Among the letters, memorabilia, manu­scripts, films, and tapes in the eighty-four warehouse boxes of the John Dewey Papers that came to Southern Illinois University at Carbondale in 1972 were a number of boxes that contained the books and journals from Dewey’s personal and professional library. The circumstances surrounding the growth of that library were these: after John Dewey died in 1952, the second Mrs. Dewey, Roberta Grant Dewey, continued to live in the same apartment with the couple’s two adopted children. (...) Upon her death in 1970, the household was dismantled and all the books there were packed away. The library therefore comprises the many volumes col­lected through the years by the two families of John Dewey: the first, John and Alice Chipman Dewey and their children—Lucy, Evelyn, Jane, Fred, Gordon, and Sabino; the second, John and Roberta Dewey and their adopted children—Adrienne and John, Jr. In addition to the books signed or anno­tated by Dewey—well over a hundred have marginalia—or inscribed to him, a number of books with the names of other family members have been included in this checklist because evidence exists that Dewey also used them; others have been included because they were available for possible use. Only school textbooks have been excluded. The checklist is divided into two basic sections: works in English and works in other languages; entries in both sections are anno­tated to indicate Dewey’s notes, marginalia, inscriptions, and similar information. Beyond its use as a research tool, both in editing the Collected Works and in verifying Dewey’s references, this checklist of Dewey’s library provides interesting, often important, insights into his life and work. (shrink)

_Ideology and Utopia_ argues that ideologies are mental fictions whose function is to veil the true nature of a given society. They originate unconsciously in the minds of those who seek to stabilise a social order. Utopias are wish dreams that inspire the collective action of opposition groups which aim at the entire transformation of society. Mannheim shows these two opposing elements to dominate not only our social thought but even unexpectedly to penetrate into the most scientific theories in philosophy, (...) history and the social sciences. This new edition contains a new preface by Bryan S. Turner which describes Mannheim's work and critically assesses its relevance to modern sociology. The book is published with a comprehensive bibliography of Mannheim's major works. (shrink)

With mention of Ogden and Richards' The Meaning of Meaning, and drawing on Mailinowski, for an opening example, Dewey argues for the importance of the relationship of interpretation and meaning, to context and and situation of usage or utterance. In this article, Dewey expounds, among other themes, on the the prospect of interpretation of a radically alien language and what this prospect tells us about linguistic meaning.

"A modern classic. Dewey's lectures have lost none of their vigor...The historical approach, which underlay the central argument, is beautifully exemplified in his treatments of the origin of philosophy."-- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research "It was with this book that Dewey fully launched his campaign for experimental philosophy."-- The New Republic Written by an eminent philosopher shortly after the shattering effects of World War I, this volume offers an insightful introduction to the concept of pragmatic humanism. Dewey presents persuasive arguments against (...) traditional philosophical constructs, suggesting their basis in self-justification. He proposes, instead, an examination of core values in terms of their ultimate effects on the self and others. This experimental philosophy was received with both outrage and acclaim for daring to mingle ethics and science. Delivered in 1919 as a series of lectures, Dewey's landmark work appears here in an enlarged edition that features an informative introduction by the author, written more than 25 years after the book's initial publication. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

The first edition of this book profoundly challenged and divided students of philosophy, sociology, and the history of science when it was published in 1976. In this second edition, Bloor responds in a substantial new Afterword to the heated debates engendered by his book.

Argues that Nietzsche tried to create a specific literary character in his writings and discusses the paradoxes of his work.

The esteemed psychologist and thinker John Dewey headed for previously unexplored philosophical territory with this influential work. Written shortly after World War I, it embodies Dewey's system of pragmatic humanism and maintains that individuals can attain "a more ordered and intelligent happiness" by reconsidering the ultimate effects of their deepest beliefs and feelings. With its promise of achieving an understanding of the past and attaining a brighter future, Reconstruction in Philosophy remains ever relevant. "A modern classic." — Philosophy and Phenomenological (...) Research. (shrink)

The disagreement of philosophers is notorious. In this book, Rescher develops a theory that accounts for this conflict and shows how the basis for philosophical disagreement roots in divergent 'cognitive values'-values regarding matters such as importance, centrality, and priority. In light of this analysis, Rescher maintains that, despite this inevitable discord, a skeptical or indifferentist reaction to traditional philosophy is not warranted, seeing that genuine value-conflicts are at issue. He argues that philosophy is an important and worthwhile enterprise, notwithstanding its (...) inability to achieve rationally constrained consensus on the issues. Given the nature of the enterprise, consensus is not a realistic goal, and failure to achieve it is not a defect. Accordingly, Rescher argues against the revisionist views proposed by Richard Rorty and Robert Nozick. His discussions are devoted to providing a clear view of why philosophical problems arise and how philosophers address them. (shrink)

In a recent paper I criticized the pragmatist theory of truth from the frame of reference of modern logical positivism. By showing the similarity between Karl Mannheim's claims of epistemological relevance for sociology of knowledge and certain pragmatist notions concerning truth I made criticism of the latter with the former. The aim of this present paper is to extend and elaborate upon those critical remarks regarding pragmatism both in order to answer objections raised since and to clarify what was said (...) there. Moreover, the evaluation of the pragmatist theory of truth may have been surprising to some since so much lately has been made of the points of agreement between pragmatism and modern positivism. It is thus also my intent to delimit agreements and disagreements and compare the respective emphases in pragmatist and positivist thought concerning the nature of truth. (shrink)

Since Protagoras' classic “man is the measure of all things,” claims of relativism and counter-claims have been tendered. The nineteenth century saw Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Westermarck, Pareto, Marx, and others, suggesting that institutions, customs, moral codes, and the like, are “relative” both to the culture and to the time. At the crest of this wave of “relativism” surged a vicious claim: that truth and knowledge itself were merely functions of particular conditions. The “validity” of knowledge was said to be at the (...) whim of historic, social factors. Not only is no theory really true; no particular statement is ever so. Not only is no theory or statement really true; no theory of knowledge has thus far ever been free from the bias of its genesis. There have been no absolute insights for epistemology. Or so, at least, it was claimed. (shrink)

Forty-three years ago Max Weber observed that “the belief in the value of scientific truth is not derived from nature but is a product of definite cultures.” We may now add: and this belief is readily transmuted into doubt or disbelief. The persistent development of science occurs only in societies of a certain order, subject to a peculiar complex of tacit presuppositions and institutional constraints. What is for us a normal phenomenon which demands no explanation and secures many ‘self-evident’ cultural (...) values, has been in other times and still is in many places abnormal and infrequent. The continuity of science requires the active participation of interested and capable persons in scientific pursuits. This support of science is assured only by appropriate cultural conditions. It is, then, important to examine those controls which motivate scientific careers, which select and give prestige to certain scientific disciplines and reject or blur others. It will become evident that changes in institutional structure may curtail, modify or possibly prevent the pursuit of science. (shrink)