- Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
|
|
Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 301--339.details
|
|
Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
|
|
Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
|
|
The significance test controversy. [REVIEW]Ronald N. Giere - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):170-181.details
|
|
On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.details
|
|
Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.details
|
|
Voiko ihmistiede olla arvovapaata?Panu Raatikainen - 2006 - In Etiikkaa ihmistieteilijöille. SKS.details
|
|
Inter-model connectives and substructural logics.Igor Sedlár - 2014 - In Roberto Ciuni, Heinrich Wansing & Caroline Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 195-209.details
|
|
The structure of acceptance and its evidential basis.P. M. Williams - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4):325-344.details
|
|
Decision-theoretic epistemology.Ruth Weintraub - 1990 - Synthese 83 (1):159 - 177.details
|
|
A bayesian paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):51-66.details
|
|
Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
|
|
When adjunction fails.Choh Man Teng - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):501-510.details
|
|
Maurice Clavelin on Galileo's natural philosophy. [REVIEW]Howard Stein - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):375-397.details
|
|
Propensity theories of probability unscathed: A reply to white.Tom Settle - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):331-335.details
|
|
The Problem of Coherence and Truth Redux.Michael Schippers - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):817-851.details
|
|
Review. Elements of scientific inquiry. E Martin, D Osherson.O. Schulte - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):347-352.details
|
|
Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
|
|
Explanations, desires, and inscriptions.Israel Scheffler - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):362-369.details
|
|
Theory choice in a two-level science.Geoffrey Sampson - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):303-318.details
|
|
Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
|
|
Mind Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):278-289.details
|
|
Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM.Hans Rott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.details
|
|
Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.details
|
|
Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘the will to believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
|
|
Engel vs. Rorty on truth.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
|
|
Avoiding epistemic hell: Levi on pragmatism and inconsistency.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):119 - 140.details
|
|
Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):119-140.details
|
|
Persistent propensities: Portrait of a familiar controversy. [REVIEW]Alfred Nordmann - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):379-399.details
|
|
Statistical explanation reconsidered.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):437 - 472.details
|
|
Truthlikeness: old and new debates.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1990 - Synthese 84 (1):139-152.details
|
|
Truthlikeness: old and new debates.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1581-1599.details
|
|
Measuring the Success of Science.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):434-445.details
|
|
Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity.Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481–502.details
|
|
Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.Professor Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481-502.details
|
|
Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
|
|
Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
|
|
The irrelevance of belief to rational action.Patrick Maher - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (3):363 - 384.details
|
|
Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
|
|
Subjunctives, dispositions and chances.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.details
|
|
Support and surprise: L. J. Cohen's view of inductive probability. [REVIEW]Isaac Levi - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):279-292.details
|
|
Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.details
|
|
Deductive closure.Isaac Levi - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):493-499.details
|
|
Subjective probability and acceptance.Mark Norris Lance - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):147 - 179.details
|
|
Propensities and Probabilities. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyberg - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):358-375.details
|
|
Visages de la rationalité A propos de Rationality To-day / La rationalitè aujourd'hui, èditè par Thèodore F. Geraëts, Ottawa: Editions de l'Universitè d'Ottawa/ The University of Ottawa Press, 1979, 501 p. [REVIEW]J. N. Kaufmann - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (1):114-131.details
|
|
Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
|
|
Why We Should Not Reject the Value-Free Ideal of Science.Robert Hudson - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (2):167-191.details
|
|
Assessing theories, Bayes style.Franz Huber - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):89-118.details
|
|