Joseph Owens presents an introduction to metaphysics designed to develop in the reader a habitus of thinking. Using original Thomistic texts and Etienne Gilson's interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, Owens examines the application of metaphysical principles to the issues that arise in a specifically Christian environment. An Elementary Christian Metaphysics focuses on questions of existence and the nature of revealed truths. Following his historical introduction to metaphysics, Owens provides a general investigation of the first principles and causes of being and (...) also a study of knowledge and of the divine nature and attributes in light of natural reason. "Irrespective of one's intellectual genotype, an exposure to the sustained, developmental elucidation of Aquinas' insights executed by an author such as Owens can only enhance any metaphysical approach to reality." --The New Scholastic "An Elementary Christian Metaphysics is intended primarily for undergraduate students as an introduction to metaphysics. . . . The scope of the metaphysical study pursued by Owens includes not only a general investigation of beings but also an analysis of knowledge (epistemology) and of the divine nature, all in light of natural reason." --Studies in Religion Joseph Owens (1908-2005) taught philosophy at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and the University of Toronto for forty years. He is the author of a number of books, including An Interpretation of Existence, also published by the University of Notre Dame Press. (shrink)

This update to the award-winning first edition analyzes the pros and cons of different media and focuses on general guidelines and basic principles, making the ideas in this guide transferable to future technologies.

According to Thomas Aquinas, both logic and metaphysics are characterized by the same universal scope. The consideration of metaphysics extends to everthing which is, as its subject is being insofar as it is being. And the science of logic too considers everything which is, not as it exists in reality but insofar as the whole of being falls under the consideration of reason. Because of the equivalence between the logical sphere of reason and the real sphere of being metaphysics has (...) an affinity with logic. This similarity is mentioned by Aquinas in order to explain the legitimate use of a logical mode of reasoning within metaphysics. Metaphysics is not identical with logic, but the modus logicus, the logical mode of reasoning, is to a certain extent useful for the philosopher in his inquiry into metaphysical matters. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Thomas refers frequently to this ‘modus logicus' by which Aristotle is said to proceed in his investigation into substance. However, it is not altogether clear what this method consists in and how the similarity between logic and metaphysics, on which the modus logicus is based, should be understood. In this article I want to clarify the meaning of the modus logicusin Aquinas and its revelance for metaphysics. This might help us to understand better how according to Thomas logic and metaphysics are related to one another and in what sense they are different. (shrink)

Generally, ontological categories are understood to express the most general features of reality; however, obtaining a complete category list is difficult. This volume examines how Aquinas establishes the list of categories through a technique of identifying diversity—in how predicates are related to their subjects. A sophisticated critique by Scotus is also examined—a rejection which is fundamentally grounded in the idea that no real distinction can be made from a logical one. It is argued Aquinas's approach can be rehabilitated in that (...) real distinctions are possible when specifically considering modes of predication. This discussion between Aquinas and Scotus bears fruit in a contemporary context insofar as it bears upon, strengthens, and seeks to correct Lowe's four-category ontology view regarding the identity and relation of the categories. (shrink)

Scotus claims that the extramental world is divided into ten distinct kinds of essences, no one of which can be reduced to another one. Although by the end of the thirteenth century this claim was not new, Scotus's way of articulating it into a comprehensive metaphysical doctrine resulted into a ground-breaking contribution to what became known as 'late medieval realism'. This paper shows how Scotus's view of the categories as ten kinds of irreducible essences should be seen as a development (...) and correction of his predecessors' (including Thomas Aquinas's and Henry of Ghent's) views. The main elements of Scotus's doctrine are his application of the real distinction to the categories, his view of inherence as a categorial item separated from accidents, and his distinction between absolute and non-absolute accidents. Finally, although Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being seems to pose a challenge to his claim that categories are irreducible to each other and do not have anything in common, this paper shows how Scotus's doctrine of univocity and his realist conception of the categories can be reconciled as two theories that describe the world from different points of view. (shrink)

Although scholars agree that Aquinas believed the pagan could possess “true but imperfect” virtues, there is deep disagreement over the question of how these “true but imperfect” virtues should be understood. Some scholars argue that Aquinas believed the pagan’s imperfect virtues are nonetheless ordered to a genuinely good end (his natural good) and are connected by acquired prudence. Other scholars argue that Aquinas believed that any virtues that the pagan possesses are considerably more limited: they are more akin to dispositions (...) than habits, and they are not connected. This paper argues that this latter position is incoherent. If one is willing to concede that the pagan can perform genuinely good actions, then one must concede that the pagan can possess genuine (albeit imperfect) virtues that are connected by acquired prudence. (shrink)

The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily (...) accessible to English speaking readers. (shrink)

This article gives a basic account of Aquinas’s theory of “synderesis” and conscience. Aquinas understands synderesis as an infallible moral awareness and conscience as the fallible judgment that applies a general moral conviction to a concrete case. The article also compares Aquinas’s and his contemporaries’ theories of whether erring conscience is morally binding, that is, whether to act in accord with erring conscience or against erring conscience is sinful.

Whence the categories? -- The body problem in Aristotle -- Form -- Prime matter -- Quality -- Quantity -- Substance.

The contributors to this volume cover a wide range of philosophers, from Simplicius to John Wyclif, and philosophical problems, including: the harmony of ...

Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Metaphysics has long been con sidered by many as one of the most interesting, most rewarding of all his works. Yet strangely enough, there has been no extensive study of this work, at least none that has ever reached print. It is in the hope of partially filling this gap in medieval research that the present study of the metaphysical system of the Commentary was conceived. However, the discussion of the Commentary's metaphysics must simultaneously be (...) an investigation into the reasons which motivated Aquinas in the composition of his work. Did he wish to expose only the theories of Aristotle, or did he simultaneously intend to present his own metaphysical views? Obviously, we must learn the answer to this before we can proceed to disentangle the metaphysical system, or systems, operative in Aquinas' Commentary. Up to the present day this problem, the nature of Aquinas' exposition has not been answered in a manner acceptable to all. Generally speak ing, three theories have been advanced. A first one would see the 1 Commentary as an objective exposition of Aristotle. A second opinion views Aquinas' exposition as an attempt to express his own personal 2 theories on metaphysics. And finally, the third view divides within the Commentary paragraphs containing Aquinas' personal thought ... (shrink)

ONE COULD SAY THAT THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS was born of Parmenides wondering how to divide being. His reasoning, namely that nothing belonging to being could divide it, and that nonbeing, since it in no way exists, cannot divide anything, set the terms of the problem within which the great Western traditions of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics developed. In reply to this Parmenidian challenge to divide being, Plato writes in the Sophist of the participation of being in the other, and (...) Aristotle in the Metaphysics of a pros hen equivocation of the name being. In response to the same seminal challenge to divide being, Thomas Aquinas speaks in the Quaestiones de veritate of modes of being and of modes of existing. Yet this terminology is barely acknowledged by Thomistic commentators. (shrink)