Introduction to Phenomenology is an outstanding and comprehensive guide to an important but often little-understood movement in European philosophy. Dermot Moran lucidly examines the contributions of phenomenology's nine seminal thinkers: Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. Written in a clear and engaging style, this volume charts the course of the movement from its origins in Husserl to its transformation by Derrida. It describes the thought of Heidegger and Sartre, phenomenology's most famous thinkers, and introduces and assesses (...) the distinctive use of phenomenology by some of its lesser-known exponents, such as Levinas, Arendt and Gadamer. Throughout, the enormous influence of phenomenology on the course of twentieth-century philosophy is thoroughly explored. Clearly explaining technical terms and avoiding jargon, Introduction to Phenomenology is an indispensable introduction to the history and substance of this vital current in intellectual thought. (shrink)

Now available in a Harper Colophon edition, this classic book has revolutionized thinking throughout the Western world about the nature of the psychiatric profession and the moral implications of its practices. Book jacket.

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

“He devoured her with his eyes.” This expression and many other signs point to the illusion common to both realism and idealism: to know is to eat. After a hundred years of academicism, French philosophy remains at that point. We have all read Brunschvicg, Lalande, and Meyerson,2 we have all believed that the spidery mind trapped things in its web, covered them with a white spit and slowly swallowed them, reducing them to its own substance. What is a table, a (...) rock, a house? Answer: a certain assemblage of “contents of consciousness,” a class of such contents. Oh digestive philosophy! Yet nothing seemed more obvious: is not the table the actual content of my perception? Is not my perception the present state of my consciousness? Nutrition, assimilation! Assimilation, Lalande said, of things to ideas, of ideas by ideas, of minds by minds. The corpulent skeletons of the world were picked clean by these diligent diastases: assimilation, unification, identification. The simplest and plainest among us vainly looked for something solid, something not just mental, but would encounter everywhere only a soft and very genteel mist: themselves. (shrink)

Anyone with a serious interest in analytical psychology or existential phenomenology will need to take account of this book.

This study, based upon empirical phenomenological research, explores an essential phenomenon of human existence: the interpermeating communion of self and world. In interpermeation, the supposed separation of self and world is transcended. The being, energy, life, and meaning of the world "flow into" one's self and become integrated as part of who one is; simultaneously, one's being, consciousness, awareness, and self "flow into" the world and become part of the world. Conscious of interpermeation, we tend to understand ourselves and reality (...) differently, and to be more aware and compassionate with others and the natural world: awareness of interpermeation generates love as love generates awareness of interpermeation. A hermeneutic dialogue is offered between existential phenomenology, transpersonal psychology, and the world's spiritual traditions. (shrink)

Paradigmatically led by existential phenomenological premises, as formulated by Jean-Paul Sartre and Edmund Husserl specifically, this paper aims at a deconstruction of the value of psychiatric labelling in terms of the implications of such labelling for the labelled individual’s experience of freedom as a conscious imperative. This work has as its intention the destabilisation of labelling as a stubborn and inexorable mechanism for social propriety and regularity, which in its unyielding classificatory brandings is Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 2, (...) Edition 1, April 2002. (shrink)

Martin Buber was close to sociology and sociologists from his university years on and in 1938 was head of the new Department of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Although influenced by Ferdinand Toennies, and George Simmel, he went beyond them in his philosophy of the “interhuman” from which standpoint he also criticized Max Scheler. Focal social concepts of Buber's are “the interhuman”_the dialogical relationship between persons that entails “inclusion,” or “imagining the real,” making present, and confirmation ; the (...) “essential We” or common cosmos that each helps to build by speech-with-meaning from his or her unique stance; the distinction between the “political principle” of government and the “social principle” of fellowship and social spontaneity; and the philosophy of community that led Buber to a federalistic socialism and the vision of restructuring society into a “community of communities”. (shrink)

"... die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt.,,1 he aim of Twentieth century phenomenology is to provide a non T psychologistic interpretation of subjectivity. Husserl agrees with Frege; to adopt psychologism is to give up truth. But this should not prevent us from investigating the subjective perspective. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that an appropriate rejection of psychologism must be able to show how propositions are correlated to and grounded in subjective intuitions without thereby reducing them to psychological phenomena. Obviously this (...) calls for an interpretation of subjectivity that makes a sharp distinction between the subjective perspective and the psychological realm. Phenomenology is devoted to the development of a notion of subjectivity that is in accordance with our experience of the world. A fundamental tenet of phenomenology is that philosophy should not dispute this experience but rather account for it. Hence, phenomenology must avoid a notion of subjectivity in which it becomes a problem to account for how a subject can ever hook up with the world. In other words, a phenomenological interpretation of subjectivity must radically disassociate itself from what is often referred to as a worldless, Cartesian subject, a res cogitans. But neither can an interpretation of SUbjectivity consistently advocate a position according to which the human order is described only in the categories appropriate to the physical order. Such an interpretation is obviously not compatible with the phenomenal basis for undertaking this very interpretation, that is, our experience of the world. (shrink)

Lately, it seems that not a day passes without the media proclaiming yet another sensational breakthrough in the search for the physical origins of mental illness. But beyond all the fanfare and media hype, is there a single shred of hard, empirical evidence to substantiate the existence of "a gene for alcoholism," or "the brain chemistry behind schizophrenia"? More to the point, in fact, is it scientifically sound to limit the search for the roots of mental illness to processes occurring (...) within the body, while dismissing socioeconomic, familial, and experiential influences as, at best, mere "triggering mechanisms"? And, if not, what harm is being done by psychiatry's current obsession with these somatic chimeras? This groundbreaking book offers answers to those questions and more. While Dr. Ross and Professor Pam clearly assert from the outset that biological psychiatry "is dominated by a reductionist ideology which distorts and misrepresents much of its research," this is by no means a raw polemic voiced by an overzealous opposition. Instead, it is a reasoned discourse based on a clear-sighted and methodical examination of the professional literature. Contributors to this volume include distinguished researchers and clinicians from the fields of psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and psychopharmacology. Their common purpose in coming together was to alert the mental health community to the ideological blind spots and conceptual errors in the basic logic and methodology of biological psychiatry, to demonstrate the need for a more scientifically based psychiatric practice, and to suggest alternative approaches to understanding and treating mental illness. Readers will find their arguments stimulating, provocative, and highly persuasive. Among the cutting-edge issues they explore are: the historical origins of biological psychiatry; genetics and mental illness; the current state of psychiatric training; psychopharmacology and drug therapy; the public health, legal, and ethical implications of biological psychiatry; and the funding, power, and politics of research. This book is essential reading for all mental health professionals. It also has many important things to say to health care administrators, political analysts, and public policy-makers. Of related interest... INSANITY The Idea and Its Consequences Thomas Szasz In this provocative book, Dr. Thomas Szasz, one of the most celebrated and controversial psychiatric thinkers of our time, presents a carefully crafted, systematic analysis of the precise character and practical consequences of the idea of mental illness. His findings and opinions have captured the attention of organized psychiatry and given everyone concerned with the human condition a better understanding of this almost universally misunderstood "disease." 1990 (0-471-52534-0) 432 pp. CRUEL COMPASSION Psychiatric Control of Society's Unwanted Thomas Szasz Cruel Compassion is the capstone of Thomas Szasz's critique of psychiatric practices. Reexamining psychiatric interventions from a cultural-historical and political-economic perspective, Szasz demonstrates that the main problem that faces mental health policymakers today is adult dependency. He gives us a sobering look at some of our most cherished notions about our humane treatment of society's unwanted and about ourselves as a compassionate and democratic people. 1994 (0-471-01012-X) 260 pp. (shrink)