REVIEW]W. D. Ross - 1930 - International Journal of Ethics 41:343.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   400 citations  
  • Varieties of moral worth and moral credit.Holly M. Smith - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):279-303.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations