- (1 other version)How to Discount Double-Counting When It Counts: Some Clarifications.Deborah G. Mayo - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):857-879.details
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An ad hoc save of a theory of adhocness? Exchanges with John Worrall.Deborah G. Mayo - 2009 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.details
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Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1007-1025.details
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(1 other version)Learning from Error.Deborah Mayo - 2010 - Modern Schoolman 87 (3-4):191-217.details
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Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference.Deborah G. Mayo & David Cox - 2009 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)Learning from Error.Deborah Mayo - 2010 - Modern Schoolman 87 (3-4):191-217.details
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Error, tests and theory confirmation.John Worrall - 2009 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 125-154.details
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Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.details
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Logical versus historical theories of confirmation.Alan Musgrave - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):1-23.details
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Evidence as Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probable versus Highly Probed Hypotheses.Deborah G. Mayo - 2005 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 95--128.details
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Principles of inference and their consequences.Deborah G. Mayo & Michael Kruse - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 381--403.details
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Novel evidence and severe tests.Deborah G. Mayo - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552.details
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(1 other version)How to discount double-counting when it counts: Some clarifications.Deborah G. Mayo - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):857-879.details
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