In recent years, several authors advocated neuroscience imperialism, an instance of scientific imperialism whereby neuroscience methods and findings are systematically applied to model and explain phenomena investigated by other disciplines. Calls for neuroscience imperialism target a wide range of disciplines, including psychology, economics, and philosophy. To date, however, neuroscience imperialism has not received detailed attention by philosophers, and the debate concerning its identification and normative assessment is relatively underdeveloped. In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation by making some (...) conceptual distinctions about neuroscience imperialism and by providing a normative assessment of prominent calls in its favour. I shall articulate and defend two interrelated claims that, I argue, undermine prominent calls for neuroscience imperialism. First, the proponents of neuroscience imperialism significantly overstate the evidential and explanatory relevance of neuroscience methods and findings for the disciplines they target. And second, prominent calls for neuroscience imperialism point to an untenable reductionist position, which rests on unsupported empirical and normative presuppositions. To substantiate these two claims, I shall draw on two sets of influential calls for neuroscience imperialism, which respectively target the economic modelling of choice and entrenched philosophical conceptions of free agency. (shrink)

This theme issue has the founding ambition of landscaping Data Ethics as a new branch of ethics that studies and evaluates moral problems related to data (including generation, recording, curation, processing, dissemination, sharing, and use), algorithms (including AI, artificial agents, machine learning, and robots), and corresponding practices (including responsible innovation, programming, hacking, and professional codes), in order to formulate and support morally good solutions (e.g. right conducts or right values). Data Ethics builds on the foundation provided by Computer and Information (...) Ethics but, at the same time, it refines the approach endorsed so far in this research field, by shifting the Level of Abstraction of ethical enquiries, from being information-centric to being data-centric. This shift brings into focus the different moral dimensions of all kinds of data, even the data that never translate directly into information but can be used to support actions or generate behaviours, for example. It highlights the need for ethical analyses to concentrate on the content and nature of computational operations — the interactions among hardware, software, and data — rather than on the variety of digital technologies that enables them. And it emphasises the complexity of the ethical challenges posed by Data Science. Because of such complexity, Data Ethics should be developed from the start as a macroethics, that is, as an overall framework that avoids narrow, ad hoc approaches and addresses the ethical impact and implications of Data Science and its applications within a consistent, holistic, and inclusive framework. Only as a macroethics Data Ethics will provide the solutions that can maximise the value of Data Science for our societies, for all of us, and for our environments. (shrink)

Feminist research is informed by a history of breaking silences, of demanding that women's voices be heard, recorded and included in wider intellectual genealogies and histories. This has led to an emphasis on voice and speaking out in the research endeavour. Moments of secrecy and silence are less often addressed. This gives rise to a number of questions. What are the silences, secrets, omissions and and political consequences of such moments? What particular dilemmas and constraints do they represent or entail? (...) What are their implications for research praxis? Are such moments always indicative of voicelessness or powerlessness? Or may they also constitute a productive moment in the research encounter? Contributors to this volume were invited to reflect on these questions. The resulting chapters are a fascinating collection of insights into the research process, making an important contribution to theoretical and empirical debates about epistemology, subjectivity and identity in research. Researchers often face difficult dilemmas about who to represent and how, what to omit and what to include. This book explores such questions in an important and timely collection of essays from international scholars. (shrink)

This chapter argues that journalism’s ethical frameworks, particularly at moments when it is making its grandest claims to value, collide with those prevalent within universities and particularly with ethical review structures. Working through these tensions requires some accommodation from all sides, and also provides opportunities for learning. The chapter discusses how universities might recognize the ethics systems particular to practices, like journalism, which set out to serve the public good and which produce knowledge in ways distinctive to that practice. Underneath (...) this problem is the more fundamental question of how to establish the boundaries between research and other activities that take place in the university. The chapter proposes, following Spicker’s argument in relation to policy studies, that distinctive ethical criteria must be recognized in different areas of university activity where claims to be producing research are being made. Yet it must also be noted that exceptionalism risks leaving university-based journalists with a weak ethical system. It concludes that journalists within the university have both the opportunity and obligation to extend their practice by using university processes to engage with a wide range of ethical frameworks. (shrink)

Background and Objectives: The observance of professional ethics is one of the most important expectations from health care team whose application has a tremendous effect on treatment course. The aim of this study was to investigate barriers to observance of the codes of professional ethics in clinical settings from the perspectives of nurses and midwifery in hospitals affiliated with Qom University of Medical Sciences in 2016. Methods: This descriptive cross-sectional study was conducted with 246 nurses and midwives working in the (...) public hospitals affiliated with Qom University of Medical Sciences. The data collection instrument was a questionnaire to investigate the observance of professional ethics in the three domains management, environmental and individual care-related. Results: In the management domain, the most important barrier to implementing the codes of professional ethics in clinical settings were lack of in-service training and educational programs from midwives’ perspectives and inappropriate head nurse-staff communication and lack of in-service training and educational programs from nurses’ perspectives, in environmental domain, lack of suitable equipment in ward from midwives’ perspectives and rotational shiftwork from nurses' perspectives and in individual care-related domain, lack of technical skills from both midwives’ and nurses’ perspectives. Conclusion: According to the results of this study, individual care-related factors were among the most important barriers to observing professional ethics from the perspectives of nurses and midwives working in hospitals. (shrink)

In this essay I consider whether the political perspective of third wave science studies – ‘elective modernism’ – offers a suitable framework for understanding the policy-making contributions that (bio)ethical experts might make. The question arises as a consequence of the fact that I have taken inspiration from the third wave in order to develop an account of (bio)ethical expertise. I offer a précis of this work and a brief summary of elective modernism before considering their relation. The view I set (...) out suggests that elective modernism is a political philosophy and that although its use in relation to the use of scientific expertise in political and policy-making process has implications for the role of (bio)ethical expertise it does not, in the final analysis, provide an account that is appropriate for this latter form of specialist expertise. Nevertheless, it is an informative perspective, and one that can help us make sense of the political uses of (bio)ethical expertise. (shrink)

Most discussion of the unity of science has concerned what might be called vertical relations between theories: the reducibility of biology to chemistry, or chemistry to physics, and so on. In this paper I shall be concerned rather with horizontal relations, that is to say, with theories of different kinds that deal with objects at the same structural level. Whereas the former, vertical, conception of unity through reduction has come under a good deal of criticism recently (see, e.g., Dupré 1993), (...) horizontal unity has generally been conceded to be an important goal. The most pressing questions about horizontal unification arise in the study of human behavior. Numerous sciences including psychology, economics, anthropology, sociology, and parts of biology, attempt to provide explanations of human behavior. It is possible that some of these sciences may be able to coexist peacefully or even cooperatively. However things do not always go so smoothly, and at least two approaches to human behavior, those deriving from economics and evolutionary biology, often involve clearly imperialist tendencies. Devotees of these approaches are inclined to claim that they are in possession not just of one useful perspective on human behavior, but of the key that will open doors to the understanding of ever wider areas of human behavior. In this paper I shall consider some areas in which economic and evolutionary imperialists are currently staking claims. It is of particular interest to look at situations where two the two imperialist programs are staking the same claim, but limitations of space force me to focus here mainly on economics, and my remarks on evolutionary imperialism will be cursory. As well as some specific insights into the particular strategies of these scientific programs, I hope that my discussion will throw some more general light on the limits of such general theoretical strategies and, thereby, I shall suggest some motivations for adhering to a horizontal pluralism of science that matches the vertical pluralism advocated by anti-reductionists. (shrink)

Genetic research has moved from Mendelian genetics to sequence maps to the study of natural human genetic variation at the level of the genome. This past decade of discovery has been accompanied by a shift in emphasis towards the ethical principles of reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry and universality.

Most people concur with most ethicists that lying is intrinsically wrong. Thus, to be ethically acceptable a lie must be justified by appeal to a higher good. Milgram defends, and his supporters condone, the use of deceptive experimentation on the grounds that the knowledge gained is a higher good that could not be gained by any alternative methodology. In several essays I criticized Milgram’s obedience studies as violating the human rights of participants in psychological research to be treated honestly and (...) kindly. This essay reaffirms my ethical objections to Milgram’s paradigm and to deceptive experimentation in general. It relates Milgram’s study of obedience to my own research of effects on children of parents’ assertion of beneficial and detrimental kinds of power. It criticizes current professional codes of ethics and institutional review boards that offer investigators loopholes to obtaining informed consent by requiring only that alternative procedures are “not feasible” and their study is “significant,” hurdles too easily circumvented by investigators who choose to employ research paradigms that, like Milgram’s, lie to subjects when obtaining “informed” consent. When in the scientific endeavor methodological rigor conflicts with the protection of the fundamental human rights of the subjects, the compromise should be made by the researcher in the rigor of the methods he or she chooses to use rather than by the use of lies and deception to control confounds. (shrink)

Genetic database initiatives have given rise to considerable debate about their potential harms and benefits. The question arises as to whether existing ethical frameworks are sufficient to mediate between the competing interests at stake. One approach is to strengthen mechanisms for obtaining informed consent and for protecting confidentiality. However, there is increasing interest in other ethical frameworks, involving solidarity — participation in research for the common good — and the sharing of the benefits of research.

Nel Noddings argues that hers is not an ethics of agape. I want to argue, on the contrary, that it is, and that this is a problem. My central thesis is that the unidirectional nature of the analysis of one-caring reinforces oppressive institutions.

3.1 Experiments and causal analysis 3.2 The severity approach 3.3 Objectivist vs. Subjectivist approaches 3.4 “Low” vs. “high-level” hypothesis testing 3.5 Novelty and construct independence 4. External validity..

ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest <blockquote> _<b>The Ethics of Neuroscience</b>_ </blockquote> in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May.