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  1. The empirical basis of color perception.R. Beau Lotto - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):609-629.
    Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of (...)
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  • More than Mere Colouring: The Role of Spectral Information in Human Vision.Kathleen A. Akins & Martin Hahn - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (1):125-171.
    A common view in both philosophy and the vision sciences is that, in human vision, wavelength information is primarily ‘for’ colouring: for seeing surfaces and various media as having colours. In this article we examine this assumption of ‘colour-for-colouring’. To motivate the need for an alternative theory, we begin with three major puzzles from neurophysiology, puzzles that are not explained by the standard theory. We then ask about the role of wavelength information in vision writ large. How might wavelength information (...)
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  • Science, Perception, and Reality.Logic and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars & Gustav Bergmann - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (3):421-423.
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  • Swamp Mary’s revenge: deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247.
    Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior (...)
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  • Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 175-226.
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  • Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
    The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of color is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across (...)
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  • Type-q materialism.Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - In Chase B. Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
    s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation.
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • Emotion and force.York H. Gunther - 2003 - In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 279--88.
    Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks (...)
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  • The Structure of Knowledge.Wilfrid Sellars - 1975 - In Hector-Neri Castañeda (ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Indianapolis,: Bobbs-Merrill. pp. 295-347.
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  • Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett. [REVIEW]Ned Block - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):181-193.
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  • Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 60-105.
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  • Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate?Jacob Berger - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
    Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of (...)
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  • (2 other versions)How to think about mental qualities.David Rosenthal - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
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  • Phenomenal properties: Some models from psychology and philosophy.Austen Clark - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):406-425.
    Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues, vol 18, Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy: The Metaphysics and Perception of Qualities. Alex Byrne & David Hilbert, section editors.
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  • The empirical basis of color perception.R. Beau Lotto & Dale Purves - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):609-629.
    Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of (...)
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  • The identity approach to the mind-body problem.Wilfrid Sellars - 1965 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (3):430-51.
    1. My primary aim in this paper is to set the stage for a discussion of some of the central themes in the so-called "identity" approach to the mind-body problem. I have particularly in mind Herbert Feigl's elaborate statement and defense of this approach in Volume II of the Minnesota Studies. A secondary, but more constructive, purpose is to bring out some of the reasons which incline me to think that the theory is either very exciting but false, or true (...)
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  • Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
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  • (1 other version)Sensory Qualities. [REVIEW]C. L. Hardin - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):244-246.
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  • A question of content.Kathleen Akins - 2002 - In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 206.
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  • Mental Colors, Conceptual Overlap, and Discriminating Knowledge of Particulars.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):641-643.
    I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments (...)
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  • The zombie's cogito: Meditations on type-Q materialism.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585-605.
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a “type-A” or “type-B” approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a “type-Q” materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our conceivability and (...)
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  • Science, Perception, and Reality. [REVIEW]Keith Lehrer - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (10):266-277.
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  • Sensory Qualities.Evan Thompson - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):130.
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