Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ranks alongside Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as one of the most profound and influential works in moral philosophy ever written. In Kant's own words its aim is to search for and establish the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative. Kant argues that every human being is an end in himself or herself, never to be used as a means by others, and that moral obligation is an expression of the (...) human capacity for autonomy or self-government. This edition presents the acclaimed translation of the text by Mary Gregor, together with an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard that examines and explains Kant's argument. (shrink)

Philosophical work exploring the relation between cognition and the Internet is now an active area of research. Some adopt an externalist framework, arguing that the Internet should be seen as environmental scaffolding that drives and shapes cognition. However, despite growing interest in this topic, little attention has been paid to how the Internet influences our affective life — our moods, emotions, and our ability to regulate these and other feeling states. We argue that the Internet scaffolds not only cognition but (...) also affect. Using various case studies, we consider some ways that we are increasingly dependent on our Internet-enabled “techno-social niches” to regulate the contours of our own affective life and participate in the affective lives of others. We argue further that, unlike many of the other environmental resources we use to regulate affect, the Internet has distinct properties that introduce new dimensions of complexity to these regulative processes. First, it is radically social in a way many of these other resources are not. Second, it is a radically distributed and decentralized resource; no one individual or agent is responsible for the Internet’s content or its affective impact on users. Accordingly, while the Internet can profoundly augment and enrich our affective life and deepen our connection with others, there is also a distinctive kind of affective precarity built into our online endeavors as well. (shrink)

"I know of no religious writer more pertinent to our time."—T. S. Eliot, Introduction to Pensees Intended to prove that religion is not contrary to reason, Pascal's Pensees rank among the liveliest and most eloquent defenses of Christianity. Motivated by the seventeenth-century view of the supremacy of human reason, Pascal (1623–1662) had intended to write an ambitious apologia for Christianity in which he argued the inability of reason to address metaphysical problems. His untimely death prevented the work's completion, but the (...) fragments published posthumously in 1670 as Pensees remain a vital part of religious and philosophical literature. W. F. Trotter translation. Introduction by T. S. Eliot. (shrink)

»Selten hat in den neueren Jahrhunderten ein philosophischer Erstling so durchgeschlagen und einen so unverrückbaren Platz unter den >großenHans Georg Gadamer in DIE ZEIT Nr. 47 vom 19.11.1982.

Anthropocentrism, in its original connotation in environmental ethics, is the belief that value is human-centred and that all other beings are means to human ends. Environmentally -concerned authors have argued that anthropocentrism is ethically wrong and at the root of ecological crises. Some environmental ethicists argue, however, that critics of anthropocentrism are misguided or even misanthropic. They contend: first that criticism of anthropocentrism can be counterproductive and misleading by failing to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate human interests. Second, that humans (...) differ greatly in their environmental impacts, and consequently, addressing human inequalities should be a precondition for environmental protection. Third, since ecosystems constitute the “life-support system” for humans, anthropocentrism can and should be a powerful motivation for environmental protection. Fourth, human self-love is not only natural but helpful as a starting point for loving others, including nonhumans. Herein we analyze such arguments, agreeing with parts of them while advancing four counter-arguments. First, redefining the term anthropocentrism seems to be an attempt to ignore behavior in which humans focus on themselves at the risk of the planet. Second, if addressing human inequalities is a precondition for environmental protection, biodiversity protection will remain out of the scope of ethical consideration for an indefinite period of time. Third, anthropocentric motivations can only make a positive contribution to the environment in situations where humans are conscious of a direct benefit to themselves. Fourth, ‘self-love’ alone is an inadequate basis for environmental concern and action. We also explore the question of agency, shared responsibility, and a fair attribution of blame for our environmental predicaments. (shrink)

Is the tick a machine or a machine operator? Is it a mere object or a subject? With these questions, the pioneering biophilosopher Jakob von Uexküll embarks on a remarkable exploration of the unique social and physical environments that individual animal species, as well as individuals within species, build and inhabit. This concept of the umwelt has become enormously important within posthumanist philosophy, influencing such figures as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze and Guattari, and, most recently, Giorgio Agamben, who has called Uexküll (...) "a high point of modern antihumanism." A key document in the genealogy of posthumanist thought, _A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans_ advances Uexküll's revolutionary belief that nonhuman perceptions must be accounted for in any biology worth its name; it also contains his arguments against natural selection as an adequate explanation for the present orientation of a species' morphology and behavior. _A Theory of Meaning_ extends his thinking on the _umwelt_, while also identifying an overarching and perceptible unity in nature. Those coming to Uexküll's work for the first time will find that his concept of the _umwelt_ holds out new possibilities for the terms of animality, life, and the whole framework of biopolitics itself. (shrink)

The authors investigated the relevance of consequentialism in commercial space exploration as well as in the actively developing space market. The authors conclude that space expansion and colonization of space objects will lead to a revision of the foundational consequentialism provisions. Consequentialism, formed during the history of terrestrial civilization, loses its effectiveness under conditions of space commercialization. The basics of planetary thinking are different from those of cosmic thinking. Therefore, considering the meaning of the terms “cosmic expansion” and “colonization of (...) the cosmos” through the existing theory of consequentialism faces serious contradictions. There is a range of problems that are not explored in modern philosophy and ethics due to the lack of an empirical basis for philosophical analysis. (shrink)

The authors investigated the relevance of consequentialism in commercial space exploration as well as in the actively developing space market. The authors conclude that space expansion and colonization of space objects will lead to a revision of the foundational consequentialism provisions. Consequentialism, formed during the history of terrestrial civilization, loses its effectiveness under conditions of space commercialization. The basics of planetary thinking are different from those of cosmic thinking. Therefore, considering the meaning of the terms “cosmic expansion” and “colonization of (...) the cosmos” through the existing theory of consequentialism faces serious contradictions. There is a range of problems that are not explored in modern philosophy and ethics due to the lack of an empirical basis for philosophical analysis. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses Karl Löwith’s anthropological critique of existential analytic that is formulated in his Habilitation thesis (Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928), where he develops an anthropological counter-paradigm, i. e.Mitanthropologie, in opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Given the extent and the complexity of such a subject, I will limit the present inquiry to two specific topics: theMiteinandersein(Being-with-one-another) and above all theSein zum Tode(Being-towards-death). In practice, I will first explain the basic features of Mitanthropologie together with (...) the crucial critique that it levels atBeing and Time. I will follow by outlining the importance of theTodesfrage(the question of death) within the existential analytic by means of a comparison between Heidegger’sBeing-towards-deathand Kierkegaard’sSickness unto death(Krankheit zum Tode). Finally, I will expound Löwith’s objection toBeing-towards-death, which is expressed in the alternative formulaFreiheit zum Tode(Freedom-towards-death). (shrink)

Origins. environment. first influences. the Russian gentry -- Solitude. anguish. freedom. revolt. pity. doubts and wrestlings of the spirit. reflections on eros -- First conversion. search for the meaning of life -- The domain of philosophical knowledge. philosophical sources. existentialism and romanticism -- Conversion to socialism. the domain of revolution. Marxism and idealism -- The russian cultural renascence of the early twentieth century. encounters -- The movement towards christianity. the drama of religion -- The domain of creativity. the meaning of (...) the creative act. the creative act as ecstasy -- The russian revolution and the domain of communism -- Russian and the west -- My final philosophical outlook. confession of faith. the domain of eschatology. time and eternity -- Concerning self-knowledge. the limits of self-knowledge. auto-biographical conclusion. years of ordeal. (shrink)

Scientific narratives about cosmology often present black holes as frightening objects of both creation and destruction, the centres of which are concealed behind event horizons. According to studies, black holes are capable of distorting time and tearing apart anything that plunges toward them. This article asks what the latest knowledge about the properties of black holes can contribute to philosophical understandings of being and time. Drawing on both scientific and narrative constructions of black holes in books written by physicists, the (...) article analyzes black holes in relation to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of ontology in Being and Time. The article argues that the topics of concealment, time, and mortality form interrelated points of intersection among scientific constructions of black holes and Heidegger’s philosophy. First, scientific commentaries on the concealment of singularities speak to Heidegger’s interpretation of the ways being is concealed in modern society. Second, with regard to time, the phenomenon of gravitational redshift invokes Heidegger’s criticisms of clock time and, by extension, notions of infinitude. On the other hand, theories about Hawking radiation and the decay of black holes also invoke Heidegger’s thesis that time subsists predominantly as a passing away toward the cessation of existence. Third and finally, Heidegger’s renowned and controversial explication of mortality helps frame black holes symbolically as forward-projections toward the impossibility of existence. Bringing these three subjects together, the article concludes that, as Heideggerian symbols of being and time, black holes represent projections toward the possibility of impossible modes and forms of existence. In this sense, black holes emblematize a relationship between being and time that marks the potential limits of existence, as humanity and science understand it. (shrink)

Scientific narratives about cosmology often present black holes as frightening objects of both creation and destruction, the centres of which are concealed behind event horizons. According to studies, black holes are capable of distorting time and tearing apart anything that plunges toward them. This article asks what the latest knowledge about the properties of black holes can contribute to philosophical understandings of being and time. Drawing on both scientific and narrative constructions of black holes in books written by physicists, the (...) article analyzes black holes in relation to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of ontology in Being and Time. The article argues that the topics of concealment, time, and mortality form interrelated points of intersection among scientific constructions of black holes and Heidegger’s philosophy. First, scientific commentaries on the concealment of singularities speak to Heidegger’s interpretation of the ways being is concealed in modern society. Second, with regard to time, the phenomenon of gravitational redshift invokes Heidegger’s criticisms of clock time and, by extension, notions of infinitude. On the other hand, theories about Hawking radiation and the decay of black holes also invoke Heidegger’s thesis that time subsists predominantly as a passing away toward the cessation of existence. Third and finally, Heidegger’s renowned and controversial explication of mortality helps frame black holes symbolically as forward-projections toward the impossibility of existence. Bringing these three subjects together, the article concludes that, as Heideggerian symbols of being and time, black holes represent projections toward the possibility of impossible modes and forms of existence. In this sense, black holes emblematize a relationship between being and time that marks the potential limits of existence, as humanity and science understand it. (shrink)

A revitalized practice of natural philosophy can help people to live a better life and promote a flourishing ecosystem. Such a philosophy is natural in two senses. First, it is natural by seeking to understand the whole of nature, including mental phenomena. Thus, a comprehensive natural philosophy should address the phenomena of sentience by embracing first- and second-person methods of investigation. Moreover, to expand our understanding of the world, natural philosophy should embrace a full panoply of explanations, similar to Aristotle’s (...) four causes. Second, such a philosophy is natural by being grounded in human nature, taking full account of human capacities and limitations. Future natural philosophers should also make use of all human capacities, including emotion and intuition, as well as reason and perception, to investigate nature. Finally, since the majority of our brain’s activities are unconscious, natural philosophy should explore the unconscious mind with the aim of deepening our relation with the rest of nature and of enhancing well-being. (shrink)