The problem of absolute generality has attracted much attention in recent philosophy. Agustin Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano have assembled a distinguished team of contributors to write new essays on the topic. They investigate the question of whether it is possible to attain absolute generality in thought and language and the ramifications of this question in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.

Adhering to the traditional concept of omniscience lands Gale in the incoherence Grim’s Cantorian arguments reveal in talk of “all propositions.” By constructing variants and extensions of Grim’s arguments, I explain why various ways out of the incoherence are unacceptable, why theists would do better to adopt a certain revisionary concept of omniscience, and why the Cantorian troubles are so deep as to be troubles as well for Gale’s Weak PSR. I conclude with some brief reflections on method, suggesting that (...) we pursue the full implications of Gale’s own revisionary remarks and replace his method of analytic argumentation with non-analytic revisionary theory-construction. (shrink)

An exchange between Patrick Grim and Alvin Plantinga regarding Cantorian arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being.

Following an idea from Gödel and Carnap we show how we can speak with absolute generality even if we cannot quantify with absolute generality.

Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that canno be a computation.

There are four broad grounds upon which the intelligibility of quantification over absolutely everything has been questioned—one based upon the existence of semantic indeterminacy, another on the relativity of ontology to a conceptual scheme, a third upon the necessity of sortal restriction, and the last upon the possibility of indefinite extendibility. The argument from semantic indeterminacy derives from general philosophical considerations concerning our understanding of language. For the Skolem–Lowenheim Theorem appears to show that an understanding of quanti- fication over absolutely (...) everything (assuming a suitably infinite domain) is semantically indistinguishable from the understanding of quantification over something less than absolutely everything; the same first-order sentences are true and even the same first-order conditions will be satisfied by objects from the narrower domain. From this it is then argued that the two kinds of understanding are indistinguishable tout court and that nothing could count as having the one kind of understanding as opposed to the other. (shrink)

Adhering to the traditional concept of omniscience lands Gale in the incoherence Grim’s Cantorian arguments reveal in talk of “all propositions.” By constructing variants and extensions of Grim’s arguments, I explain why various ways out of the incoherence are unacceptable, why theists would do better to adopt a certain revisionary concept of omniscience, and why the Cantorian troubles are so deep as to be troubles as well for Gale’s Weak PSR. I conclude with some brief reflections on method, suggesting that (...) we pursue the full implications of Gale’s own revisionary remarks and replace his method of analytic argumentation with non-analytic revisionary theory-construction. (shrink)

A survey is made of work since 1879 on foundational problems viewed as an analysis, by reduction and formalization, of the concepts proof, feasible, number, set, and constructivity. It is suggested that there are five domains of concepts and methods, viz., anthropologism, finitism, intuitionism, predicativism, and platonism. It is also suggested that the central problem is to characterize these domains by formalization and to determine their interrelations by different forms of reduction. Finally, the range of logic in the narrower sense (...) is discussed, and applications of mathematical logic are briefly outlined.ZusammenfassungDie Entwicklung der Grundlagenforschung seit dem Jahre 1879 wird hier im Überblick dargestellt und zwar vom Standpunkt einer Analyse durch Reduktion and Formalisierung der Begriffe Beweis, Zahl, Menge und Konstruktivität aus gesehen. Fünf Bereiche von Begriffsbildungen und Methoden werden zu Grunde gelegt, nämlich: Anthropologismus, Finitismus, Intuitionismus, Prädikativismus und Platonismus. Als zentrale Aufgabenstellung wird hier die Charakterisierung dieser Bereiche durch Formalisierung betrachtet und weiterhin die Bestimmung ihrer gegenseitigen Zusammenhänge durch verschiedene Arten von Reduktionen. Schliesslich wird das Gebiet der Logik im engeren Sinne diskutiert und Anwendungen der mathematischen Logik skizziert.RésuméL'article réexamine les travaux faits depuis 1879 sur les problèmes du fondement des mathématiques, que P'on considère comme des analyses par réduction et formalisation des concepts de démonstration, de nombre, d'ensemble, et de constructivité. On suggère qu'il existe cinq domaines de concepts et de méthodes, à savoir: anthropologisme, finitisme, intuitionisme, « predicativism » et platonisme. On suggère aussi que le problème essentiel consiste à caractériser ces domaines par formalisation et à déterminer leurs relations réciproques par différentes formes de réduction. Finalement, on étudie la portée de la logique prise dans son sens le plus étroit et on esquisse rapidement les applications de la logique mathématique. (shrink)

This is an exploration of a cluster of related logical results. Taken together these seem to have something philosophically important to teach us: something about knowledge and truth and something about the logical impossibility of totalities of knowledge and truth. The book includes explorations of new forms of the ancient and venerable paradox of the :Liar, applications and extensions of Kaplan and Montague's paradox of the Knower, generalizations of Godel's work on incompleteness, and new uses of Cantorian diagonalization. Throughout, the (...) concern is with metaphysical and epistemological implications of these results: what such results may have to teach us about knowledge, truth, and possibility. (shrink)