Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology.Sanford Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   104 citations  
  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2565 citations  
  • Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics.Onora O'Neill - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
    Why has autonomy been a leading idea in philosophical writing on bioethics, and why has trust been marginal? In this important book, Onora O'Neill suggests that the conceptions of individual autonomy so widely relied on in bioethics are philosophically and ethically inadequate, and that they undermine rather than support relations of trust. She shows how Kant's non-individualistic view of autonomy provides a stronger basis for an approach to medicine, science and biotechnology, and does not marginalize untrustworthiness, while also explaining why (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   243 citations  
  • The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   711 citations  
  • Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   972 citations  
  • Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
    Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  • The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):91-107.
    Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for further attitudes, such as admiration, and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The uses of aesthetic testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.
    The current debate over aesthetic testimony typically focuses on cases of doxastic repetition — where, when an agent, on receiving aesthetic testimony that p, acquires the belief that p without qualification. I suggest that we broaden the set of cases under consideration. I consider a number of cases of action from testimony, including reconsidering a disliked album based on testimony, and choosing an artistic educational institution from testimony. But this cannot simply be explained by supposing that testimony is usable for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • What Is Trust?Thomas W. Simpson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):550-569.
    Trust is difficult to define. Instead of doing so, I propose that the best way to understand the concept is through a genealogical account. I show how a root notion of trust arises out of some basic features of what it is for humans to live socially, in which we rely on others to act cooperatively. I explore how this concept acquires resonances of hope and threat, and how we analogically apply this in related but different contexts. The genealogical account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
    Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Personal Style and Artistic Style.Nick Riggle - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):711-731.
    What is it for a person to have style? Philosophers working in action theory, ethics, and aesthetics are surprisingly quiet on this question. I begin by considering whether theories of artistic style shed any light on it. Many philosophers, artists, and art historians are attracted to some version of the view that artistic style is the expression of personality. I clarify this view and argue that it is implausible for both artistic style and, suitably modified, personal style. In fact, both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Frauds, Posers And Sheep: A Virtue Theoretic Solution To The Acquaintance Debate.Madeleine Ransom - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):417-434.
    The acquaintance debate in aesthetics has been traditionally divided between pessimists, who argue that testimony does not provide others with aesthetic knowledge of artworks, and optimists, who hold that acquaintance with an artwork is not a necessary precondition for acquiring aesthetic knowledge. In this paper I propose a reconciliationist solution to the acquaintance debate: while aesthetic knowledge can be had via testimony, aesthetic judgment requires acquaintance with the artwork. I develop this solution by situating it within a virtue aesthetics framework (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.
    Thomas Hurka, Simon Keller, and Julia Annas have recently argued that virtue ethics is self-effacing. I contend that these arguments are rooted in a mistaken understanding of the role that ideal agency and agent flourishing (should) play in virtue ethics. I then show how a virtue ethical theory can avoid the charge of self-effacement and why it is important that it do so.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Competition as cooperation.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (1):123-137.
    Games have a complex, and seemingly paradoxical structure: they are both competitive and cooperative, and the competitive element is required for the cooperative element to work out. They are mechanisms for transforming competition into cooperation. Several contemporary philosophers of sport have located the primary mechanism of conversion in the mental attitudes of the players. I argue that these views cannot capture the phenomenological complexity of game-play, nor the difficulty and moral complexity of achieving cooperation through game-play. In this paper, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Autonomy and Aesthetic Engagement.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1127-1156.
    There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Aesthetic testimony: What can we learn from others about beauty and art?Aaron Meskin - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):65–91.
    The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted--even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. This Kantian position is mistaken. Some testimony about beauty and artistic value can provide a degree of aesthetic justification and, perhaps, even knowledge. That is, there are cases in which one can be justified in making an aesthetic judgment purely on the basis of someone else's testimony. But widespread aesthetic unreliability creates a problem for much aesthetic testimony. Hence, most (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • How to be an optimist about aesthetic testimony.Rachel McKinnon - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):177-196.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On the Rational Power of Aesthetic Testimony.Errol Lord - 2016 - British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (1):1-13.
    Can one know aesthetic facts on the basis of testimony? Optimists say that we can. Pessimists say that we cannot. Daniel Whiting has recently put forth a new argument for pessimism about the epistemic power of aesthetic testimony. He seeks to establish pessimism by arguing that testimonial beliefs cannot justify the downstream reactions that would otherwise be justified if one had aesthetic knowledge. In this paper, I will show that there is a plausible alternative explanation of the data that Whiting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Myth of (Non-aesthetic) Artistic Value.Dominic McIver Lopes - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):518-536.
    Art works realize many values. According to tradition, not all of these values are characteristic of art: art works characteristically bear aesthetic value. Breaking with tradition, some now say that art works bear artistic value, as distinct from aesthetic value. I argue that there is no characteristic artistic value distinct from aesthetic value. The argument for this thesis suggests a new way to think about aesthetic value as it is characteristically realized by works of art.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • On an apparent truism in aesthetics.Paisley Nathan Livingston - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (3):260-278.
    It has often been claimed that adequate aesthetic judgements must be grounded in the appreciator's first-hand experience of the item judged. Yet this apparent truism is misleading if adequate aesthetic judgements can instead be based on descriptions of the item or on acquaintance with some surrogate for it. In a survey of responses to such challenges to the apparent truism, I identify several contentions presented in its favour, including stipulative definitions of ‘aesthetic judgement’, assertions about conceptual gaps between determinate aesthetic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • A Modest Defense of Aesthetic Testimony.Brian Laetz - 2008 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (4):355-363.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Virtue ethics is self-effacing.Simon Keller - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):221 – 231.
    An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts. In his influential paper 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' [1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be self-effacing, if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker's argument is often taken to provide a reason to give up consequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   239 citations  
  • Trustworthiness.Karen Jones - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):61-85.
    I present and defend an account of three-place trustworthiness according to which B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on. This is not the whole story of trustworthiness, however, for we want those we can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding.Sherri Irvin - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):283-304.
    Prominent philosophical accounts of artistic forgery have neglected a central aspect of the aesthetic harm it perpetrates. To be properly understood, forgery must be seen in the context of our ongoing attempts to augment our aesthetic understanding in conditions of uncertainty. The bootstrapping necessary under these conditions requires a highly refined comprehension of historical context. By creating artificial associations among aesthetically relevant qualities and misrepresenting historical relationships, undetected forgeries stunt or distort aesthetic understanding. The effect of this may be quite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Kant, Quasi‐Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement.Robert Hopkins - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166-189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one’s mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony.Robert Hopkins - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):138-157.
    Is testimony a legitimate source of aesthetic belief? Can I, for instance, learn that a film is excellent on your say-so? Optimists say yes, pessimists no. But pessimism comes in two forms. One claims that testimony is not a legitimate source of aesthetic belief because it cannot yield aesthetic knowledge. The other accepts that testimony can be a source of aesthetic knowledge, yet insists that some further norm prohibits us from exploiting that resource. I argue that this second form of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
    Can we decide to trust? Sometimes, yes. And when we do, we need not believe that our trust will be vindicated. This paper is motivated by the need to incorporate these facts into an account of trust. Trust involves reliance; and in addition it requires the taking of a reactive attitude to that reliance. I explain how the states involved here differ from belief. And I explore the limits of our ability to trust. I then turn to the idea of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   228 citations  
  • Trust, Distrust and Commitment.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):1-20.
    I outline a number of parallels between trust and distrust, emphasising the significance of situations in which both trust and distrust would be an imposition upon the (dis)trustee. I develop an account of both trust and distrust in terms of commitment, and argue that this enables us to understand the nature of trustworthiness. Note that this article is available open access on the journal website.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   94 citations  
  • Art Criticism as Practical Reasoning.Anthony Cross - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (3):299-317.
    Most recent discussions of reasons in art criticism focus on reasons that justify beliefs about the value of artworks. Reviving a long-neglected suggestion from Paul Ziff, I argue that we should focus instead on art-critical reasons that justify actions—namely, particular ways of engaging with artworks. I argue that a focus on practical rather than theoretical reasons yields an understanding of criticism that better fits with our intuitions about the value of reading art criticism, and which makes room for a nuanced (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • High and low thinking about high and low art.Ted Cohen - 1993 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (2):151-156.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The acquaintance principle.Malcolm Budd - 2003 - British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (4):386-392.
    The Acquaintance Principle maintains that aesthetic knowledge must be acquired through first-hand experience of the object of knowledge and cannot be transmitted from person to person. This implies that aesthetic knowledge of an object cannot be acquired either from an accurate description of the non- aesthetic features of the object or from reliable testimony of its aesthetic character. The question I address is whether there is any sound argument in support of the Principle. I give scant consideration to the possibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Trust and antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   500 citations  
  • Virtue ethics and the charge of egoism.Julia Annas - 2007 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    There are problems with egoism as a theory, but what matters here is the point that intuitively ethics is thought to be about the good of others, so that focusing on your own good seems wrong from the start. Virtues are not just character traits, however, since forgetfulness or stubbornness are not virtues. Virtues are character traits which are in some way desirable. Criticism is generally renewed at this point on the grounds that claims about flourishing are now including claims (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Artifacts and Their Functions.A. W. Eaton - 2020 - In Sarah Anne Carter & Ivan Gaskell (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of History and Material Culture. Oxford University Press.
    How do artifacts get their functions? It is typically thought that an artifact’s function depends on its maker’s intentions. This chapter argues that this common understanding is fatally flawed. Nor can artifact function be understood in terms of current uses or capacities. Instead, it proposes that we understand artifact function on the etiological model that Ruth Millikan and others have proposed for the biological realm. This model offers a robustly normative conception of function, but it does so naturalistically by employing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value.Dominic Lopes - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    For centuries, philosophers have identified beauty with what brings pleasure. Dominic McIver Lopes challenges this interpretation by offering an entirely new theory of beauty - that beauty engages us in action, in concert with others, in the context of social networks - and sheds light on why aesthetic engagement is crucial for quality of life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Trust as an unquestioning attitude.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • On Being Awesome: A Unified Theory of How Not to Suck.Nick Riggle - 2017 - New York: Penguin Books.
    I develop a theory of social virtue around the concept of a "social opening" and argue that a range of contemporary terms track various modes of success and failure with respect to social openings: ‘awesome’, ‘down’, ‘chill’, ‘sucks’, ‘wack’, ‘lame’, ‘douchebag’, and others. A basic idea is that the normative character of contemporary social life cannot be fully understood in traditional philosophical terms: ‘obligation’, ‘demand’, ‘duty’, ‘right’, ‘just’, ‘requirement’. ‘Sucks’ and ‘awesome’ (and their ilk) capture a special mode of interpersonal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Norms of Belief and Norms of Assertion in Aesthetics.Jon Robson - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Why is it that we cannot legitimately make certain aesthetic assertions – for instance that ‘Guernica is harrowing’ or that ‘The Rite of Spring is strangely beautiful’ – on the basis of testimony alone? In this paper I consider a species of argument intended to demonstrate that the best explanation for the impermissibility of such assertions is that a particular view of the norms of aesthetic belief – pessimism concerning aesthetic testimony – is correct. I begin by outlining the strongest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Virtue, Vice and Value.Thomas Hurka - 2004 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 194 (3):351-351.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations