Newton claims to have proven the heterogeneity of light through his experimentum crucis. However, Olaf Müller has worked out in detail Goethe’s idea that one could likewise prove the heterogeneity of darkness by inverting Newton’s famous experiment. Müller concludes that this invalidates Newton’s claim of proof. Yet this conclusion only holds if the heterogeneity of light and the heterogeneity of darkness is logically incompatible. This paper shows that this is not the case. Instead, in Quine’s terms, we have two logically (...) compatible theories based on mutually irreducible theoretical terms. From a Quinean point of view, this does no harm to the provability of the corresponding statements. (shrink)

Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...) Newton wanted to admit. By insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by the phenomena, Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And Goethe's insight is surprisingly significant, because he correctly claimed that all of the results of Newton's prism experiments fit a theoretical alternative equally well. If this is correct, then by suggesting an alternative to a well-established physical theory, Goethe developed the problem of underdete... (shrink)

Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.

In der Debatte um den wissenschaftlichen Realismus gewinnt zunehmend der Strukturenrealismus - dessen Auffassung zufolge der Realgehalt wissenschaftlicher Theorien in deren mathematisch-logischer Struktur liegt - an Bedeutung. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht diese These anhand der in unserer fundamentalen Physik bedeutsamsten Klasse von Theorien, den Eichtheorien, die durch spezielle lokale Symmetriestrukturen gekennzeichnet sind. Die Arbeit bietet dem Leser in ihren ersten Kapiteln einen Einstieg in die zentralen Themen Symmetrien, wissenschaftlicher Realismus und Eichtheorien. In den im Mittelteil durchgeführten Analysen werden Quanten- und (...) Gravitations-Eichtheorien in konzeptioneller Hinsicht - vor allem bezüglich der zugrundeliegenden Prinzipien - und ontologischer Hinsicht - mit Blick auf die Unterbestimmtheit der Entitäten und verschiedener Lokalitätsannahmen - im Detail untersucht. Resultierend ergibt sich eine Stützung des Strukturenrealismus, jedoch nicht in dessen radikaler ontischer Variante, sondern in der moderateren epistemischen oder allenfalls intermediären Spielart, bei der sowohl Strukturen als auch deren Träger existieren, wobei letzterer jedoch amorph und und mithin epistemisch unverfügbar ist. (shrink)