- Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributions.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Why Williamson should be a sceptic.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.details
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Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193-197.details
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Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.details
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Getting Luck Properly Under Control.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):496-511.details
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The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.details
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Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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(1 other version)Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.details
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(2 other versions)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought.Ernst Mayr - 1993 - Journal of the History of Biology 26 (2):378-380.details
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Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, £48.00, ISBN 978-0-521-85789-5 (cloth), £16.99, ISBN 978-0-521-71898-1 (paperback), xii + 188 pp. [REVIEW]Patrick Allo - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):427-432.details
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