- Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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The Self-Effacing Functionality of Blame.Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1361-1379.details
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Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.details
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A Conceptual Analysis of Glory.Paul Silva - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):561-582.details
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Basically Deserved Blame and its Value.Michael McKenna - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3).details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Determinism, Moral Responsibility and Retribution.Elizabeth Shaw & Robert Blakey - 2019 - Neuroethics 13 (1):99-113.details
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Instrumentalism about Moral Responsibility Revisited.Anneli Jefferson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):555-573.details
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XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.details
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Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):208-229.details
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A Conceptual Analysis of Glory.Paul Silva - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):561-582.details
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The Hard Problem of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Evaluative Beliefs First.Ben Bramble - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Czy wnioski z eksperymentów naukowych badających wolną wolę są uzasadnione? Przegląd i analiza krytyki eksperymentów Benjamina Libeta i Johna-Dylana Haynesa.Michał Marzec-Remiszewski - 2016 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (2):475-492.details
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Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:107-122.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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The Two-Stage Solution to the Problem of Free Will.Robert O. Doyle - 2013 - In Antoine Suarez Peter Adams (ed.), Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer. pp. 235-254.details
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Utilitarian Moral Virtue, Admiration, and Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):77-95.details
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The Free Will Problem [Hobbes, Bramhall and Free Will].Paul Russell - 2011 - In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy in early modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 424-444.details
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Does Division Multiply Desert?Theron Pummer - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.details
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The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.details
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Irrational blame.Hanna Pickard - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):613-626.details
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Reactive Attitudes.Michelle Mason - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Against libertarianism.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.details
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Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 126–50.details
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Blame: Taking it Seriously.Michelle Mason - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):473-481.details
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Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.details
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Justice and the Grey Box of Responsibility.Carl Knight - 2010 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 57 (124):86-112.details
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Revisionism about Free Will: A Statement and Defense.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.details
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Persons, punishment, and free will skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.details
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Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges.Manuel Vargas - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.details
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Initial Conditions as Exogenous Factors in Spatial Explanation.Clint Ballinger - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Cambridgedetails
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The Nature of Immorality.Jean Hampton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):22.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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The mind and the machine. On the conceptual and moral implications of brain-machine interaction.Maartje Schermer - 2009 - NanoEthics 3 (3):217-230.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Holding others responsible.Coleen Macnamara - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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As a matter of fact : Empirical perspectives on ethics.John M. Doris & Stephen P. Stich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Utilitarian blame: Retrospect and prospects. [REVIEW]Neil Gallagher - 1978 - Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (1):13-23.details
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Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Metaphysical illusions.J. J. C. Smart - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):167 – 175.details
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The force and fairness of blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.details
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Determinism and the antiquated deontology of the social sciences.Clint Ballinger - unknowndetails
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Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment‘.Paul Russell & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2006 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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