- Human Dignity and Law: Legal and Philosophical Investigations.Stephen Riley - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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In search of the moral status of AI: why sentience is a strong argument.Martin Gibert & Dominic Martin - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (1):319-330.details
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Moral zombies: why algorithms are not moral agents.Carissa Véliz - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (2):487-497.details
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Robots should be slaves.Joanna J. Bryson - 2010 - In Yorick Wilks (ed.), Close Engagements with Artificial Companions: Key social, psychological, ethical and design issues. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 63-74.details
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Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice.Gregg D. Caruso - 2021 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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On the moral status of social robots: considering the consciousness criterion.Kestutis Mosakas - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (2):429-443.details
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The Reasonable Robot: Artificial Intelligence and the Law.Ryan Abbott - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Humans and Robots: Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism.Sven Nyholm - 2020 - Rowman & Littlefield International.details
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Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap).Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (3):1315-1328.details
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Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.details
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Moral Responsibility of Robots and Hybrid Agents.Raul Hakli & Pekka Mäkelä - 2019 - The Monist 102 (2):259-275.details
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(3 other versions)Responses to CriticsMoral Relativism and Moral Objectivity.Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):207.details
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The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility.Gideon Yaffe - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
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Mind the gap: responsible robotics and the problem of responsibility.David J. Gunkel - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (4):307-320.details
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Law, Liberty, and Morality.H. L. A. Hart - 1963 - Stanford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata.Andreas Matthias - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.details
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Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):299–309.details
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Granting Automata Human Rights: Challenge to a Basis of Full-Rights Privilege.Lantz Fleming Miller - 2015 - Human Rights Review 16 (4):369-391.details
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How Autonomous Are Collective Agents? Corporate Rights and Normative Individualism.Frank Hindriks - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1565-1585.details
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Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality.Patricia S. Churchland - 2011 - Princeton University Press.details
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All Animals Are Equal.Peter Singer - 1989 - In Tom Regan & Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 215--226.details
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Justice for hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Why computers can't feel pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.details
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Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Turing triage test.Robert Sparrow - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (4):203-213.details
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(1 other version)The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata. [REVIEW]Andreas Matthias - 2004 - Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):175-183.details
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On the morality of artificial agents.Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):349-379.details
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Resuscitation and resurrection: The ethics of cloning cheetahs, mammoths, and Neanderthals.Sariah Cottrell, Jamie L. Jensen & Steven L. Peck - 2014 - Life Sciences, Society and Policy 10 (1).details
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Robots: Machines or artificially created life?Hilary Putman & Hilary Putnam - 1964 - Journal of Philosophy 61 (21):668-691.details
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Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Synthese 38 (3):415-449.details
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In search of the moral status of AI: why sentience is a strong argument.Martin Gibert & Dominic Martin - 2021 - AI and Society 1:1-12.details
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Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics.Joanna J. Bryson - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (1):15-26.details
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Artificial Consciousness and Artificial Ethics: Between Realism and Social Relationism.Steve Torrance - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):9-29.details
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Cognitive Impairment and the Right to Vote: A Strategic Approach.Linda Barclay - 2013 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):146-159.details
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A Theory of Legal Personhood.Visa A. J. Kurki - 2019 - Oxford University Press.details
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Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain.Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.details
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Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.Mike Redmayne - 2005 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2):209-232.details
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Personhood Beyond Humanism: Animals, Chimeras, Autonomous Agents and the Law.Tomasz Pietrzykowski - 2018 - Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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(3 other versions)Responses to Critics. [REVIEW]Gilbert Harman - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):207-213.details
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Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency: What properties must an artificial agent have to be a moral agent? [REVIEW]Kenneth Einar Himma - 2009 - Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29.details
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Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction.Karl R. Popper - 1995 - Utopian Studies 8 (1):211-212.details
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Artificial Intelligence: Does Consciousness Matter?Elisabeth Hildt - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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6. Skills for a Social Life.Patricia S. Churchland - 2011 - In Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 118-162.details
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(1 other version)Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.details
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(3 other versions)Review: Responses to Critics. [REVIEW]Gilbert Harman - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):207 - 213.details
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