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  1. (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • 4. Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.Gary Watson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 119-148.
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  • (3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In Watson G. (ed.), Free will. 2nd edition. Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 5-24.
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  • (1 other version)Conversation and Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
    In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P. F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning--agent meaning--just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is (...)
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  • Some Theses on Desert.Randolph Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis about (...)
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  • The Defeat of Good and Evil.Roderick Chisholm - 1968 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 42:21 - 38.
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  • (2 other versions)Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
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  • The force and fairness of blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
    In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...)
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  • (3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
    The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to certain personal (...)
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  • (1 other version)Free will, praise and blame.John Jamieson Carswell Smart - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):291-306.
    In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such (...)
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  • (3 other versions)The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Giving desert its due.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):101-116.
    I will argue that a desert-based justification for treating a person in a certain way is a justification that holds this treatment to be justified simply by what the person is like and what he or she has done, independent of (1) the fact that treating the person in this way will have good effects (or that treating people like him or her in this way will have such effects); (2) the fact that this treatment is called for by some (...)
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  • (3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - unknown
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  • Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):546-569.
    Many theorists claim that the reactive emotions, even in their private form, are communicative entities. But as widely endorsed as this claim is, it has not been redeemed: the literature lacks a clear and compelling account of the sense in which reactive attitudes qua private mental states are essentially communicative. In this paper, I fill this gap. I propose that it is apt to characterize privately held reactive attitudes as communicative in nature because they, like many paradigmatic forms of communication, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Free Will, Praise and Blame.J. J. C. Smart - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility. [REVIEW]B. J. Diggs - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):90-96.
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  • The varieties of retributive experience.Christopher Bennett - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):145-163.
    Retribution is often dismissed as augmenting the initial harm done, rather than ameliorating it. This criticism rests on a crude view of retribution. In our actual practice in informal situations and in the workings of the reactive (properly called 'retributive') sentiments, retribution is true to the gravity of wrongdoing, but does aim to ameliorate it. Through wrongdoing, offenders become alienated from the moral community: their actions place their commitment to its core values in doubt. We recognize this status in blaming, (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Causation in Perception.P. F. Strawson - 1962 - In Peter Strawson (ed.), Freedom and Resentment. Oxford University Press.
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  • Compatibilism and contractualism: The possibility of moral responsibility.James Lenman - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):7-31.
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